The new face of defence logistics

Logistics has long been recognised as a crucial aspect of military capability, however, some now argue that "modern integrated logistic services represent a military edge and a valuable strategic capability worthy of concentrated attention in its own right".
The proposition that a modern logistics capability represents a military edge in its own right is advanced in a recent Australian Defence Studies Centre working paper authored by Lieutenant Colonel Susan Smith. It is offered in comparison to what she says is the current practice "which invariably casts logistics as 'an enabler:' a handmaiden to the politically appealing warfighting technology that dominates capability considerations in the Australian Defence Organisation".

As appealing as the concept of a handmaiden may be in some contexts, a variety of security challenges in our region and the evolving nature of Australia's alliance relationship with the US means that a subordinate view of logistics is out of step with the reality facing the ADF.

Some of the more perceptive comment on last year's White Paper and the recent AUSMIN talks has noted Australia's increasing obligation to defence self-reliance and the expectation of our major ally that Australia will be both capable and willing to play a leading role in our region.

According to Lt Col Smith one of the major lessons to come from the ADF's deployment to East Timor as part of INTERFET, and one that has been borne out in other successful coalition operations such as the Korean and Gulf wars, was the need for the lead nation to make up the logistic capability shortfalls of other coalition members.

The original support concept for INTERFET was that logistics would remain a national responsibility, with each contributor nation deploying and supporting its own force.

In reality, Australia had to underwrite much of the logistics capability in East Timor and in fulfilling its role as lead nation also made up for many contingent's deficiencies in combat service support. This entailed the ADF deploying force-level logistic assets aside from those necessary for the Australian units sent to East Timor.

Australia's success in East Timor is well recorded, but less well known is just how much of a close run thing it was in terms of logistics. Thankfully, with relatively minor exceptions, the peace-enforcing role did not escalate and there were not large ammunition re-supplies to be brought forward and many wounded in need of evacuation.

If Australia has to adopt such a regional lead role in the future then extra logistical capabilities will be required. Lt Col Smith says, "The inability of the ADO to support the Australian Army deployed offshore beyond a certain time limit, without guaranteed access to a larger logistic system, significantly reduces strategic flexibility". While the ADF's professional military leaders are no doubt aware of this, it is an issue that Australia's political leaders should also understand.

According to General Sir Archibald Wavell, "It is a lack of knowledge of the principles and practice of military movement and administration - the 'logistics' of war, some people call it - which puts what we call amateur strategists wrong, not the principles of strategy themselves which can be apprehended in a very short time by any reasonable intelligence".

Logistics capabilities underpin the ADF's ability to fulfil its politically determined strategic functions.

The foremost of these is the defence of Australia and its direct approaches, and this was reiterated in last year's White Paper. That same document made clear that, "The kind of Australian Defence Force that we need is not achievable without the technology access provided by the US alliance".

In dismissing the term "deputy sheriff" after the recent AUSMIN conference, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "We are partners with Australia and Australia plays a leading role in this part of the world".

While there is no doubt that Australia's relationship to the US is hugely beneficial in terms of access to defence technology, the relationship is increasingly bringing with it the obligation to look after our own backyard. The US rendered great assistance in East Timor, but there is no guarantee that they will be willing, or in a position, to do so again. It is a fair bet that they would rather help us to help ourselves.

Any recasting of the ADF's logistic capabilities to meet its strategic aims would have to be achieved at a time when the search for efficiency within Defence is on in earnest, and there is great competition for available funds.

The partial commercialisation of the ADF's logistic tail to take advantage of existing national infrastructure and private sector efficiencies has been attempted with mixed success. Many individual contracts let under the Commercial Support Program seem to be working well enough in the short to medium term, but the recent attempt to outsource Defence warehousing and distribution under the Defence Integrated Distributed System (DIDS) has been an unmitigated and costly failure.

It is not clear that savings gained from outsourcing certain activities to the private sector can be sustained when the pool of ex defence-trained personnel employed by the various contractors moves on. Training new personnel is an expense that will increase the price in future contracts.

