Leo Purdy is a Defence analyst and historian focused on the application of military power, combined-arms philosophy and the theory of armoured warfare. He is the author of a range of publications on these subjects including doctrine, concepts, capability documents, articles and research papers. While LTCOL (ret’d) Purdy’s views are his own, in the light of recent media commentary on the topic, ADM is publishing them here in the interest of informed and balanced debate.
It is clear from recent remarks that the role of Armour, and more broadly Army, within Australia’s national security is poorly understood by elements of the Defence commentariat. Government's decision on Australia’s most significant armoured vehicle project, Project Land 400 Phase 3 (Land 400-3), is approaching. However, the project’s acquisition of 450 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) continues to be the target of misinformed critiques.
This is typified by impassioned criticism labelling this acquisition as ridiculous, obsolete or a waste of money. Critics seek a major reduction in the numbers acquired or, along with other armoured vehicle projects such as the upgrade of the M1 tank, its outright cancellation.
However, these opinions are generally unencumbered by evidence or draw questionable and premature conclusions from the conflict in Ukraine in support. Army’s recent commentary on the subject, provides an insight into its view on the IFV and its conclusions on Ukraine. While this addresses certain aspects of the broader narrative which has been warped by misinformation, it is evident that the role of Armour in Australia’s security context and the relevance of the IFV remains unclear to some in the public domain.
Thus, for those new to the debate or unfamiliar with its content, discerning fact from fiction may be challenging. This poses problems for those decision makers within Government, Defence and industry who serve as stewards, practitioners and provedores of Australia’s national security. Importantly, it is the Australian people who provide the resources that they commit. While these resources include their tax dollars, this also requires the investment of their mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters and sons and daughters to serve in the armed forces. It is therefore in the national interest to ensure this discussion is informed by facts and logic.
The aim of this article is to inform those parties engaged in the debate on Armour. Its purpose is to improve the foundation of knowledge to further discussion. Its approach is threefold. First, it explains pertinent terms and definitions to help establish common ground for discussion. Second, it explains the history of Land 400-3 to illustrate the heritage of thinking on the IFV. Third, it explains the relevance of the IFV within Australia’s security context.
What is Armour?
Armour has at least two meanings in military use. It refers to armoured vehicles in a collective sense as well as the forces which operate them.
In Western militaries these forces specifically include Armoured (tank) and Cavalry organisations as well as those Infantry, Combat Engineer and Artillery elements which are equipped with armoured vehicles. The latter are often prefixed by the terms ‘Armoured’ or ‘Mechanised’ e.g., Armoured Infantry and Mechanised Combat Engineers, to differentiate them from those elements not equipped with armoured vehicles.
Armoured vehicles are self-propelled vehicles which combine weapon systems with physical armour, and other protective means, as well as the ability to move cross-country (off-road). These three design characteristics: firepower, protection and mobility; are often referred to as the ‘Iron Triangle’ of armoured vehicle design.
For example, when designing a vehicle to fight in close proximity to the enemy, armour protection is paramount. To afford the maximum protection possible, the composition of that armour, how it is angled and arrayed, are carefully considered. Equally, the numbers and types of weapon systems and munitions carried are balanced to maximise the firepower generated. Mobility factors include cross-country movement, the ability to cross or crush obstacles and to penetrate woods or jungle. Alternatively, mobility may prioritise the ability to patrol long distances to enable the widest coverage of a given area. Conversely, armoured vehicles designed to transport troops often place a primacy on carrying capacity and mobility over firepower and protection.
Therefore, different armoured vehicle designs place different emphasis on these characteristics to perform a given role or function. In contrast protected mobility vehicles such as the Bushmaster and Hawkei, as well as trucks and utility vehicles with armour added to them, are not designed for close combat. These are primarily designed to transport personnel, stores and equipment on roads with some protection against mines and ambushes, rather than endure the rigours of sustained close combat.
