• The White Paper made it clear the ARH Tiger will definitely be replaced. Credit: Defence
    The White Paper made it clear the ARH Tiger will definitely be replaced. Credit: Defence
  • In order to support OneSKY, Defence is seeking approval from the Public Works Committee to deliver new and upgraded infrastructure to several air traffic management bases across Australia. Credit: Airservices Australia
    In order to support OneSKY, Defence is seeking approval from the Public Works Committee to deliver new and upgraded infrastructure to several air traffic management bases across Australia. Credit: Airservices Australia
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Once again the ANAO has come out with some cracking reports, this time on the Tiger ARH, an update from their first effort in 2005, and one on the OneSky procurement process thus far for a combined Defence/civil air traffic management system.

Katherine Ziesing | Canberra

Tiger, as seen in the link above, has had a troubled birth into the ADF. After almost eight years in service it only reached Final Operational Capability this year and even then has significant caveats on operations. These include, the Electronic Warfare Self-Protection System, Identification Friend or Foe System and Communication and Mission Planning System.

There were also several shortfalls between the initial Government approvals given in 2001 and the capability realised when FOC was declared in 2016. The shortfalls related to aircraft availability, rate of effort and the threat environment in which the Tiger can operate.


 

"While none of this is news to those who have been following the program, it does make uncomfortable reading for Army, CASG and of Airbus Group Australia Pacific."

 


The key findings of the report are:

  • As at April 2016, the Tiger also had 76 capability deficiencies relating to Army’s current and future operational requirements, 60 of which were deemed by Defence to be critical. Other key limitations relate to shipborne operations, pilot flying hours, interoperability and communications, airworthiness, and the roof-mounted sight.
  • To date, sustainment costs have exceeded the original contract value. The 15-year (2004–2019) sustainment contract provided for expenditure of $571 million. That sum was expended by June 2014, and expenditure as at June 2016 was $921 million.
  • As at June 2016, the cost per flying hour for the Tiger fleet was $30,335, compared to a target of $20,000. The long-term average was $39,472 per hour. Defence negotiated a cost cap to control sustainment cost growth in 2014.
  • On average only 3.5 aircraft of the operational fleet (16 aircraft) were serviceable at 10am on any given day in 2015, against a target of 12 aircraft.

While none of this is news to those who have been following the program, it does make uncomfortable reading for Army, CASG and of Airbus Group Australia Pacific.

Both Defence and of Airbus Group Australia Pacific have acknowledged the accuracy of the report but a statement from Airbus argues that it does not give the full story about where the program is now:

“The efforts to improve the levels of serviceable aircraft now focuses on the reliability of some systems, maintenance burden reduction and optimisation of support arrangements in the Operational Unit. 

“Both CASG and Army have expressed their support for the initiatives and acknowledge the improvement plans which are in place. It is the view of Airbus Group Australia Pacific that the Extract does not provide a balanced view of the Tiger ARH as it does not appreciate the significant improvements which have been made in the past two years nor the positive trend of all support key performance indicators”.

OneSky

The ANAO report into OneSky was specific in its aims: “to examine whether Airservices Australia has effective procurement arrangements in place, with a particular emphasis on whether consultancy contracts entered into with International Centre for Complex Project Management (ICCPM) in association with the OneSKY Australia project were effectively administered”.


 

"In a nutshell, the ANAO was not impressed about the lack of competitive tendering used by the agency."

 


This report is the first of two into the issues surrounding the program that has cost several high profile jobs in Airservices. The second performance audit will examine the conduct of the OneSKY Australia tender process from initiation to finalisation of the selection and contracting process, with a focus on the achievement of value with public resources in accordance with appropriate probity protocols. The consideration of any probity impacts on the tender process will be examined within the scope of the second audit.

In order to support OneSKY, Defence is seeking approval from the Public Works Committee to deliver new and upgraded infrastructure to several air traffic management bases across Australia. Credit: Airservices Australia

Credit: Airservices Australia

In a nutshell, the ANAO was not impressed about the lack of competitive tendering used by the agency:

“In addition, Airservices routinely failed to adhere to its policies and procedures in procuring services from ICCPM. As a result, Airservices’ procurement of services from ICCPM, on an exclusively sole-sourced basis, did not deliver value for money,” the report concluded.

The issue came to head in a Senate committee hearing where the following matters were raised:

  • the engagement of a member of the ICCPM Board to undertake the Lead Negotiator role involving contract negotiations with the successful tenderer Thales, whose managing director Chris Jenkins was also (then) Chair of the ICCPM Board; and
  • the role of an Airservices employee (and former ICCPM employee and subcontractor to Airservices) in recommending approval of a substantial extension to a contracting arrangement with ICCPM, given his spouse’s role as ICCPM managing director and CEO.

ADM will stay tuned for the second ANAO report into the $1.5 billion program.

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