Of particular relevance to civilian participation in logistic support activities is the as-yet incomplete development of policy for deployment of civilian contractors in area of operations. A discussion paper on this was released in March 1999 but little else has surfaced publicly. There is anecdotal evidence of a trend away from using contractors in certain areas of Defence. Some division and organisational heads have discovered to their chagrin that insufficient suitably qualified Defence personnel remain to determine specific specialist requirements and effectively administer contracts.

In his address to the Defence+Industry 2001 conference in Canberra, Major General Peter Haddad, Commander Joint Logistics, pointed out that, "Our deployments are normally to places where there is some form of devastation. The devastation may be man-made or natural, however it usually results in there being limited or in some cases no commercial infrastructure or services we can draw on during the initial periods.

"The support the military force needs must be delivered in an environment that is less than orderly, has disrupted or poorly developed infrastructure and is subject to interference by a range of forces. Our forces are generally operating with less than perfect information and within a constantly changing framework.

"This is not the ideal commercial business environment."

Maj Gen Haddad stated that, "The Australian Defence Force must have a deployable logistic support capability that: matches the speed of deployment of our forces; has the responsiveness to match rapid changes; and possesses the inherent flexibility to cope with uncertainty in an austere environment in order to support battlefield equipment and ensure full combat power is available to the force commander.

"Similarly any commercial arrangement we enter into or any commercial practice we adopt (or adapt) must be capable of achieving the same outcome in the same circumstances."

The ADF takes with it at least enough supplies and materiel to function for a given length of time, called an operational viability period. This is achieved via a layered approach; meaning each group carries with it a degree of inherent sustainability such as fuel, food, spare parts and basic medical support. The more layers, the longer the ADF can operate without a flowing supply chain. However, too many layers and the layers themselves become a burden. In business terms, the ADF could bankrupt itself with over-insurance.

To ensure this does not happen Maj Gen Haddad says, "We must have a balance and take measured risks". Logistic support options include the ADF's assets, international and national support.

According to Maj Gen Haddad, "Our experience, and the experiences of other nations is that across the duration of an operation we draw on all three options in combination to meet the warfighter's needs and the ratio of the three options varies through the duration of an operation".

Australia's changing strategic circumstances and maturing alliance relationships may dictate that that prudent risk management means placing greater reliance on, and devoting more resources to, the ADF's own logistic assets.

JP 2059 - Bulk Liquid Distribution - JP 2059 is providing support to operations in East Timor by the provision of ship to shore transfer of fuel, bulk storage of fuel and the effective purification and subsequent bulk distribution of large volumes of water. Active phases of the project are Phase 2 (fuel) and Phase 3 (water). Phase 1 entailed a project definition study and is complete.

Phase 2 is divided into two sub-phases, providing ship to shore refuelling and the transfer of bulk quantities of ground and aviation fuels inland from the beachhead.

Phase 2A will provide the ADF in East Timor with the capability to transfer bulk quantities of aviation and ground fuels from naval and civilian support vessels to storage onshore. This requirement will be addressed by the development of two discrete fuel transfer sub-capabilities.

The ship to shore sub-capabilities will be based on a medium transfer capability consisting of Dunlop flexible towed barges (Dracones); and a light transfer capability based on Dunlop collapsible fuel bladders carried in an LCM 8. These capabilities will be operated in conjunction with the inland fuel transfer capability identified in Phase 2B.

Phase 2B will provide the ADF with a
Possession of this capability will enable the ADF to rapidly transfer high volumes of fuels from the beachhead in order to attain target stock levels to support operational rates of effort for deployed combat forces.

Phase 3 is also divided into two sub-phases. Phase 3A will provide the ADF with the capability to treat water drawn from various sources using reverse osmosis technology. The capability is a truck/trailer-mounted modular system capable of treating seawater, organic, chemical, radiological and biologically contaminated water.

