C3I: JP 2072 - picking up the pieces

1 November 2007

By Tom Muir

The DMO has taken an unusual step in terminating General Dynamics Canada’s prime systems integrator (PSI) contract for Joint Project 2072. Further delay now seems inevitable, but the ADF need an NCW capability quickly. What happens now?

In what appears to have been a particularly drastic step by the Defence Material Organisation, General Dynamics Canada, the prime systems integrator for JP 2072, Battlespace Communications Land, had its contract terminated last month.

It seems that following delays with the project, and an unsatisfactory Systems Engineering Review by the Commonwealth and GDC, the company had prepared a recovery plan to get the project back on track. But the initiatives proposed in the plan were rejected.

GDC was well qualified to undertake the task, its successful involvement in the somewhat similar Bowman and Iris programs attest to that.

Earlier in the piece, the DMO's David Marshal, in an interview with British defence journalist Adam Baddeley, said the JP2072 project office had visited the Bowman integrated project team while developing the statement of work for the JP2072 prime system integrator request for tender.

“JP2072 can be likened to a cross between the Bowman and Falcon projects in the UK, analogous to the US Warfighter Information Network–Tactical.

The project office maintains a watch on the development of both programs and intends to maintain close links when completing the requirements development post-contract signature,” he said.

Apples and oranges
However, he noted that important differences existed between Australian and British requirements - JP2072’s initial requirements would not introduce a capability comparable to the UK’s Bowman High Capacity Data Radio.

“The key lesson observed from discussions with allies and Australian users is the need to maintain accurate situational awareness at the lower tactical level.

Due to force dispersion, this environment has and is likely to continue to rely on VHF and HF communications. Without heavy reliance on satellite communications, maintaining acceptable data capacity between these mobile headquarters will pose a challenge,” Marshall said.

“The project office is managing links to other communications projects through interface control working groups. Many of these are already in place and were established by existing projects.

Where they do not exist, they will be established by JP2072 and will be the prime forum for interface management through the requirements definition process.

“In a phased program, maintaining legacy equipment and ensuring maximum backward compatibility with new capability are always issues that require close management.

In JP 2072, both the fleet management organisation responsible for maintaining current systems and the JP 2072 project office belong to the same system program office.”

Future procurement decisions, Marshall explained, would be taken with value for money and through life-cycle support costs as prime considerations.

An important component of this equation is maximum practical use of existing infrastructure and support where possible.

At the time of the interview, Marshall told Baddeley that a prime system integrator (PSI) for JP 2072 was expected to be appointed later that year.

He said the integrator would be responsible for demonstrating that this analysis had occurred during the evaluation process, prior to any equipment solution being accepted by the ADF.

Certainly the selection of GDC as preferred tenderer involved considerable, if not exhaustive, questioning of its proposals.

SYPAQ provided offer definition evaluation services to the DMO's Electronic Systems Division for JP 2072, which involved conducting offer definition workshops with GDC, and updating the offer definition SOW.

The services also included review of the tender SOW for ambiguities or inconsistencies and, with the assistance of JP 2072 staff, identify areas where the preferred tenderer's SOW response fell short of Defence requirements. SYPAQ also reviewed the contractors' plans.

So with all this careful evaluation of GDC's winning solution, how come things went so wrong? Did GDC rely too heavily on its Canadian resources, human and otherwise, to manage the initial stages of this Australian project, thus missing out on close interaction with the JP2072 IPT?

This may have been particularly important for the preparation of the project definition study that was one of the primary requirements of the initial project phase.

Did GDC leave the transfer of skilled staff to its Canberra office too late? Did the company rely too heavily on recruiting skilled staff locally only to be hit by the downturn in the availability of qualified systems engineers and the like?

Whatever the cause, time was lost and the program slipped badly, to the extent that some of its responsibilities were hived off to other projects, Land 200's BGC3 communications requirement an example.