For our purposes, armoured vehicles fall into three broad categories: armoured fighting vehicles (AFV), self-propelled artillery and armoured support vehicles. AFV perform mounted close combat – they are designed to kill. This is generally conducted by firing at the enemy who they physically have line of sight upon (direct fire) and are in close proximity to (close combat). Self-propelled artillery attacks the enemy beyond their line of sight (indirect fire) and at longer distances (ranged combat).
As their name implies, armoured support vehicles are primarily designed to enable the functions of other armoured vehicles. They fulfill a wide range of roles such as command and control, personnel transport, resupply, medical evacuation, repair and break-down support.
Armoured vehicles may be classified by light, medium and heavy weight classes and are further divided into different types based on their primary function. In some cases, an entire family of vehicles (FoV) can exist in a particular weight category. Thus, a FoV may include a range of vehicle types, including AFV, self-propelled artillery and support vehicles. Those of most relevance are discussed below to provide a general understanding of their function and design characteristics.
Main Battle Tanks
Main Battle Tanks (MBT) are heavily armed and armoured AFVs, whose primary function is to provide direct fire in close combat. MBT typically have a large turret equipped with a cannon and other weapons. They have high levels of cross-country mobility as they travel upon caterpillar-type tracks propelled by powerful engines which enable them to move at speed across broken and uneven ground, crash through jungle or crush obstacles. The tank is the apex predator of close combat; it can defeat almost any ground threat with its cannon and endure against a wide range of threats.
However, it is only effective when operating as part of combined-arms organisations which shield its vulnerabilities and enable it to fight. While the tank was designed in response to the stalemate of trench warfare in the First World War, it has continued to evolve ever since, with Fourth Generation MBTs emerging. These late model MBTs are often equipped with long-range programmable munitions, integrated active-protection systems to neutralise anti-armour munitions, advanced physical armour packages and increased automation. MBT serve as the principal weapon system of Armoured elements.
Armoured Personnel Carriers
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) are primarily designed to transport soldiers, equipment and cargo to battle. In general terms APC deliver infantry to the fight, but are not employed to fight with them.
Personnel carriers appeared prior to the Second World War and have continued to advance since. They include wheeled and tracked designs optimised to carry an infantry section of 8-10 soldiers, which requires a large internal area to accommodate them. As a result, APC designs make trade-offs to provide greater capacity. These include reducing vehicle armament to self-defence weapon systems such as machine guns, and limiting armour protection to only that required to survive small arms fire and artillery fragments. APC have traditionally equipped Mechanised Infantry forces and as a troop transport in other elements.
Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) are designed to transport infantry soldiers into battle and fight with them.
IFV are an evolution of the APC and were developed during the Cold War. They are designed to enable Infantry to closely operate with Armour, rather than simply deliver infantry close enough to join them on foot. IFV are tracked and have a turret, thus the uninitiated may confuse them with tanks or APCs. However, IFV designs make trade-offs in capacity, some carry only 6-8 infantry, to gain capability in firepower and protection. IFV are often equipped with rapid-firing auto-cannon, anti-tank guided missiles, grenade launchers and machine guns to defeat a wide variety of targets. Likewise, IFV are generally more heavily protected than APC as they must be able to survive combat in close proximity to the enemy. IFV are employed by Armoured Infantry forces.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicles
Reconnaissance and Surveillance vehicles have the primary function of gaining information on the enemy and about terrain. They fall into two general types: small, lightly armed and armoured reconnaissance vehicles, and larger, heavily armed and armoured Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRV).
Light armoured reconnaissance vehicles primarily employ sensors and stealth to gain information. In contrast, CRV fight for information and to deny it from an enemy force. Accordingly, CRV may be equipped with auto-cannon and other weapons to defeat enemy reconnaissance elements; as well as an array of sensors, unmanned systems and enhanced communications to gain information and convey it across the force. Both types generally have high levels of on-road mobility allowing them to quickly surveil large areas.
Some have misconstrued that the CRV is the same as an IFV; this is incorrect. While CRV may carry a small number of soldiers, these soldiers, often termed Scouts, perform dismounted reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and do not act as Infantry. Equally to carry large infantry sections requires trade-offs in other areas such as firepower and protection. CRV serve as the primary equipment of Cavalry.
