Land Warfare - ASLAV: Are we overtasking this willing workhorse? | ADM Oct 08
The versatile ASLAV has borne the brunt of the Army’s armoured mobility tasking through active service deployments in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and has proved to be an exceptionally reliable and hardy vehicle. But questions are being raised about the value of the mid-life upgrade now under consideration.
Tom Muir
The Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) has been acquired and enhanced under a multi-phased project, Land 112.
Under its first phase 15 USMC LAVs were brought over in 1989 for testing and evaluation.
Following selection in 1992, 113 ASLAVs were acquired under Phase 2 with deliveries beginning in 1995.
Under Phase 3 a further 144 ASLAVs were ordered, deliveries of which were completed in late 2004.
That same phase included the upgrade of the original vehicles to match the evolved capabilities of the Phase 3 build versions.
These enhancements to offensive capabilities and crew protection, included new electric turret drives, improved thermal sights, integrated laser range finder, second generation drive line and new suspension components.
In preparation for their first deployment to Iraq in 2003 ten ASLAVs were equipped with Kongsberg Remote Weapon Stations (RWS) and spall liners.
Similar ‘rapid acquisition’ upgrades followed the announcement in early 2005 that an additional 40 ASLAV vehicles would be deployed to Iraq by May 2005.
Of the 62 ASLAVs deployed since 2005 to the Middle East, all the ASLAV-PC’s have been fitted with Protector Remote Weapon Station (RWS) mounting the 12.7mm heavy machine gun.
Seal Solutions supported the rapid acquisition of the 59 systems acquired mostly for ASLAV operation in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This involved design engineering to integrate the RWS while meeting all the ADF’s safety and suitability requirements.
The vehicles also received improved protection, through being fitted with bar armour and internal spall liners to better withstand blast, small-arms hits and fragmentation.
This ‘rapid acquisition’ work had to be done very quickly and under difficult circumstances, with much of the installation being conducted in Iraq or Kuwait.
This required significant project management and engineering effort and required civilian contractors to move to Kuwait.
And while this is testimony to the excellent cooperation between Defence and industry, with special mention of GDLS-A (RWS and bar armour), Armatec (spall liners) and Seal on getting an urgent job done, it was also testimony to the urgent need to improve the crew’s protection in what was proving to be a far from benign working environment.
Phase 4 midlife upgrade
Phase 4, the survivability enhancement and midlife upgrade of the ASLAV fleet received first pass approval in 2006.
According to the latest Defence Capability Plan, Phase 4 may include such possible enhancements as mine protection, ballistic protection, BMS integration, signature management and a defensive aid suite (jammer).
The additional weight from these enhancements will need to be offset and the motive power increased to handle a heavier vehicle.
A Systems Design and Development (SDD) activity is currently being conducted to investigate options to enhance the survivability and situational awareness of the ASLAV.
The SDD stage is principally a prototyping activity aimed at reducing the risk involved in the production and introduction into service of the phase 4 solution.
Two design studies have been undertaken so far to determine options for upgrading the platform’s survivability.
According to Defence these studies, and an analysis with GDLS-A last year, have helped develop a robust set of requirements and the identification of other ballistic and mineblast protection options.
These have been reviewed and Defence’s expectation is that a viable solution will be presented for second pass approval.
Our understanding is that the OEM, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), has proposed a comprehensive solution to the Phase 4 requirements that includes mine blast protection through mine protection covers under the rear two axles, and enhanced ballistic and fragmentation protection with applique aluminium armour and extended spall systems.
The powerpack would be upgraded and remanufactured to zero km and a multi-spectral camouflage system offered for signature management.
Crew protection
The protection of soldiers is an issue of mounting (and proper) concern within Defence and crew protection requirements - particularly those that arrive as afterthoughts - are costly features of major projects such as the artillery and the Army’s vehicle replacement programs.
As we have noted enhancing ASLAV survivability and providing further crew protection is a major aspect of Land 112 Phase 4.
It is also tacit acknowledgement that the vehicle’s patrol tasks on reconnaissance and surveillance missions, and the carriage of troops, are now frontline activities in view of the growing threat from IEDs.
While the Chief of the Defence Force properly lauds our forces in Afghanistan with brave words about ‘taking the fight to the Taliban’ the majority of the mounting casualties among foreign troops - 184 in the first eight months of this year - were victims of roadside or improvised bomb attacks while on patrol.
And it would seem that the use of this effective, asymmetric weapon, will be more widely adopted by low-level insurgencies, including in our own region.
In October last year, tasked with clearing a route on a tactical reconnaissance operation, the driver of an ASLAV was killed instantly and the crew commander injured, when a mine/IED, exploded under the front left wheel of their vehicle.
This occurred only 6km from the Australian-Dutch Forward Operating Base (FOB Russell) in an area dubbed ‘IED alley’ due to the prevalence of Taliban laid IEDs
The official report stated that the vehicle was immobilised, sustaining significant damage to its left front wheel system, external hull and forward interior.
