By far the most dramatic moment at ASPI’s two-day “The Submarine Choice” conference came in its closing minutes, with an extraordinary verbal stoush between the chairman of German submarine constructor Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS), and a retired Swedish Rear Admiral.
The exchange highlighted the tension between TKMS, which purchased Collins class designer Kockums from Sweden in 2005 and renamed it TKMS AB, and the Swedish government which continues to retain Collins class intellectual property (IP). It also threw into sharp relief the complexities facing the Commonwealth in deciding on a design and construction entity for Project Sea 1000.
Answering questions at the conclusion of a presentation in which he noted that TKMS subsidiary HDW had built 183 conventionally-powered submarines since 1960, Dr Hans Christopher Atzpodien said it appeared Sweden no longer wanted a foreign owner to be involved in the country’s next generation A26 submarine program. “Of course we would have been open to any discussions and fair solutions to this new situation, but there was not much of talking – recently there was much more of, let’s say, force to deprive us of our basic ownership rights.”
Pointing out that these developments could influence Australia’s Sea 1000 choices, RADM (Rtd) Göran Larsbrink commented from the audience that while selling Kockums had been a mistake, it was right for Sweden to “take it back”, to have the capability to design, produce and operate its own submarines, “as well as to cooperate with others in order to meet national security interests, all under the umbrella of government-to-government agreements.
“And in this Sweden possesses all relevant IP and (can) use it as we want….. and there is no one else that can use it without permission from our government,” stated Larsbrink, who prior to retirement in 2008 held senior position in the Swedish armed forces, Defence Materiel Administration, and Ministry of Defence.
Dr Atzopodien then expressed surprise at the phrase “take it back” being linked to an entity of which TKMS was the legal owner.
“The measures to take it back resulted in hiring massively our skilled people without telling us, taking away the business licence or putting it on hold, not providing us with any further orders for shipyard in total (sic) and thereby destroying the industrial base and the employment base for almost 1,000 people,” he commented.
Options for Sea 1000 Just four days later, Thyssen Krupp and Sweden’s Saab confirmed they were in talks over the sale of TKMS AB. If successful, this would clear the way for Saab both to seek involvement in Sea 1000, and separately, to eventually market the A26 for export in competition with the HDW Type 218SG - recently selected by Singapore.
With the Sea 1000 Integrated Product Team (IPT) in Adelaide now involved with initial concept work – compiling for the yet-to-be selected design entity a detailed brief on the new design options for the Collins replacement - much of the informal discussion at the conference centred on from where that entity would be sourced.
This will be informed in part by the industry engagement exercise announced in his keynote speech by Defence Minister David Johnston.
Surprisingly, Germany (HDW) and France (DCNS) were both largely discounted in the informal (but informed) discussions as prospective design partners on the basis of there being no basis of engagement, as was Sweden (TKMS AB), due to the troubled relationship between the then-Kockums and Defence, and current developments. Navantia’s prospects have dimmed following design faults with its S-80, while the practical implications of cultural differences appear to limit Australian interest in Japan’s Soryu class to its highly-effective drive train.
This all emphasises the strength of the bilateral and multilateral relationships in the submarine space between Australia, the UK and the US, and the possible emergence of a “Three Eyes” design entity headed by Australia, with technology support from the US and design and technology support from the UK.
Work on the alternative replacement option of an evolved Collins design is currently being carried out under contract by TKMS AB. This follows an agreement signed last year by the Commonwealth with the Swedish government, extending its access to existing Collins IP.
In his conference speech Senator Johnston dismissed speculation about whether Australia needed the 12 Future Submarines specified in the 2009 Defence White Paper.
“Let me be clear on this subject – my primary focus is not on numbers but on the capability and availability of boats required to meet the tasks set by government,” he stated.
The strategic objectives of the Future Submarine program including operational concepts, the number of submarines required at sea and therefore the total number of submarines, would be examined in developing next year’s Defence White Paper.