Combat Engineering Vehicles
Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEV) conduct a wide range of engineering tasks in support of a force. These include breaching, clearing and marking obstacles, spanning gaps and earthmoving.
CEV include Armoured Breaching Vehicles (ABV), Armoured Engineering Vehicles (AEV) and Armoured Bridge Layers (ABL). ABV are designed to breach, clear and mark passage through obstacles and minefields using explosives, electro-magnetic emitters or with mine ploughs. AEV act as armoured ‘bull dozers’ conducting earthmoving to fill in and remove obstacles, demolish structures and fortifications as well as build defensive positions to improve AFV survivability. As the name suggests, ABL carry a folding metal bridge to span gaps in a force’s path. These gaps include ditches, rivers and canals or they can supplement existing bridges which may not bear the weight of armoured vehicles.
CEV are a critical component of a combined-arms force as they improve its mobility and enhance its survivability through mounted engineering support. However, certain tasks require Combat Engineer soldiers to perform them on the ground. As a result, Mechanised Combat Engineers are provided Engineer Section Vehicles (ESV) which enable them to move alongside Armoured and Infantry and dismount at the time and place required to support them.
Self-Propelled Artillery
Self-Propelled Artillery is a catch-all term for the suite of self-propelled vehicles whose primary function is to provide indirect fire support at long-ranges. These include Self-Propelled Mortars (SPM), Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH), Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL), and certain very long range tactical ballistic missiles and anti-ship missile systems.
These vehicles are the product of design trade-offs which optimise firepower over mobility and protection. While not designed for close combat, these vehicles do afford artillery crews protection by enabling them to load, fire and rearm under the protection of armour. Equally, because they can execute fire missions more rapidly and move more quickly than traditional artillery towed by trucks, their protection is enhanced by reducing their exposure to enemy counter fire.
These various artillery types have different characteristics, ranges and munitions which provide precise, long-range, mobile and protected fire support against a broad range of targets. SPM are better suited to providing immediate fire support in close proximity to friendly forces, SPH are better suited to providing sustained heavy fire support at longer ranges and MRL provide long-range strike against installations or troop concentrations. Another important vehicle type is the Joint Fires Vehicle (JFV). These vehicles move with Armoured and Infantry elements and provide the ability for artillery observers to call for and coordinate fire from artillery, aircraft and ships.
While nomenclature and weight classes differ between militaries the broad categories, types and classes of armoured vehicles discussed are depicted in Figure 1.[i]
The role of Armour in Australia’s national security
Given this understanding of Armour, it is appropriate to briefly describe its role within Australia’s security context. Recent commentary demonstrates that the role of Armour within Australia’s national security is poorly understood. A prime example of this is this recent article, notable for its demonstrable lack of understanding of Australia’s military strategy. The author suggests that IFVs and tanks are irrelevant to Australia’s maritime security and falsely claims that they are being acquired to sate the desires of the United States for Australia to fight in the Middle-East, although he provides no evidence to support this assertion. The author is wrong on both accounts.
The Australian Army contributes Land Power as part of the joint equation of national military power. This is implemented via a Maritime Strategy which combines Land, Sea, Air, Space and Informational Power.
This is drawn from elements across the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to perform three broad strategic tasks: Shape, Deter and Respond. Land Power contributes to shaping by understanding the operating environment, giving form to the risks and threats posed to Australia’s national security and by training and building collective security capacity with allies and partners. Land Power provides conventional military deterrence by preparing and posturing land forces to demonstrate their credible ability to punish aggressors and raise the cost of aggression to unacceptably high levels; thereby discouraging threats to Australia’s security and preventing conflict.
If deterrence fails, Land Power is employed to respond to threats to Australia’s sovereignty and interests. This may require the use of, or threat of, violence to destroy armed threats; and seizing territory to compel or coerce an adversary to conform to Australia’s national interests.
Within a Maritime Strategy, Land Power may support Sea and Air Power. It does so by seizing, occupying and defending terrain such as ports, airbases and installations to support the projection of Sea and Air Power. It also denies threat forces access to land, sea and air space across the vast Indo-Pacific littoral operating environment.