Where to now?
So what is left of JP2072 and what is now the way forward? As originally conceived JP2072 covered the ADF’s combat net radio (CNR) and trunk communications networks, as well as local area voice and data systems.

It will also introduce tactical data distribution systems and tactical extended range communications systems not previously employed in the Australian context.

The goal was to provide the Land Force with a deployable and integrated BCS(L) with connectivity across all component systems such as C2, intelligence, offensive fire, logistics, ground based air defence and sensor-linked weapon systems.

The first (and current) phase was intended to equip a Joint Task Force (JTF), based on a Brigade Group (including RAAF, LSF and Force-level elements), with core elements of a modern digitally based communications system, providing a baseline for the future tactical information exchange system.

At its core, JP2072 would provide interfaces between subsystems, external systems (air, maritime, strategic, coalition), and where necessary provide interfaces to remaining legacy systems.

Defence saw the first phase as an opportunity to examine new technologies and architectures in an operational environment prior to being introduced more widely throughout the ADF.

Thus Phase 1 also included definition studies for Phase 2 as well as capability demonstrators for candidate technologies in that and future phases.

The core elements of the system to flow from Phase 1 included:

• new HF and UHF/VHF tactical radios

• high-capacity communications links from Bde HQ to combat unit HQ

• high-capacity voice and data radio links interconnecting the major nodes with a COTS-based network management system

• secure mobile telephones for staff permitting extended mobility within the network coverage area

• Concept Technology Demonstrator (CTD) ‘inserts’ to fast-track new capabilities such as a real-time tactical data network.

But before these core elements could be identified there were other tasks in front of the PSI. These comprised:

• the definition and design of the 2015 tactical communications system architecture

• definition of the 2015 mission and support systems

• mapping out the plan for implementation of the system over the project's three phases

• identification of technical solutions for the high priority capability shortfalls for Phase 1

The second part, Phase 1 Orders, was aimed at acquiring and introducing new equipment as well as enhancements to existing capabilities, following market surveys and trade studies.

There was a budget of $97 million but due to delays, market survey responses are now out of date, and it is clear that some of the equipment requirements have been hived off to other projects presumably with their budgets.

The Land 200 (L200) BGC3 includes a requirement for top of the range Type 1 encrypted combat radio systems to support battle management system (BMS) generated data, and existing voice services within the Battle Group.

L200 also requires a network management system (NMS) to electronically integrate, configure, monitor and control the CRS. The proposed extensive and prolonged evaluation of these systems suggests we are looking at complete CNR solutions for the Battle Group and below.

All of this then leaves:

• completion of the definition and design of the 2015 tactical comms architecture

• completion of the definition of the 2015 mission and support systems

• completion of the system implementation plan

• identification of the potential technical solutions for the balance of capability shortfalls.

Previous JP2072 contenders
We believe there were just three other contenders for the JP 2072 PSI role in addition to the GDC bid. They included Raytheon Australia, BAE Systems Australia and IBM Australia as vendor-independent PSIs.

Raytheon Australia saw JP2072 as a cornerstone project for achieving Network Enabled Operations capability within the ADF. Its team comprised Raytheon Australia (prime) with Northrop Grumman, Kongsberg and Ericsson as capability partners.

Northrop Grumman is prime contractor for the US Army’s Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and is the architect and integrator of the US Army Tactical InterNet, a mobile wireless network.

BAE Systems Australia proposed a solo, vendor-independent bid for the prime systems integrator role. It currently supplies the ADF with more than 90 per cent of its mobile tactical and trunk communications equipment and was awarded a $75 million contract to provide the terrestrial infrastructure to fully utilise satellite communications using the Defence-owned payload on the new C1 satellite.

As we have noted IBM was also a contender for the PSI role on a similar vendor independent basis as BAE Systems, though it seems unlikely at present it will bid again.

Who knows? Perhaps GD Systems Australia, with very considerable firsthand knowledge of JP2072's needs, may put up its hand for the balance of Phase 1, if it is retendered.