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One of the things that I love most about working at ADM is that there is always something new to report on, be it a new technology, a new company, a new program or a new policy. There is always the chance to go back and give some context to these new developments but in the main, it’s the new things that make the magazine.

But in this case, it was the reflection on where we’ve been that really struck me this month. Tom Muir provides what he has humbly called JP2072: A potted history on P24. He traces the program with its many phases back to first principles to see what has changed, what went right and what has gone wrong over its decade-long existence. I must admit to learning more about this program that I thought I knew pretty well. I hope it educates you as well.

With that in mind, it can be easy to look at the litany of long-term programs that Defence has on the books and wonder where did the delay come from? Programs that have multiple phases, incorporate new technology or doctrine or even those that have just had stops and starts along the way are all part of our acquisition and sustainment profile. JP2072 is but one of many in this regard.

But there are always reasons for these delays or rescoping, many of them sound when the decision was made despite the 20/20 hindsight that we now possess. Sometimes it can be due to changing requirements. Afghanistan and Iraq taught the ADF the importance of protection when it came to soldiers and vehicles.

Other times, the interaction with other programs is just too much for the proposed schedule to bear. Which communication standard do we use? What other programs have to be in place before this can be introduced into service? I remember talking to the JP2072 program manager some years ago at an industry brief where he casually mentioned that he had to keep up to date with 42 other programs across all services to make sure he was interoperable with all of them. Now put that in a joint or coalition context. Our friend complexity comes to the fore.

The DMO has pointed out in numerous reports that when it comes to managing complex programs, they do pretty well compared with other complex industries and even other nations. And in many regards they do. The majority of their programs do come in on time and even under budget. Small simple programs, which are the bulk of their work, should.

It’s when other factors come into play that the process fails the people that have to uphold the process. Success does not consist in never making mistakes but in never making the same one a second time, according to George Bernard Shaw, Irish playwright and a co-founder of the London School of Economics. Defence prides itself on being a learning organisation.

Mistakes are learnt from but we’re finding new and better ways to make new and different mistakes. For example, I do question whether making minor programs under $20 million go through the two pass process is a worthwhile use of time and money.  What is the value in this decision? Where is the business case that explains why this is a good move for the end user or taxpayer?

Both the ADF and DMO have learnt a lot in the past decade after a high operational tempo that tested both organisations. Both have a lot to be proud of. And both are entering a new phase of their organisational lives; budgets are tighter and paperwork is mounting.

The corporate memory of both will be tested when it comes to dealing with the implications of both these factors. Defence is in touch with a lot of its grey beard community through various associations and the DMO is also reaching out through the gate review system to tap into the experience that lies outside its doors. These are both excellent initiatives that will help them deal with whatever the future may hold.

To swear off making mistakes is easy; just don’t have any new ideas and the bravery to test them. I’m all for mistakes here and there. But do it early and cheaply if you can. Innovation does not come from taking the safe road. Some of the best capabilities that the DMO has delivered to the ADF, particularly in the past decade, have not taken the safe road. They have paid for it in both time and money (and even reputation). And the world didn’t end.

As a keen observer, I say go forth and make some new mistakes. Just make sure you learn from them. 

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