Contrary to the reductionist views of some concerning the utility of Land Power, maritime security is not simply premised on securing sea-lines of communication or fighting some vague air and naval battles scenario fought in the central Pacific Ocean, as I have explained previously. Maritime security encompasses not only oceans, but the littoral intersection of land, sea, air and space, including cities, sea and air ports, rivers and coastlines.
This encompasses not only the defence of continental Australia, but also seizing holding and occupying terrain in the Indo-Pacific with which to project power from. Hence, owning ‘small patches of ground’ and exerting control over populations is vital to enable the strategic effects of the other domains in the air-sea-land-space-information operating environment. While Sea and Air Power are highly destructive as they can bomb cities, blockade ports, shoot down aircraft and sink ships; Land Power gives relevance to these actions. Equally, without Sea and Air Power to project it from the Australian continent and fight alongside it, Land Power loses its strategic relevance and operates at much higher risk when deployed. This symbiotic relationship between the domains is critical to achieve Australia’s Maritime Strategy.
While these other aspects provide essential contributions to Australia’s national security, Land Power is unique. It alone provides Australia the ability to conduct close combat on land to own terrain and to control, compel and, when necessary, kill with discrimination. Most importantly, close combat has historically proven decisive in military conflict.
In seeking decision, Land Power may be supported by the other elements of national military power to defeat enemy forces on land, and to seize and occupy terrain in order to terminate conflict. Therefore, the ability to conduct close combat is arguably Army’s most important strategic effect in war, as it alone of the services provides this capability. However, close combat is inherently dangerous and difficult, requiring the combination of various capabilities to defeat an enemy and protect friendly forces. This approach is known as Combined-Arms Warfare.
The means to deliver this strategic effect are combined-arms combat forces, based on the mixture of Armoured, Cavalry, Infantry, Combat Engineers, Artillery, Air Defence and Aviation elements. In Army parlance these arms, when combined with integrated command, control and communications and protected mobile combat service support, form the basis of the Combined Arms Fighting System (CAFS).
CAFS is a construct which guides Army thinking on war and warfighting e.g., how it fights, how it organises and what it fights with. CAFS may be viewed as a system of systems which groups like capability together in order to guide, manage, integrate and align combat forces and those systems which support them. In essence CAFS is an instrument to apply Land Power within the joint equation of the Australian Military Strategy.
Armour modernisation and Land 400-3
One of the systems within CAFS is the Land Combat Vehicle System (LCVS). The LCVS is the primary system, although others contribute, which enables Army to conduct mounted close combat; simply, fighting with armoured vehicles. Over the next decade Defence is modernising its armoured vehicles to provide a credible, deployable and sustainable mounted combat capability. This is being achieved under the purview of the Land Combat Vehicle Program. The program, sponsored by Army and delivered by Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) in concert with industry, does so through four major projects:
- Project Land 400 Phase 2 which is delivering the Boxer CRV to replace the Australian Service Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV).
- Project Land 400 Phase 3 which will deliver an IFV to replace the M113AS4 APC.
- Project Land 8160 Phase 1 which will deliver Combat Engineering Vehicles.
- Project Land 907 Phase 2 which will upgrade the M1A1 MBT to an A2 standard.
These projects, less Land 400-3, have gained Gate 2 approval from Government and are in the early stages of acquisition and or introduction into service. Land 400-3 is due to be considered by Government in the third quarter of 2022.
However, Land 400-3 is not the first attempt to manufacture and procure a replacement for the M113 APC, of which 811 were introduced from 1965. Notably, these were sufficient to provide the capability to lift an infantry battalion in each of Army three brigades and provision its Cavalry elements. In 1979, Project Waler was conceived under the Liberal Fraser government to provide a replacement for the M113A1 suite of vehicles. Importantly, its replacement was to be designed to suit local operating conditions and manufactured principally by Australian industry. The estimated total cost was around $638 million in 1984 dollars, for the development and production of around 650 vehicles commencing in 1995. By this time, it was assessed that the M113A1 would be approaching the end of its useful service life.
