Submarines: Submarines for Australia’s Defence – Past, Present and Future | ADM November 2012

Many of the current missions of Australia’s submarine fleet are classified. But by looking at the successes of past fleets in Australia, their future importance cannot be underestimated.

Submarines have been increasingly effective in maritime strategy since their introduction in the late 19th century. Consequently submarines played an important role in Australia’s defence in two world wars. In WWI with our own small but effective submarine force; in WWII through the proxy role of US Navy, British and Dutch submarine forces operating from Australia.

In WW1 HMA Submarines AE 1 and AE 2, both commissioned on 28th February 1914, made the long passage to Australia arriving on 24th May 1914 . With the declaration of war on 5th August the Australian fleet was transferred to British command and control as had been agreed in 1911.

Both submarines were assigned to the task force despatched to occupy the German territories to the north of Australia and to engage the German Pacific Fleet. During this operation AE 1 was lost without trace on 14th September and the wreck and grave for her crew remain to be found.

AE 2 went on to distinguished service in the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915, being the first submarine to penetrate Turkish seamine fields, and then to run amok with Turkish shipping in the Sea of Marmora, before succumbing to naval gunfire.

During the interwar years, Australia again acquired a submarine force but this was given up for economic reasons. When WWII came to Australia after Pearl Harbor and the rapid Japanese expansion to occupy the Dutch East Indies colonial empire, Australia again had no submarines and had lost any knowledge to reacquire the capability in the heat of war.

Past victories

USN submarines operated in large numbers from Brisbane and from Fremantle. Later they were joined in Fremantle by British and Dutch submarines. The contribution of submarines to the ultimate defeat of Japan has been acknowledged.

‘”Press home all attacks” wrote Rear-Admiral James Fife USN, Commander Submarines South Pacific, in his standing orders.

The American submariners in the Pacific, very ably assisted by the British and the Dutch, put Admiral Fife’s orders faithfully into effect and achieved devastating results. By VJ-Day, August 1945. Allied submarines in the Far East were actually running out of targets to sink.

By that time, although submarines still constituted only two per cent of the American effort in the Pacific, American submarines had sunk two thirds of the total Japanese merchant ship tonnage sunk during the war and had also sunk one out of every three Japanese warships sunk.

Post WWII , the British 4th Submarine Division was based at HMA S Penguin in Sydney to provide anti-submarine training for Australian and New Zealand defence forces and continued until 18th August 1967 when HMA Submarine Oxley arrived and the new Australian submarine base HMAS Platypus was commissioned. The six Australian submarines of the Oberon class were to give exceptional service to Australia’s defence capability and allied operations in the Cold War, as has been well described by Dr Michael White QC in his authoritative book ‘Australia’s Submarines. A History.’

The present expanded capability in the form of the six submarines of the Collins Class continues to play a significant role in Australia’s maritime defence capability, albeit with some painful learning curve experiences arising from the bold step to construct in Australia a submarine class to a new design. The continuing echoes of the lessons learned are heard every day in the context of the future submarine program (FSM), potentially the largest defence acquisition program ever undertaken by Australia.

Analysis

Future submarine capability and cost analyses are underway as has been well reported earlier in 2012 and have been debated in the media with various levels of insight and credibility. There seems to be a general consensus that an Australia submarine force is an essential capability provided it can be afforded and supported.

Secondly we seem to agree that the lessons from the Collins Class submarine program must be acknowledged and applied to the FSM.

Thirdly the practical demands and lack of experience of nuclear propulsion seem to rule that option out for this generation; maybe the following generation if by then there has been acceptance of the necessity for nuclear power for base-load electricity generation in place of fossil fuels.

The big issue that does not seem to get much discussion is what will we use the FSM to do? The recent public discussion of the Australian Defence Force Future Joint Operating Concept (FJOC) emphasises the need to create strategic response options. I doubt anyone would disagree that submarines, especially if carrying payloads such as the tactical land-attack missile (T-LAM), provide an extraordinary basis for strategic responses.

The US has placed recent emphasis on wide area surveillance in the creation of its Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force to ensure a joint approach to ISR and in this field also submarine forces are exceptional contributors, especially in undersea surveillance but also in covert ISR in littoral situations. Australia’s FSM may well spend most of its time deployed in an ISR role, while at the same time carrying the means for strategic response should it ever be ordered. The other side know that too, but they don’t know if our submarines are on their doorstep or not.

Note: Christopher J Skinner is a vice president of the Submarine Institute of Australia. He holds BSc(Eng) MEngSc MIET MIEAust MACS CPEng and is also Captain RAN (retired).