Submarines: Future Submarines: Timing and technology | ADM November 2012

The opaque process by which information is being gathered and analysed to inform government on the broad options for Australia’s Future Submarine program is moving into areas of greater detail, boosted in part by the $214 million allocated to Sea 1000 in the May budget.

With First Pass currently scheduled for late 2013-early 2014, a variety of sources familiar with the program say the Program Office is on track to timorously provide the National Security Committee of Cabinet with the information necessary for it to narrow down the options on which work should proceed.

This ongoing work will be aided by receipt before the end of the year of the government’s statement of strategic intent – what it wants the submarines to do, where, when, how, and over what duration.

The top-secret document, in preparation at the time of ADM going to press, will expand on and prioritise some if not all of the aspirational requirements included in the 2009 Defence White Paper.

Given Defence Minister Stephen Smith’s comments on the strategic situation to the Lowy Institute in September, these seem unlikely to be varied to any significant extent by the conclusions of the new White Paper due early next year.

Contender elements

The choices for the Future Submarine remain either a Military-off-the-Shelf (MOTS) conventionally-powered European submarine – the French DCNS Scorpene, German HDW Type 214, or the Spanish Navantia S-80 – a modified MOTS, an evolved MOTS which would include a major redesign and development of the in service Collins class, or an entirely new design. Although the S-80 has not yet been to sea, the Program Office is assuming it will have done so by the time of Second Pass approval.

Integral to First Pass is a decision on the combat system and weapons – whether to continue with the AN/BYG-1 (V) combat system and Mk 48 Mod 7 CBASS (Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System) heavyweight torpedo now equipping the Collins boats, or whether to leave open consideration of competing European and US systems.

To add to information already garnered, the Program Office has issued a Request for Information (RFI) to commercial submarine combat system houses and responses are expected before the end of the year.

In addition to the AN/BYG-1(V), these systems are understood to include Lockheed Martin’s SUBICS (installations in the Brazilian HDW Type 209, Spanish S-80); DCNS’ SUBTI CS (French, Chilean, Indian, Malaysian, Brazilian Scorpene; Pakistani Augosta 90B, Singaporean Archer); Kongsberg’s MSI-90U (Norwegian Ula), BAE Systems’ SMCS NG (UK Astute) and Atlas Elektronik’s ISUS-90 (80 systems to 12 navies).

Several of these are likely to have been included for the sake of completeness rather than for any realistic expectation of selection but all are in service, unlike the developmental and flawed Rockwell system that initially equipped the Collins class.

In general terms, weapons tend to be associated with the parent combat system and both generally come from the same country. This is exemplified by the AN/BYG-1(V) and CBASS torpedo, both of which are currently in service only with the US and Australian navies and remain part of successful bilateral development programs.

“If you drew a matrix that listed all the submarine options down one side and all the combat systems across the top, there’s a lot of no-go boxes,” commented one well informed source speaking on condition of anonymity. “It would be particularly difficult to try to put a French combat system in a German submarine, for example.

“A decision at First Pass to stick with the combat system and the weapon in which Australia has invested quite heavily will have some significant consequences in terms of what are the remaining viable submarine options.

“Likewise a decision not to do that but to keep open all the other combat system options would have a significant impact as well; the Program Office would have to do a significant amount of work on a very large number of system and platform options between First and Second Pass.”

Information flowing from the RFI and subsequent analysis should enable the Program Office to determine the practicality or otherwise of, for example, installing the AN/BYG-1(V) combat system and CBASS into a Modified or Evolved MOTS design.

This in turn will inform simultaneous or subsequent decisions on platform options.

A MOTS submarine would be precisely that – off-the-shelf, with the only modifications being those necessary to comply with Australian environmental, occupational health and safety and other legislation.

Evolved MOTS

Evaluation of the three European MOTS options is understood to be well-advanced, including broad estimates of the cost of the modifications and the effect these would have on performance. Being about two-thirds the size of Collins and not designed for an operating concept matching Australia’s geography inevitably means they will fall short of notional top-level requirements in several respects.

Nevertheless, their capabilities will be matched with their cost as an affordable option that would be available relatively quickly – particularly if an initial batch was to be constructed offshore while Australia’s own submarine-building resources were being reinvigorated.

As noted, a modified MOTS option revolves around the ability of the three MOTS types to incorporate alternative systems – in particular the AN/BYG-1(V) and CBASS.

Progressing an evolved MOTS design widens the choice since this could include lengthening the pressure hull of the inservice designs with a plug, creating space for enhanced capabilities and endurance. Changing the diameter of the hull would be regarded as a new rather than an evolved design.

The primary focus at this time with the Evolved option centres on the potential development of Collins, given Defence’s intimate knowledge of the type’s design, its capabilities and its systems – including the AN-YBG-1 (V).

This assessment is being carried out in conjunction with the Swedish original designer Kockums – now owned by the German multinational ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems who also own HDW, designer of the competing Type 214.