However, this plan faced opposition within Army and Defence and by elements outside of it. While some within Army prioritised the APC replacement, others argued that the acquisition of battlefield mobility helicopters was more urgent. APC replacement advocates asserted that it was not suitable even for lesser contingencies due to inadequate firepower, protection and mobility – a view contested by others inside the Department and the wider commentariat. History shows that the latter view prevailed.
Project Waler was first delayed then cancelled by the Hawke Labour government in 1985. The then Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, advised that while Project Waler showed that ‘… a vehicle could be produced that would be superior to the M113, it would be costly compared to a suitably modified M113.’ In place of Project Waler, the Hawke government directed that some of the APCs be stored and others upgraded in the future.
The subsequent M113 Minimum Upgrade Project commenced in 1992, and aimed to convert 537 vehicles to the M113A2 standard over two phases. In 2002 these phases were combined into the M113 Major Upgrade Project (subsequently titled Project Land 106) to convert 350 vehicles to an AS4 standard. The project aimed to make the vehicles safer and more effective, and to extend their life until 2025, thereby providing an interim capability until the introduction of the ADF’s next generation of armoured vehicles. This number was increased to 431 in 2008 under the Enhanced Land Force initiative. As a result of Army’s expansion from one mechanised infantry battalion to two, an additional 81 APCs were needed to provision both units. Notably, at this time Army’s mechanised capability was concentrated in only one of its brigades.
The first upgraded vehicles were accepted into service in 2007 with the final vehicles delivered in 2012. However, by this time, Australia’s strategic circumstances and the threat environment had moved on. In its 2012 audit report the Australian National Audit Office advised that
‘The upgraded M113 does represent an improvement on the older, unextended vehicle. However, a vehicle that was considered fit‐for purpose when the minor upgrade was first proposed 20 years ago now lags behind armoured infantry vehicles in use with other armed forces, and is vulnerable in many current threat environments, leaving Defence with an acknowledged capability gap.’
The audit apportioned fault for this across Government, Defence and industry as it identified issues with approvals, requirement setting, contracting, project management and production delays. Consequently, in lieu of more capable systems Army used the M113AS4 APC as an IFV surrogate during training to preserve its fundamental, yet highly perishable, combined-arms skills.
However, the significant differences between APC and IFV technologies left gaps in Army’s understanding of IFV employment as well as the sustainment challenges these pose. Inevitably this, coupled with other capability gaps such as self-propelled artillery, air-defence and armoured engineering systems, has affected the forces’ ability to develop the guiding doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to remain abreast of the state of the art and science of armoured warfare.
Driven by analysis and lessons learnt from conflicts in the early 2000s, Project Destrier or Land 400 was established in 2004 with the initial aim to provide a replacement for the M113 and ASLAV from 2015. This was later expanded to include the PMV elements of motorised infantry units, as outlined in the 2009 and 2012 Defence Capability Plans.Under this approach Land 400 was expected to acquire around 1,100 new vehicles as discussed in the 2009 Defence White Paper.
Given the concurrent upgrade of the APC capability, Phase 1 of Land 400 was a deliberate and lengthy process to define the project. It conducted a number of requests for information to define the requirements for the next generation of armoured vehicles. It also absorbed Project Land 135, which had sought to acquire a light armoured mortar system in the mid-2000s based on the ASLAV. However, these requirements were incorporated into Land 400 and would be delivered with the next generation of AFV.
Notably, by early 2014 Army advised that Land 400 had been reduced to around 700 vehicles and the scope reduced to the replacement of the ASLAV, M113 and introduction of a ‘manoeuvre support vehicle’ (combat engineering vehicle).
Phases 2 and 3 were established in their current form in 2014, leading to detailed consideration of contemporary vehicle options. These informed the Land 400-3 Gate 1 milestone approval in 2018. This was followed by a request for tender for 450 IFV and 17 manoeuvre support vehicles in August 2018. This led to the down selection in 2019 of two vehicles for competitive trials; the KF41 Lynx produced by Rheinmetall Defence Australia and Hanwha Defence Australia’s AS21 Redback. These vehicles incorporate the latest available technology including active protective systems, advanced armour packages, anti-tank guided missiles and programmable munitions – developed in response to contemporary threats.
