Tom Muir | Canberra
The ADF deserves credit for the speedy introduction of tactical UAVs in support of its deployed forces in the MEAO. But the same cannot be said for the DMO in its’ quest to acquire a Tactical UAV system under JP129. Tom Muir looks at where the ADF has come from and where’s it’s going in the UAV space.
Promoted as interim capabilities while the JP129 TUAV acquisition was being played out, the leasing of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) such as ScanEagle and Heron, was a sensible and timely investment in force protection and ISR.
But should we have then gone on to purchase outright a system with capabilities suited to and honed during past joint force and coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than one more suited to future ADF requirements, with organic strike/CAS capabilities?
JP129 TUAV
As we later surmised it was probably just as well that the proposed acquisition of a Tactical UAV system under JP129, which began with the release of an industry issues paper in 1996, detailing elements of the proposed capability, ended with the project’s termination in August 2008!
As a preliminary, a Market Survey was issued in August 2001, to encourage early industry input in the capability development phase, and to obtain system level capability and cost information for the acquisition of the TUAVs and their utilisation. This was with seemingly little regard to future strategic circumstances and the type of hostilities envisaged for their deployment. Certainly there was no great hurry to introduce the TUAV into service and it wasn’t until July 2004 that an RFT was released for the capability with bids due by November that year.
Boeing Australia, offering the Israeli I-View Mk250 system, was selected in December 2006 in a $145 million contract to provide Army with a high precision, day/night surveillance and targeting capability. The contract was supposed to result in the delivery of two TUAV systems, comprising four modified I-View 250s and ground stations plus a further four spare UAVs by late 2009. However, the program was running over two years late, resulting in it being added to Defence’s Projects of Concern list.
One of the difficulties Boeing faced was over the transference of US technology to an Israeli organisation. There were indications that Boeing had wanted to be released from the contract in 2007 but the company’s US principals were believed to be against the move in case it impacted adversely on this country’s proposed acquisition of the F/A-18 Super Hornet.
The system sought under JP129 was specified to fill capability gaps identified in the Army’s current ISTAR architecture by providing a Near Real Time (NRT) reconnaissance capability for a deployed Joint Task Force, with an integral target acquisition system providing a NRT sensor-to-shooter link, as well as a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) capability.
It is apparent that JP129 was seeking the sort of capability a Joint Force might need on fairly major (and presumably infrequent) operations, but would it and the band of brothers that operate it, have applicability in the sort of low level, but equally dangerous operations, a feature of extant and likely future ADF deployments?
And despite the manner of its use being set out in the Operational Concepts Document (OCD), there were concerns as to whether the Army was doctrinally ready to introduce and deploy such an important capability - or even if it really needed the capability in light of changed, strategic circumstances.
In the meantime, the Australian Army involved in operations in Iraq and subsequently Afghanistan, had waited long enough and awarded a contract to Boeing Australia to provide reconnaissance and surveillance services using the ScanEagle autonomous UAV. This complemented the Elbit Skylark hand-launched miniature UAV system that had been in service since late 2005, which provided a useful if limited tactical capability, as did SOTG’s RQ-11 Raven SUAS.
By September 2007, well before before JP129 was terminated, Boeing was able to report that the ScanEagle UAV system had ticked up 5,000 hours of airborne surveillance and reconnaissance services to the ADF in Afghanistan and Iraq. During its five years in operation in Afghanistan, ScanEagles flew about 32,000 hours in more than 6,200 missions in support of the Reconstruction Task Force, Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force, MTF, Combined Team – Uruzgan and the Special Operations Task Group.
In announcing the cancellation of Boeing’s JP129 TUAV contract in August 2008, then Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon was succinct: “Since contract award, Boeing Australia and its subcontractors have experienced a range of technical issues making it increasingly difficult to deliver the full scope of the contract within a time-frame acceptable to Defence.”
However, ignoring the advantages of a commercially leased and supported system already meeting the Army’s tactical requirements, and the drawbacks of selecting and acquiring a TUAV capability without any clear guidance as to its eventual applicability, Fitzgibbon added that this ‘decisive’ action would enable Defence to focus on the earliest acquisition of an alternative TUAV to meet the JP129 requirement, noting that the Army would continue to use the ScanEagle currently inservice in the Middle East.