Two equipment solutions have been procured. These are the Karcher, 600 litres per hour - 1600G; and the Searecovery North Sea 150/M3 6,250 Litres per hour water purification units. The capability will provide purified water for deployed force elements comprising between 500 and 3,500 personnel.

Phase 3B will provide the ADF with the capability to transport (using the existing Army fleet of medium vehicles) and store bulk quantities of water for deployed force elements. The distribution capability will be provided through Tieman 3,000 litre rigid tanks that are self-deployable from Unimog and Mack vehicles and Amfuel 1,800 litre flexible tanks.

Due to the urgency of this project, off-the-shelf equipment solutions have been sought. In addition, most equipment has been sole-sourced due to the specialist nature of the equipment and the limited number of international suppliers.

Procurement and delivery of the elements under Phase 2 is continuing. All elements of Phase 3 are under contract with several capabilities already delivered to East Timor. All remaining equipment should be delivered by December 2001.

Procurement of the wider ADF capabilities under JP 2059 will be subject to further Defence committee approvals. Projected years of decision for the main project are: phase 2 fuel - 2001/02; and phase 3 water - 2001/02. It is expected that the range of equipment to be acquired will be similar to that procured for the East Timor requirement.

JP 126 - Joint Theatre Distribution - Joint Project 126 concerns an integrated distribution system that deals with the distribution of materiel and personnel both to and within a joint force area of operations (AO). JP126 is driven by improving the effectiveness of operational level logistics.

There are four phases in JP126 and phase 0 is a preliminary stage to confirm the scope and conceptual requirements of the joint theatre distribution system. Phase 1 consists of a three-year project definition study (PDS) which seeks to identify and map out a cost-effective path for co-ordinating the many disparate logistic initiatives underway within Defence.

Phase two covers acquisition and implementation and is currently scheduled for determination on 2003/04. Phase 4 has a year of decision out in 2010/11 and will upgrade or replace the systems acquired in phase 2.

Particular deficiencies identified in recent operation that are to be addressed by the project include asset visibility, logistic command and control, management information systems, and physical delivery platforms and handling equipment.

JP 2077 - Improvements to Logistics Information Systems - Logistic support is provided to the ADF through the acquisition of goods and services, and the repair, maintenance and modification of existing equipment. The processes to conduct and manage these activities are embedded in the Defence's logistics information system (LIS).

The main information technology component of the LIS is the Standard Defence Supply System (SDSS). The SDSS upgrade project is enhancing standardisation across the ADF and further improving SDSS's interoperability with other systems.

The May 2001 federal budget included funding for JP 2077 - Improvements to Logistics Information Systems, which will complement and extend the improvements delivered by the SDSS upgrade. The project consists of a number of activities that include: upgrading the computing platform and software packages; increasing the standardisation of systems and procedures; improving inventory management practices; auditing of the logistics inventory; and improving the ability to track goods in transit.

The purpose of JP2077 is to achieve more efficient and effective logistics support to the ADF through improvements to the Logistics Information System. Implementing each of the components of JP2077 will improve the ability of the LIS to: support management reporting; resolve the deficiencies revealed in East Timor; and support a co-ordinated Defence approach to electronic procurement, as directed by the government's on-line agenda.

Combined theatre logistics ACTD - In February 2000 the Australian Department of Defence accepted an invitation from US Pacific Command to participate in a project to improve logistics interoperability and situational awareness between coalition partners. The project, known as coalition theatre logistics - advanced concept technology demonstration (CTL-ACTD), is designed to enhance combat support to coalition forces by providing operational and logistic staff with access to timely, integrated and relevant logistic information, together with a suite of decision-making support tools.

The core of the CTL-ACTD project is the ability to build an information exchange environment between coalition partners that will enable decision-makers to view and analyse data and information needed to co-ordinate coalition logistics support. The CTL-ACTD will leverage existing national systems and information resources to form an integrated coalition
Australia and the US are co-sponsors of this five-year project. Thailand has agreed to participate. Other nations have already expressed interest in this project as they see the clear potential for it to provide logistic efficiencies during future deployments.

By Daniel Cotterill, Canberra