During the trials, these vehicles underwent thorough testing, evaluation and analysis during a year-long Risk Mitigation Activity, the evidence from which informs the Gate 2 decision in 2022. By this time the project will have been in existence for around 18 years, during which it has been subject to – and passed – scrutiny from numerous force structure and capability/investment plan reviews to ensure that it remained necessary and relevant. Notably, it has received bi-partisan support throughout this period, evinced by the 2009, 2013 and 2016 government endorsed Defence White Papers. Consequently, Australia is on track to acquire one of the most advanced AFV in existence.
Relevance of the IFV to Australia’s approach
A single AFV, or even a few hundred of them, is not a strategic effect. For Land Power to be effective at this level it must be credible, deployable and sustainable. Army’s combined-arms task forces deliver its strategic effects. These task forces, often deployed under the aegis of larger joint task forces, employ and sustain a wide array of capabilities.
In an expeditionary or offensive scenario, the task force, based on a combat brigade and attached elements, is about the minimum level of commitment in an Australian context to produce a strategic effect, e.g., South Vietnam and East Timor are examples. While smaller niche commitments drawing on special forces, mentoring, reconstruction, training, engineering and medical assets are important and can have disproportionate effects to their size; alone they have not proven decisive nor do they provide all the effects necessary to end conflict.
The task force is the lowest level where all the combat arms of the CAFS unite to form combined-arms teams and provide the widest range of credible response options. A task force of 3,000-5,000 personnel, can generate around three battle groups, each of 500-800 personnel. These battle groups are based on a combat unit such as an Armoured Cavalry Regiment, Mechanised or Motorised Infantry Battalion or an Aviation Regiment, with attached Combat Engineer and Artillery support.
The task force contains headquarters, signals and combat service support units who provide command, control, communications, administrative, health, transport, maintenance, supply and repair support. The task force also benefits from a range of specialised support from other formations, including: intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance, cyber and electronic warfare, construction engineering and logistics.
To function effectively, a task force may contain large quantities of AFV, artillery, aircraft, support vehicles, weapons, equipment and supplies. To deploy such a force abroad requires significant strategic transportation assets, primarily ‘sea lift’ ships complemented by strategic ‘air lift’ aircraft. To sustain this force also requires strategic lift assets to supply the force ammunition, fuel, food and mountains of supplies and parts. The ADF has relatively few of these and the challenges this poses to Australia are worthy of further analysis.
Equally, the force will inevitably require personnel, vehicles and equipment to replace battle losses as well as follow-on forces to rotate the initial commitment and sustain it for protracted periods. Sustaining such an endeavour is a national effort underpinned by industry.
In general terms, Army has sustained these commitmentsvia athree stage ‘force generation’cycle. If one task force is ‘ready’ to becommitted to the fight, one is ‘readying’ to replace it and a third is in ‘reset’, generating the capabilities to go into the cycle, or in the case of enduring commitments, re-generating them. Ideally in enduring commitments, a fourth rotation is mobilised to add a ‘rest’ periodbefore re-entering the cycle, to avoid physically and mentally exhausting the force and ‘burning out’ the capability.
The logic of this cycle is mirrored in the Coles Review of Navy’s submarine capability. Notably, to achieve the strategic effect of two submarines, it demonstrated that a six submarine force was needed to ensure that: two were consistently available for tasking, two were in training or short term maintenance and two were in long term maintenance or upgrade. Simply put, no capability can provide 100 per cent of its capacity for 100 per cent of the time.
Thus, three combat brigades, adequately resourced and supported, provide credible and sustainable Land Power for immediate response options, and follow-on forces. These are necessary to perform the strategic tasks assigned in the military strategy against a prescribed threat profile.