Sure enough 2008 saw the launch of a new JP 129 competition under which BAE Systems Australia teamed with American firm AAI to offer the Shadow 200 UAV. Selection of the RQ-7B Shadow 200 was announced in August 2010. This ‘B’ variant expanded the original Shadow’s wingspan to 14 feet, endurance to six hours, and payload to 20 kilograms. It was the US Army’s main tactical UAV and had extensive operational use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The August 2010 deal, reportedly worth A$ 175 million, was for four RQ-7B Shadow 200 systems comprising 18 aircraft, additional ground control stations, and launch and recovery equipment and simulation training systems. Testing and delivery of the first system and training of their operators in the US was expedited to enable the system’s early operational deployment.
This occurred in early 2012 with Shadow operating out of Tarin Kot undertaking ISR missions in support of the SOTG. While the Shadow’s endurance of 6-7 hours is significantly less than ScanEagle’s 15-20 hours, it has a much more capable payload, comprising high fidelity EO/IFR camera, laser target designation and a communications relay.
Mounted on Unimog trucks equipped with AN/PRC-152 radios, it would seem that the ADF’s current (and only) TUAV capability with its target indication and range finding capabilities, is particularly suited for Joint Force and Coalition type operations, where ground strike capabilities from CAS or indirect fires from AFATDS data relays, is a major feature.
In more recent Coalition operations such ground attack capabilities would likely involve MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper systems, operated by US and British forces respectively, and possibly Australian F/A-18 aircraft with JDAM-ER fitted with laser sensors. (JDAM-ER is a low cost guidance kit designed to convert existing 500lb, 1,000lb and 2,000lb unguided free-fall bombs into precisely guided all-weather smart munitions. JDAM-ER’s wing kit is based on the Australian ‘Kerkanya’ glide technology initially developed by DSTO).
But the sort of discrete, possibly amphibious, operations the ADF may have in mind within the ROE, may lack the accompanying airborne ground attack capabilities previously available from coalition forces, relying instead on missile attack from ARH Tiger and F/A-18 if within range.
Strike capability for Shadow 200
What is missing in the ADF’s Shadow is an organic strike capability so that rather than relaying targeting data for CAS, it is able to complete the mission. It was the lack of armed RQ-7 Shadow UAS that frustrated the USMC when, on one deployment by a single unit, the marines counted 94 ‘high-value targets’ that escaped, despite being spotted by RQ-7s circling overhead. The unarmed RQ-7 could only hand off the targets to other weaponised platforms, such as helicopters and fighters, but none were immediately available in the 94 events catalogued.
That experience prompted the USMC to launch a combat demonstration aimed at proving the feasibility of dropping guided bombs weighing under 11.5kg from the RQ-7. Shadow manufacturer AAI has reported a pair of successful live-fire demonstrations from an RQ-7 Shadow 200 UAV using its new GPS/laser guided free-fall-lightweight modular munition (FF-LMM), known as the Fury, developed in collaboration with manufacturer Thales. This demonstration to TRL 7 levels (prototype tested in representative environment) took 15 months of planning and work with Thales.
The weapon is a 70-cm long, six-kilogram glide bomb with many of the common components used on the LMM missile developed by Thales to meet a UK MOD requirement. In simple terms, the Fury uses the body and control actuators of the 15 kilogram LMM but removes that weapon’s rocket motor and associated components.
The internals are re-packaged and Thales has added INS and GPS navigation as well as a semi-active laser guidance that replaces the beam-riding system used on the LMM. Four enlarged fins increase lift, while overall weight is reduced to six kilograms. The LMM’s 2-kg warhead also is retained, but the company also is looking at adding an airburst fuse that would be selectable in-flight.
Another possible weapon is the Lockheed Martin Shadow Hawk, an 11-pound class, 27 centemetre diameter, 68 centimetre long drop-glide munition released a mile or more above the target by the RQ-7B. The Shadow Hawk is guided to its target by a semi-active laser seeker of astonishing accuracy. In the first public test, the Shadow Hawk was dropped by an RQ-7 from a height of one mile and it hit the target at a speed of 500 km/h just 20 cm from dead centre.
While the ADF’s Shadow 200B can transmit targeting information to Australian 155mm M777s via the AFATDS link, this is of little use if they are operating out of indirect fire range or artillery is not available for that mission. Lower level ROE operations by the ADF, such as oversight and protection of high value targets, might not include combat air support but would surely need to retain an airborne strike option to dislodge intruders.
The ADF’s questionable choice of a tactical UAV with potentially surplus and costly capabilities in light of likely ROE engagements would be corrected if the Shadow 200B was armed and could complete strike missions without the need to hand-off to other ground attack assets.
Small tactical UAV systems
In 2005 four Elbit Skylark miniature UAVs were deployed to assist the second rotation of the Al Muthanna Task Group while a further two UAVs were held back in Australia for training and preparation purposes. They were used on reconnaissance and surveillance missions, and providing real-time information about the terrain and activities in an area increasing troops’ ability to respond to identified threats. They were subsequently used in supporting ADF and ISAF operations in southern
Afghanistan.