Meanwhile, the life of the Collins class fleet would probably be extended for a further five or six years, taking the service life of HMAS Farncomb, commissioned in 1998, out to about 2033.
From selection of a design concept to the cutting of steel would take at least eight years – “this means we are already pretty much against the wall in terms of this critical path schedule,” the Minister commented.
Continuing the close relationships with the US and UK on high end submarine capability was critical to success with the Future Submarine.
“Our ability to access such technologies is not a simple undertaking and relies on our ability to sustain a trusted relationship with these critical partners at the levels of government to government, navy to navy and across industry,” he said.
RAN perspective Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Ray Griggs noted that his counterparts in other countries attached great importance to incremental development and to learning from their previous experiences. “What we are looking at is probably best characterised as a contemporary version of the Collins class capability,” he added.
“As we contemplate the direct cost of the new submarine program for Australia, I think we should always balance that against the considerable cost impact that the investment we make imposes on others to try and counter the effect of our submarine capability.
“This aspect of the submarine discussion is largely absent in the public domain; if we are truly thinking strategically it needs to be there, front and centre.”
Reinforcing the importance of range, endurance and stealth, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut RN, head of the Future Submarine program, explained that at the tactical level, stealth was achievable operating forward, where the place and time of attack remained with the submarine.
“It becomes far less achievable the closer our submarines are constrained to operations near our vital areas. In such areas, submarines are forced to operate reactively, which would require positioning at speed with questionable success and increasing risk of compromise,” he said.
Core technical expertise in Australia had yet to attain the experience levels to produce what David Gould, General Manager Submarines at the DMO, described as the intelligent customer organisation.
The organisation’s function would include accountability to Defence and government for the execution of the program including letting contracts, making critical design calls and providing authoritative advice to government where appropriate, acting as the design approval authority, and providing certification for the submarine throughout its life.
Attracting the appropriate skill levels “is going to challenge assumptions which are cherished in some places in this city about how people are recruited and contracted into the public service,” Gould commented.
The alternative – unacceptable for a strategic project - would be for cost, capability and design choices to be delegated to a commercial supplier or a foreign government.
Gould stressed that the prospective builder and maintainer, whether one and the same or separate entities, must be involved in design from an early stage.
But although contemporary experience in formulating an executable program for detailed design and build was “gold dust”, care should be taken not to turn the industry consultation phase into de facto selection, he said. Solicitation for design and build was likely to take place next year.
Continuous build program Whatever the number of submarines to be constructed, a continuous build program – “a continuous drum beat”- would allow both build and design skills to remain at their peak and optimum affordability to be achieved, according to ASC CEO Steve Ludlam.
“This approach also allows for continuous capability improvement and evolution so that as new technologies become available, they can be integrated, keeping our fleet at the cutting edge,” he added.
“After you’ve built the final submarine, the first one is being retired and we start again.”
However, for ASPI’s Mark Thomson, the business case for such a continuous build program was dubious for 12 boats, and likely to be non-existent for a fleet of nine or six boats.
To accommodate such a program working at less than a glacial pace would require the life-of-type to be reduced. While it would allow shipyards to progressively deliver higher productivity and thereby reduce costs and lower the risk of schedule delay, the cost of more frequent replacement would be forbidding, he suggested.
Administrative and managerial overheads would need to be maintained continuously rather than for a limited time both within industry and Defence, while the Commonwealth would almost certainly have to split any savings from ongoing productivity gains with the shipyard workforce and the private sector firms engaged in the project.
Additionally, a continuous build program would lock the government into maintaining the size of the relevant fleet, and provide a permanent shipbuilder and its workforce with every incentive to lobby to preserve and expand their privileged position.
“Already, our newspapers are graced with urgent pleas from state politicians, unionists, and shipbuilders to avoid the looming so-called ‘valley of death,’ Thomson commented.
“A small number of players with a strong vested interest in future shipbuilding orders are seeking to shape defence policy in their favour., The tail is doing its very best to wag the dog.”