However, if the threat exceeds this profile, such as a major direct threat against sovereign Australia or its vital interests in the region, then the capabilities and capacities of the forces to defend Australia must also be reviewed – arguably the reason for 12 submarines. Equally, significant increases to the threat profile may trigger the activation of reserve elements and wider mobilisation of the civil populace as methods to grow the capacity of the ADF. Critically both scenarios require the timely and rapid activation of industry, who will help provision the initial commitment and follow-on forces and will be vital in repairing and replacing battle losses.
Why 450 IFV?
Army’s three active or regular combat brigades each have elements equipped with APCs. To maintain this force structure, it is logical that sufficient IFV are acquired to equip them to provide credible conventional deterrence in peace and a viable and sustainable response when in conflict.
Army ostensibly owns 431 APCs (less those gifted to Ukraine) arrayed across its combat brigades and training establishments. Some of these are also held as spares to enable fleet rotation, major maintenance activities, upgrades and replace combat losses. Therefore, the acquisition of around 450 IFV in nine variants under Land 400-3 makes sense to replace similar numbers of APCs in the current context. A lower number, such as 300 or even 200 vehicles as proposed by one commentator, falls well short of what is required to provision the current force.
Notably, if 350 M113AS4 were deemed inadequate to equip two mechanised infantry battalions and supporting elements, how then is 300 an adequate number to equip three armoured infantry battalions and supporting elements in the future? 300 vehicles would thereforeacquirethe capability in such small numbers that it is neither a credible deterrent nor a viable response.
This is particularly so with regard to the key strategic effect of close combat. The 450 vehicles sought will equipInfantry, Combat Engineer and Armour organisations, as well as supporting elements such as artillery observers, headquarter elements, medics, mechanics and logisticians. By Army’s calculation around 3,000 soldiers are afforded the advantages of moving and fighting under armour, greatly improving their chances of success in combat and reducing the likelihood of casualties. This equates to roughly a third of Army’s active combat force, a significant number.
Reducing the number by a third therefore exposes around 1,000 soldiers to greater risk and undermine the forces’ ability to operate as combined-arms organisations with like mobility and protection. More broadly, without sufficient numbers of IFV, Land Power’s contribution to the Maritime Strategy is greatly diminished as Army’s combined-arms organisations are incomplete. A lower number impacts the ability to defeat threats and support Sea and Air Power through the seizure of key terrain and denial of land, sea and air space. Ultimately this draws into question the feasibility of accomplishing the strategic tasks of deter and respond.
Furthermore, given the economies of scale of manufacturing 450 vehicles over 300, serious scrutiny should be applied by decision makers as to the purported benefits of reducing the capability by a third to achieve savings which are unlikely to yield an equivalent 30%reduction in cost.Acquiring around 450 infantry fighting vehicles is therefore an appropriate choice for Australia in this context, as it provides the strategic means for Land Power to deliver, and sustain, its key strategic effects to the Maritime Strategy.
Equally, these 450 vehicles are not simply exchanging old-for-new, or like-for-like; the IFV is a vastly more capable vehicle which provides significant benefits. The IFV and Infantry form a ‘battle team’; in effect a micro-combined arms team. The IFV delivers soldiers into the fight and fights with them in close combat. The IFVs superior protection enables Infantry to close with the enemy while under the protection of armour, thereby reducing their exposure to enemy fire.
Once dismounted, the Infantry benefit from immediate direct fire support and the physical protection provided by their vehicle. Conversely, the Infantry protects the IFV, and other Armour, from short-range anti-armour threats, clears and holds terrain and adds to the team’s situational awareness. In simple terms, in the infantry close quarters fight, the IFV is the big kid on the block the little kids call upon to beat up the neighbourhood bully.
In contrast the APC performs a ‘battle taxi’ function; it delivers soldiers to the fight but it lacks the firepower and protection to fight with them in close combat. The APCs limited protection generally means that it delivers the infantry to a location outside effective anti-armour weapon range. This risks the infantry moving and fighting on foot for a protracted period. This increases their exposure to enemy fire and the likelihood of casualties; it also may physically exhaust the infantry before they reach the enemy and cause them to expend much of their ammunition in covering fire before achieving their mission. It also increases their reliance on tank and artillery support. Figure 2. demonstrates the differences in approaches between these two systems.
