Back in 2004, Defence launched an ambitious project, Air 9000, to rationalise the helicopter fleet which then comprised Kiowa, Iroquois, Black Hawk, Chinook, Tiger, MRH-90, Squirrel, Sea King, Seahawk and Super Seasprite aircraft, either in-service or entering service. That’s 10 different types, each with its own particular support, logistics and training requirements.

A Special Correspondent | Canberra

The 2006 Defence Capability Plan outlined the admirable intent of reducing the different types in the ADF inventory to as few as four, performing all the required roles of training, armed reconnaissance, medium lift and multi-role.

It did note that four might not be achievable.

“But a significant reduction in types is both achievable and desirable over the next 5-15 years,” it said.

So how have they gone? Alas the answer is not that well.

The ADF helicopter inventory now comprises eight different types – Black Hawk, Chinook, Tiger, MRH-90, Squirrel, Seahawk, Seahawk Romeo (in the process of arriving) and Bell 429. Should the Navy opt for an unmanned surveillance capability – likely the Firescout MQ-8C – you can add yet another.

So there seems little prospect of any rationalisation any time soon. Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Andrew Davies makes the fair point that all that’s been achieved is retirement of the elderly Sea Kings and some commonality between Army and Navy MRH-90s.

This commendable ambition fell by the wayside through a series of decisions, each entirely defensible.

Here’s an example. At vast cost, the Seasprites never entered service and that required defence to look for a new type able to resurrect the navy’s diminishing airborne anti-submarine capability.

The choice was Romeo or the NFH-90, a marinised version of the Eurocopter MRH-90, then entering service in the utility role in both army and navy.

Choosing NFH-90 would certainly have been a step towards rationalisation. With its large cabin, it would have been the better choice in the dual ASW and utility role operating off vessels such as the frigates and air warfare destroyers, considering most naval helicopter tasks involve moving people and stuff.

But NFH-90 ASW mission systems needed considerable development and so, it’s turned out, did the airframe.
In contrast, the cheaper Romeo was just entering service with the US Navy with a mature and familiar airframe and capable mission systems which didn’t need further development.

After the deeply painful experience with Seasprite, Romeo ticked all the right boxes as a low risk military off-the-shelf acquisition and so it’s turning out well for Navy.

"Certainly no-one at that time, certainly not those in Defence who should have known, seemed to appreciate that MRH-90 was a whole lot more developmental than they thought."

That could not be said of either MRH-90, placed on the Projects of Concern list in November 2011. This was the subject of an Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report in June 2014, which examined the procurement process to acquire 47 of these aircraft to replace Black Hawks in the troop transport role and to operate from ships such as the new LHDs in the utility and transport role.

The Army of course preferred to hang onto their Black Hawks, a familiar and proven capability which remains in worldwide service. But, the ANAO said, then Defence Minister Robert Hill preferred MRH-90 which could carry more troops, operate better off ships and could be assembled in Brisbane.

ASPI’s Andrew Davies suggests this is one of those cases where industry policy trumped defence’s own requirements. Certainly no-one at that time, certainly not those in Defence who should have known, seemed to appreciate that MRH-90 was a whole lot more developmental than they thought.

As one insider confided to your correspondent: the MRH-90 can do everything required of it, just not all at the same time.
Some time ago, your correspondent bravely declared that with time and effort, Seasprite would eventually come good, so I’m somewhat hesitant about making a similar declaration for MRH-90. It does seem that MRH-90 is much further along than Seasprite, though recent trials aboard the LHDs have thrown up a new problem of excessive rotor windmilling.

It does seem that rationalisation of the helo fleet has faded from consciousness with minimal prospects of improvement anywhere but the margins any time soon.

There are just too many diverse platforms with too much service life remaining. None are getting any cheaper to operate. Your correspondent hasn’t seen any current figures but a 2009 report by the excellent ASPI organisation said each Seahawk cost a breathtaking $45,000 an hour to operate, 10 times the hourly operational cost of a civilian Bell Jetranger.

Operating helicopters from ships will always be expensive. That’s because of the unavoidable requirement that every individual aircraft goes to sea with an extensive suite of spares and support equipment, plus the maintainers required for service and support far from home base.