The injury radius was confined to driver and crew commander areas and passengers in the rear compartment were not injured.
In view of the foregoing it is important that Second Pass proposal for Phase 4 - if it ever gets up - clarifies the role of the upgraded platform and, in light of its vulnerability to powerful land mines/IEDs, mandates effective mine resistant measures for the protection of all crew and not just those in the rear compartment.
On the capabilities of the ASLAV, recent military blogs are illuminating:
They are VERY good at recon (sneak in, spot the enemy, sneak out to warn the general and run like hell under cover of arty if you’re spotted) as is their capability as a screening force, both front and flanks, for larger units.
They are very good in that role and capable of operating over large areas.
But again, once you spot the bad guys, call for artillery support and run like hell.
They have some capability at slash-and-run raids but not stand-and-fight battles.
If ASLAV is being tasked beyond its specified role, as a protected troop carrier for instance, rather than long range reconnaissance, then perhaps consideration should be given to bringing Land 400 forward so that our infantry have the high levels of protection necessary when moving forward in combined operations.
Battle groups in combined operations
How are assets to be ordered to form a Battle Group for a specific mission or situation?
SASR can conduct Long Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance, 4RAR CDO being part of the wider SF fraternity can conduct Raid, the Cavalry Regiments can conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Infantry Battalions can conduct Close Combat and seize and hold ground, as indeed can the Armoured Regiment.
If the IED/RPG or anti-armoured threat is high, an Armoured heavy BG may need to be employed, of if there is a high threat level from suicide bombers the BG may be Infantry heavy to conduct saturation patrols, and cordons and searches.
The upgraded M113AS (even with belly plates should they be acquired) will be sufficient for another East Timor situation, but will fall well short of combined operations in a joint setting especially if it is to be with coalition forces.
The Land 400 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (the M113AS is not that), will provide protected mobility to close combat troops, from the FUP (forming up point) to the LD (Line of Departure) so the dismounted troops can conduct the fight through to the LOE (limit of exploitation).
The M113 upgrade was never meant to produce an IFV.
The L400 Mission Statement highlights the five characteristics of the Combat Vehicle System (CVS) which it sees as a vital part of the combined arms team: superior mobility; knowledge; survivability; lethality and sustainability.
These characteristics should enable the CVS to ‘fight and win in open and complex terrain across the full spectrum of possible missions. Current operations reinforce this need.’
L400 then goes on to state that ‘current combat vehicle systems and their planned upgrades are adequate for mid-term operational scenarios but will become increasingly vulnerable to future threats, and increasingly expensive to operate.’
It seems to us that current combat vehicle systems and their planned upgrades are not only inadequate for mid-term operational scenarios, (assuming mid-term to be five or seven years hence) but are little more than borderline in terms of the protection and fighting capabilities they now provide for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As to timing, L400 sees the life of type of current land fighting vehicle systems, (ASLAV and M113AS) as being around 2020 but that replacement of some elements of the system could begin in 2015.
But combat vehicle systems in today’s threat environment is surely a misnomer.
The ASLAV is a reconnaissance vehicle and as such does not offer anywhere near the protection levels mandated in current projects such as Land 17.
While the ASLAV platform has the versatility to accommodate a variety of roles including ASLAV-PC, a properly protected armoured personnel carrier (APC) isn’t one of them.
Nor will the upgrade proposed under Land 112 (ASLAV Enhancement) which, although it leans heavily to mineblast and ballistic protection, is compromised by weight increases that limit its current amphibious and land mobility.
As to the M113AS, we are faced with a system that flies in the face of modern combat vehicle technology exemplified by infantry fighting vehicles such as the KMW Puma and the Artec Boxer, or others in the UK’s current crop of FRES contenders, as well as the manned and unmanned systems being dreamed up for the US Future Combat System program.
Fast track L400 elements?
Should we not use L400 to fast track the acquisition of its priority capability the Infantry Fighting Vehicle before getting bogged down in the definition, evaluation, testing and acquisition of the project’s other capabilities of lesser importance?
We don’t need an officially endorsed future force structure to know that M1A1 firepower alone isn’t going to win any battles without suitably protected infantry moving up in close formation.
An important issue is that, unlike the incumbent fleet, these advanced platforms are suited to the incorporation of smart technologies available for mission role systems, including surveillance, C2, battle management systems and communications.
The rolling acquisition of a manageable number of systems a year, to ease doctrinal, training and support aspects of their introduction into service, could be linked to ongoing improvements in the form of spiral development that provides for the insertion of upgrades as new technologies and new requirements develop and come on-line over time.
The ADF will then have the capabilities to meet and defeat the kind of adversary exemplified in the Army’s own Complex Warfighting doctrine.
As we have seen in Afghanistan engagements, these are able to remain below the detection threshold until committed to engagement. In prosecuting such adversaries, land combat forces must be sufficiently protected to survive first strikes and be able to respond rapidly in order to regain combat initiative.