Hamish de Bretton-Gordon | UK

The current CBRN threat, or at least perception of it, is increasing with the use of CBRN agents in Syria and Iraq by the Assad regime and ISIS, and is likely to be replicated by IS outside these countries by individuals wanting to create fear and inertia. The planting of a chlorine bomb in an Indonesian supermarket by returning Jihadists in March 2015 adds credence to this concern.

The beheading of hostages last year has highlighted the ruthless brutality of this group, and their apparent ‘no boundaries’ approach to terror in their desire to create the Islamic Caliphate. There is a strong possibility that IS affiliates globally will attempt to use improvised, ‘physiological WMD’s’ as ‘active shooter and Cyber-attack’ are mitigated by State Security forces. Improvised CBRN weapons are relatively easy to get hold of to create terror, even just by the suggestion of their use.

"Very simple and effective equipment is available though some expertise is required to interpret data and provide advice – but ‘Lab-on-a-Stick’ is not far away."

These threats and attacks require agile, simple, flexible CBRN resilience capabilities. In most cases it is not realistic to fight for extended periods in PPE in current and future conflicts – ‘Survive to escape and operate again’ is more realistic. This is certainly true of operations against ISIS and other terror groups. However, Russia and North Korea still pose a high end full CBRN threat which requires careful consideration to give the required levels of resilience and assurance. In simple terms Governments need a range of equipment and options.

Though it was a UK requirement to take respirators to Afghanistan, few did because of the additional load and perceived lack of threat. An incident in LashKar Gah (LKG) in 2007 with Toxic Industrial Chemicals required 700 escape hoods to be dispatched as an emergency expedient to the UK military base in LKG, this took seven days, when troops where dangerously unprotected.

Current thinking on the CBRN threat is that the most likely tactic is improvised CBRN use by non-state actors and state sponsored terror groups. This kind of attack happens with no/short notice, is designed to create maximum inertia and terror, has low toxicity and is not persistent.

For these attacks, IPE needs to be agile, flexible and fit for purpose. The standard operating procedure is to seek shelter and live to fight/report another day. Essential equipment needs to be compact, portable, allow movement, have outstanding field of vision, and high levels of comfort.

Cost effective escape hoods are a solution for generalists. Providing a minimum of 15 minutes protection, they are compact and lightweight, and with options to lease/hire, are an effective escape option. CBRN PPE resilience kits are now available. They provide an escape hood, lightweight protective suit, gloves and decontamination equipment. These packs are low cost, one size fits all, need minimal training, and are pre-packaged ready to deliver.

For specialist teams, a general service respiratory protection mask is needed which offers usability, operational effectiveness and protection. Key requirements include the need for reduced breathing resistance, enhanced protection against toxic agents, ease of weapon deployment, integrated communications, and high flow hydration connections to enable quick and easy fluid intake.

Modular components grant maximum flexibility – interchangeable components allow bespoke systems to be built from individual components as requirements change. Variation in airflow and wearer positions allow integration from lower levels of equipment to higher levels quickly and easily.

The single most important factor to come out of Syria about CBRN is decontamination – 70 per cent of casualties in Syria were caused by secondary contamination but some nations appear to pay lip service to personal decontamination in particular. More people died at Ghouta from secondary contamination than from the initial attack. This was the same situation in Halabja and the smaller attacks in Syria.

There are excellent, low-cost personal decontamination kits available which neutralise chemical weapons rather than just absorbing the hazard.

And personnel must be trained in effective decontamination procedures. Detection at all levels will become increasingly achievable through technological advances which will greatly aide agility and flexibility. Very simple and effective equipment is available though some expertise is required to interpret data and provide advice – but ‘Lab-on-a-Stick’ is not far away.

Extensive use of reach back and data networks will negate the requirement for forward deployed scientists and laboratories

Detection at all levels will allow troops to be proactive on the very complex battlefields of the future.

Note: Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is Managing Director CBRN at Avon Protection.