For a Sea Power edition of ADM you might find it a little strange that there is no feature article on anything to do with submarines, the topic de jour in the maritime world. This was a very deliberate decision on my part; the huge levels of uncertainty surrounding the program is almost paralysing. We do, however, have a news story on the following page updating readers on the state of play of the program and some of the responses to the path the government has outlined.
The path of the future submarine is mired more in politics and jobs than the capabilities that an evolution of the Collins class would bring the Navy, Defence and stated aims of national security concerns. I do not say this with any pleasure as someone who follows defence both professionally as a journalist and personally as a taxpayer. The complete avoidance of the term ‘tender’ by Defence Minister Kevin Andrews or any other government member is concerning. What’s wrong with a tender? What is the difference between a competitive evaluation process and a tender that makes the minister hesitate to even use the dreaded ‘t’ word?
At the ADM Congress last month, DMO’s head of submarine David Gould outlined how he saw the program coming together and how no boat currently on the market could meet Australian requirements which had now been confirmed. Regardless of who wins whatever form of competition the government runs, there needs to be substantial design work undertaken for the new Australianised design, Gould summarised. I also understand that any design that involves more than a 10 per cent deviation from an existing design is effectively a new boat. That being said, Australia is getting a new boat. It may have DNA from France, Germany or Japan but it IS a new boat, make no mistake. Once again, the RAN will be a parent navy to an orphan boat. We’ve come down this road once before and know that it is bumpy. But name me a submarine project globally that has been smooth sailing from start to finish. One only has to listen to any of the ‘lessons learned’ speeches from the US, UK or Europe or attended any previous Submarine Institute of Australia conferences to know that large and costly mistakes have been made.
Navantia, for example, failed the key submarine test - that of neutral buoyancy on the S-80. A submarine is a boat that should sink but also rise again. In May 2013, Navantia announced that a serious weight imbalance design flaw had been identified which will delay the delivery of the first submarine to the Spanish Navy until possibly 2017. Excess weight of 75 - 100 tonnes had been added to the sub during construction and the current design is not able to resurface after diving. A former Spanish official says the problem can be traced to a miscalculation — someone apparently put a decimal point in the wrong place or by the addition of new technologic devices. Lengthening the submarine would create additional buoyancy, though at a cost of €7.5 million per metre. At this point, the S-80 is a black hole of funding that may be beyond repair, requiring designers to literally go back to the drawing board.
Submarines are the most complex asset that any defence force can build, own and operate. The environment in which they operate is unforgiving. Submariners know that if they operate beyond a certain depth and, God forbid, something goes wrong with the boat, they must make their peace with the world.
Do we really want to go down a path where we opt for a political decision rather than one based on capability? The perception that the procurement process thus far has been flawed is an understatement. The announcement that only Japan (who has never exported a military capability let alone one as complex as a submarine), France (take a nuclear boat and then remove the nuclear bit) and the Germans (a credible but paper boat in the Type 216) was also a surprise. What happened to Sweden? Kockums, designer of the Collins class, is now under new management with Saab, at the direction of the Swedish government. The Swedes have gone to great efforts at all levels of defence, government and industry to explain their offering to Australia. Yet they have been left out of the competition at this relatively early stage. What is stopping the government from including them in the competitive evaluation process? Let them put forward their best effort and it can be included or excluded based on the merit of that plan rather than history and politics.
Governments of both colours over the past decade have woefully neglected this important strategic asset. Navy has been extremely quiet in all this debate about the fate of its submarine capability. It is time for the Silent Service to make some noise.
This article first appeared in Australian Defence Magazine VOL.23 No.3, March 2015