Transported and operated by two soldiers (less than 40 kilograms overall) and requiring no special skills, the Skylark system was launched by hand with recovery performed by a deep stall manoeuvre, landing the vehicle safely on a small inflatable cushion, at a pre-designated point. Elbit developed the Skylark manpack system for tactical close-range surveillance and reconnaissance missions, artillery fire adjustments as well as force protection and perimeter security.
No doubt impressed by Skylark’s capabilities, the Army planned to introduce a small single person launched and operated UAV, the Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS). It was intended to provide information to commanders at the Combat Team level and below with enhanced situational awareness through improved reconnaissance and surveillance coverage. It would offer commanders NRT video and still images with associated metadata by day and night.
It appears that the RQ-11B Raven has been acquired to meet the Army’s SUAS requirement. Not dissimilar to the hand-launched Skylark, Raven is designed for rapid deployment and high mobility for military applications requiring low-altitude reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Raven can be operated manually or programmed for autonomous operation, utilising the system’s advanced avionics and precise GPS navigation. It is believed that Raven has mainly been employed in support of the ADF’s SOTG deployments in Afghanistan.
Raven provides aerial observation, day or night, at line-of-sight ranges of 10 kilometres or more, delivering real-time colour or infrared imagery to ground control and remote viewing stations, as well as IR laser illumination of ground targets.
Future Small Unmanned Systems
The Future Land Warfare Report for 2015 suggests that Army is increasingly likely to conduct future operations in the urban littoral, an environment that poses significant challenges for the force’s methods of operation. Army has already embarked on a study to see how it could most effectively contribute to Australia’s maritime strategy within this environment.
According to the FLWR 2014 operational experience has clearly demonstrated that, as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies continue to improve, adversaries will seek shelter in complex and congested physical, human and informational terrain.
The co-mingling of ad hoc networks within essential infrastructure will challenge targeting approaches, complicate calculations of collateral damage and force. The land force needs to be capable of discriminating between adversary combatants and the multitude of other actors who are likely to be present within the battlespace.
For dangerous military operations in dense urban environments we suspect that highly manoeuvrable multirotor drones of various sizes will replace the type of hand-launched, fixed-wing UAV such as the ADF’s inservice RQ-11 Raven UAS.
A number of advanced UAS concepts were displayed at the inaugural Australian Army Innovation Day in Sydney on 30 September 2014. They included Aeryon’s Skyranger, AeroVironment’s Wasp micro air vehicle and Switchblade, a small, backpackable NLOS precision targeting and strike capability, at the same time providing ISR on a beyond LOS target within minutes.
At the small end of the scale are systems with ISR capabilities such as the Prox Dynamics Black Hornet. Weighing only 16 grams, the Norwegian Black Hornet is a nano-size piece of military hardware that can be carried and operated by a soldier as easily as using a radio.
British infantrymen in Afghanistan have been using Black Hornets on a variety of missions — from scouting routes for possible enemy ambushes to looking over the walls of a nearby compound. The unmanned air vehicle was designed for small units that required a quick, tactical ‘stealth’ camera in the sky, said Ole Aguirre, vice president of sales and marketing for Prox Dynamics AS, the Norwegian company that produces the Black Hornet.
A complete PD-100 kit comes with two Black Hornets, a docking station for battery recharging, a remote control unit and a mobile device with a seven-inch-wide (18 centimetres) screen to watch the camera feed — all of which is carried in a tough, waterproof case, for a total weight of 1.3 kilograms.
Pulled out of the case and readied for action, the drone follows GPS waypoints to reach its target. Once there, it sends video and still images back to the operator. The Black Hornet can fly for 20 to 25 minutes before needing to recharge, so it’s limited to travelling just over a kilometre in one shot. Perhaps we will soon see similar small UAV systems introduced into ADF service.
Conclusion
Arming the RQ-4 Shadow 200B UAS with the capacity to carry and release mini-glide bombs, such as the Thales/Textron Fury, would fill an important gap in the Army’s covert ISTAR/Strike capability. At the other end of the scale, on issue to frontline rifle teams, mini-UAVs, like the PD Black Hornet, could provide ‘over the wall’ and route surveillance for their handlers, complementing the ISR and targeting capabilities of the in-service RQ-11 Raven UAS.
Regardless of the platforms choices made by the ADF in the future, it is clear that the capability conferred by UAVs, UASs, RPAs are here to stay.