Professor Lester Grau at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth sums up the problem for infantry fighting without the benefit of modern armoured vehicles with beautiful bluntness:
‘Infantrymen are of little value if they are late to the battle, tired when they arrive, hungry and short of ammunition, unable to keep up with the tanks or committed piecemeal.’
Given contemporary threats and available technology, the IFV represents the best obtainable solution to these issues. Retiring the M113 APC after almost 60 years of service and replacing it with a credible, deployable and sustainable IFV is a logical approach to filling this capability gap. Australia’s aged APC capability has fallen well behind comparable Western militaries which acquired IFVs in the 1980s.
Further, regional militaries have recently undergone their own programs to acquire modern Armour, including MBT, IFV and self-propelled artillery. Commentators have argued that it would be ‘ridiculous’ for the Navy to be operating Collins submarines in the 2040s because by then these boats will be 50 years old. It would be equally ridiculous to send soldiers to fight in a 75-year-old APC in the 2040s. Therefore, a decision to replace the M113AS4 APC capability is timely and appropriate.
Conclusion
In the ongoing debate about the role and relevance of Armour, and more specifically the planned IFV acquisition, facts and context are key. However, this discourse has suffered from a poor, or poorly interpreted, knowledge base. This article has sought to contribute to thisfoundation by explaining what Armour is, outlining the historical efforts to deliver an IFV capability and its relevance to Australia’s security equation.
Fundamentally, Defence has a capability gap in its joint combined-arms warfare approach. This creates a fissure running from tactical to strategic levels, weakening the ADFs ability to demonstrate credible conventional deterrence and deliver response options. Contrary to recent grossly misinformed comments, Armour is not irrelevant to Australia’s Maritime Strategy – it is essential to it. Without Armour, CAFS and Land Power poorly equipped to contribute to Australia’s maritime security.
Given the threat environment and contemporarytechnological approaches, the IFV represents the best available means to close that gap. Since 2009, the numbers of vehicles sought under Land 400 has steadily reduced from 1,100 to 700 to now 661. The last figure encompasses 211 CRV to replace 257 ASLAV under Phase 2 and 450 IFV variants to replace 431 M113AS4 variants in Phase Three. Further reductions of Phase 3, therefore call into question the ability to provision the forces which undertake mounted combat. The 450 IFVproposedprovides the minimum capability necessary for Land Power to contribute to,and sustain, Australia’s Maritime Strategy within the current strategic context.
For those charged with the national security of Australia – it’s time. Retiring and replacing the M113 APC capability with a credible, deployable and sustainable IFV in numbers sufficient to enable the combined-arms approach; is logical, appropriate and timely. The IFV provides benefits to Australia’s soldiers which the APC does not and which they need to win in battle.
Should history repeat itself and the government defer or cancel the replacement of the M113, as occurred in Project Waler, this would not only be a reversal of its long standing support for the capability since 2004, but would leave Army ill prepared to conduct its most important strategic task within the joint Maritime Strategy. Fighters, frigates and submarines are important to a Maritime Strategy, however; their relevance and ability to force a decision to favourably terminate conflict is eroded without Land Power founded on Armour.
Importantly, this acquisition delivers significant secondary benefits by improving Australia’s sovereign industrial capability to design, develop, manufacture and sustain armoured vehicles. Improving Australia’s ability to sustain Armour, and the wider CAFS, complements its ability to demonstrate and deploy, credible conventional Land Power. With the right approach, right partners and a real commitment to manufacturing this will provide Australia enduring national security benefits that transcend the often unsophisticated debate on Armour.
[i] For those wishing to see examples of Armour first hand, at least two world class collections of historical Armour are available to the public in Australia. One is located at the Australian Armour and Artillery Museum in Cairns Far North Queensland. The other is the Australian Army Tank Museum at Puckapunyal in central Victoria. Notably, Army conducts a demonstration of contemporary combined-arms close combat during the annual Exercise Chong Ju held in August at Puckapunyal.