“It makes sense, Collins is the oldest design, it would need the greatest level of redesign work, so it’s also the one which would present probably the greatest risk to program and schedule and probably cost as well,” said one source familiar with the issues. “If the Project Office follows through on that it will have a pretty good idea of, if not the capability, certainly the schedule and risk and cost profile of the others, and they would all be less.”

Collaboration with Kockums would probably need to include looking into the replacement in an evolved Collins of the notoriously unreliable Hedemora diesel engines with off-the-shelf engines whose worth has already been proven in other submarines.

But sources noted that a potential redesign was unlikely to address hull form or control systems, given that Collins was specifically designed for Australian conditions and requirements.

Evolved Collins issues

Instead, the intention would be to harness advances in computer processing power to enhance a variety of systems, benefit perhaps from step-changes in battery technology, and move the main electric motors from direct current to lightweight, more efficient permanent magnetic units.

Pursuing a new design would be unlikely to produce an operational submarine until about 2030; the current life-of-type of the newest of the six Collins class boats.

Nevertheless this is being pursued as a valid option; one that was the subject of an industry engagement workshop in Canberra in August that won positive feedback from industry participants.

This is being followed up by formation of an integrated Defence-Industry-DSTO project team tasked with producing by late next year, two costed submarine concepts that will provide the Program Office with cost/risk/schedule information on the new design option. The work of the Adelaide based project team will be carried out with some US assistance.

“No-one is claiming we have the ability today to design our own submarine but we do need to establish and develop a sufficient capability to ensure at the very least that we’re informed customers,” commented one source.

“We had to trust Kockums to a very large extent when we did Collins because we didn’t have the ability to be as smart a customer as we needed to be. No matter what submarine we buy, we’re going to need sufficient design capability eventually to be sure we know what we’re being told is right, and later in the life of the submarine to handle enhancements.”

Separate DSTO studies are meanwhile underway on a wide variety of technologies, basically to ensure the Program Office is knowledgeable and informed on issues ranging from air independent propulsion to composite propellers.

Their ambit may be substantially extended by potential access for the first time to details of technologies employed in Japan’s well-regarded submarines, the latest of which are larger than Collins and nearly double the size of the largest of the three European types under consideration.

This follows the partial lifting last December of Japan’s post World- War II ban on defence exports and the signature in May of a Japanese-Australian Agreement on the Security of Information to provide a framework for the sharing of classified material.

Two months later Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, head of the Sea 1000 Program Office and Chief Defence Scientist Alex Zelinsky visited Tokyo not, as mistakenly reported in some media, to physically inspect a Soryu class boat, but to help progress the weapons technology swap deal eventually announced in September.

Given the ongoing problems with the Collins class propulsion system, the main area of interest is understood to be the Japanese diesel and electric main motors and generators. The Air Independent Propulsion system aboard the Japanese boats incorporates a virtually silent and vibration- free Kockums-developed Stirling engine which increases submerged endurance from days to weeks.

Notwithstanding a high degree of automation, the latest Japanese boats also feature a 65-strong crew. As with Collins, whose crews were increased from 42 to 58 in 2009, manning of this magnitude is considered necessary to provide the necessary endurance on station after a lengthy covert transit.

 

Timing issues

 

Avoiding any gap in Australia’s submarine capability revolves around two issues: the ability, if necessary, to extend the life of some or all of the Collins class fleet beyond the scheduled decommissioning of the first boat in 2025; and the timetable for their replacement.

 

Taking up the option of a new design would be unlikely to produce an operational submarine until about 2030, according to well-informed sources. An Evolved design could be ready about 2027, and a limited capability MOTS boat constructed in Australia could be operational by about 2025.

 

A report on the potential for extending Collins’ 28-year life-of-type is expected to be with government by early next year. Early indications are that pushing back retirement by several years should not be a problem, conditional on a realistic sustainment program being in place and the ongoing replacement of obsolete sub-systems in areas of relatively rapid technological advancement.

 

Meanwhile work continues on the possible establishment of a land-based Submarine Propulsion Energy, Support and Integration Facility (SPESIFy). This would inform engineering development for the Future Submarine program, regardless of what platform option is ultimately chosen.

 

A short-term scoping study delivered by Babcock under a competitive tender has in essence identified the questions that need to be asked prior to setting up such a facility, while reinforcing its potential value.

 

“This wasn’t done with Collins and that mistake won’t be repeated,” commented one source. “This resource could be used for training, engineering development, system integration, and bench-testing systems prior to installation in a submarine under build.

 

“Even if we simply go with the MOTS option it would provide training and a reference system for fault finding, analysis and rectification.”

 

Yet to be determined are the best locations in which to place what could be a series of facility nodes; possibly training and fault-finding in West Australia, system test and grooming in Adelaide, system integration (should the Evolved MOTS or new design option be selected) also in Adelaide, and scientific experimentation (under the close supervision of DSTO) in Melbourne.

 

One option understood to be under consideration is to seek approval for construction reasonably soon, but not populate the facility or nodes with option-specific equipment until the relevant decisions are taken by government.