• Australian Army soldier Private Brendan Winter provides force protection at the Taji Military Complex, Iraq. Credit: Defence
    Australian Army soldier Private Brendan Winter provides force protection at the Taji Military Complex, Iraq. Credit: Defence
  • In 2004, Jim was deployed to Iraq as Chief of Operations to lead a multi-national force of 300,000 troops. In a rapidly changing situation, facing a new style of insurgency, the Molan plan achieved results which included the first democratic elections held in Iraq and rebuilding and protecting Iraq's infrastructure, including vital oil production. Credit: ICMI
    In 2004, Jim was deployed to Iraq as Chief of Operations to lead a multi-national force of 300,000 troops. In a rapidly changing situation, facing a new style of insurgency, the Molan plan achieved results which included the first democratic elections held in Iraq and rebuilding and protecting Iraq's infrastructure, including vital oil production. Credit: ICMI
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Former ADF general and one time coalition operations chief in Iraq during 2004-05, Jim Molan presents the final of his four part series titled "The Answer is Strategy".

Jim Molan | Canberra 

The only complaint that I believe should be made against the current operational strategy – given that I support the US policy and grand strategy and applaud the more effective operational strategy – is that it is taking too long.

There is a delicate balance in how fast you prosecute a campaign. It is easy to imagine that we have unlimited time to win, and so we can take the time to eradicate as much risk as possible. Rushing can produce excessive casualties and defeat. Taking too long can open any strategy to dislocation. There is more art in this than science, but at this stage it is the critical strategic judgement for very good reasons.

The longer you take in a conflict to achieve a decisive result (to win), the more vulnerable you are to the impact of unforeseeable events, often external, that dislocate your strategy.

In the last five years, the following could be considered to be some mostly unforeseen events capable of disrupting existing strategy: (2010) Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War; (2011) the precipitate withdrawal of US from Iraq; (2013) Obama’s failure to apply his red line threat in Syria; (2010-2014) the second Maliki government; (2013) Daesh takes Fallujah; (2014) IS takes Mosul; (2014/15) Iranian intervention in Iraq; (2014) US re-commits at ineffective levels; (2014-15) Tikrit, Ramadi, Palmyra; (2015) Russian and Iranian intervention in Syria, European refugee crisis; Turkish attacks on the PKK; attempts by Russia to become involved in Iraq; Paris attacks; and Turkey/Russia fallout.


 

"I fear that we still think that we have unlimited time to win in Iraq."

 


Already in 2016, we see the massive dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran. All of these events have dislocated the strategies at the time, which then required new strategy after new strategy, with none of them really settling in. You can never eradicate strategic surprise in war, but you can limit the time that you are exposed to it by achieving a decisive result as soon as possible. I fear that we still think that we have unlimited time to win in Iraq.

In 2004, Jim was deployed to Iraq as Chief of Operations to lead a multi-national force of 300,000 troops. In a rapidly changing situation, facing a new style of insurgency, the Molan plan achieved results which included the first democratic elections held in Iraq and rebuilding and protecting Iraq's infrastructure, including vital oil production. Credit: ICMIWe know that the ADF has a high level of operational competence and will acquit itself well in its limited mission in accordance with the government's direction.

Australia can attempt to influence coalition operational strategy and perhaps we have been doing this. There are some reports now that the US has a more logical approach to the prosecution of the war, it has asked its allies for support. Prime Minister Turnbull has said that we are not going to change the level or nature of our commitment (we cannot act unilaterally), but that if asked we will consider the request.

The PM visited Washington recently and met with President Obama – he would've be wise to have in his mind the need to align Australia’s policy, strategy and tactics both with our own national interests and with those of the US.

If one reason for being in Iraq is alliance support, and if the PM believes that it is in our interest to be successful there, Australia should be willing to do more if it achieves a decisive defeat of Daesh in as short a time as possible. 

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