In a previous article we questioned the relevance of acquiring L400 land combat vehicle systems with capabilities honed for contemporary rather than future warfare.
We don’t resile from that view. As long as land warfare requires lethal effects to achieve military objectives, the systems which deliver them remain fundamental to the way battles are fought. In the quest for combat advantage more effective and sophisticated weapon systems will be sought thereby encouraging the ongoing development of weapons technology. Consequently the weapons required to win future conflicts may differ significantly from those used to defeat adversaries today.
A reading of the Future Land Warfare Report 2014 suggests a mindset still attuned to conventional warfare, modified perhaps by experience from recent ADF deployments, resulting in greater emphasis on force protection.
But despite the extreme and costly lengths that have been taken to protect troops from IEDs, RPGs and so on, one gets the sense that, aside from such basic concepts as surprise and overmatch, the ADF remains uneasy with asymmetric warfare. It seems to regard it as a somewhat unconventional capability, within the realm of insurgents and non-state actors, fighting against traditional military powers.
Chief of Army, LTGEN David Morrison, has no illusions about the doctrinaire classifications of conflict according to the complexion or organisation of one protagonist against another, which he says have not proven to be much help to soldiers on the ground.
“If a boy from a village in Helmand can trigger a device that can destroy your heavily armoured vehicle, you are unlikely to find it useful to ask whether he is a state or non-state actor or whether he thinks he is in a war or an insurgency,” he said.
And while his Army is in the process of hardening and networking, with M1A1 main battle tanks providing the foundation of a robust combined arms team, for which L400 will provide protected mobility, we are left to ponder how this ‘overmatching strength’ could deal with deadly Boko Haram style outbreaks in our own region.
The operational concepts for L400 accept that the LCVS must offer protection against the range of existing and evolving threats, which will require investments in lower signatures and stealth. These, together with other measures such as force protection, countermeasures, protective security and systems redundancy, are surely contemporary approaches, and testing of the operational concepts may reveal a lack of research into the demands of future warfighting.
The L400 CONOPS indicates that it requires platforms that are capable of defeating a ‘comparable’ and ‘adaptive’ enemy, including through amphibious assaults, with the desired end-state providing ‘enhanced land combat lethality, survivability, situational awareness, close combat mobility and combat power in order to win the land battle over time’.
This statement strongly suggests that operational doctrine needs revision in light of the Army’s own Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC) and that further consideration may need to be given to the types of weapon systems needed for future combat, with an interim procurement of contemporary designs, pending further research and understanding of the future warfighting environment.
Industry context
So what do we know about the L400 LCVS requirement? Around 1100 new vehicles are expected to be supplied under the estimated $10 billion program, which forms part of the Army's Combined Arms Fighting System (CAFS). The latter includes legacy, current and future capabilities such as the M1A1, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH), communications and battle management systems, field vehicles and other offensive fire and support assets including tactical lift. CAFS will also integrate legacy and new equipments.
According to the L400 CONOPS the LCVS will allow close combat force elements to develop clear situational awareness of the battlespace by connecting with the future CAFS network architecture. In turn, close combat force elements will be able to use the sensors and systems of the LCVS to target enemy personnel, platforms, weapons systems and installations, with either the integral weaponry or by real time integration with other offensive fire support (sea, land and air based weapon systems).
Industry responded to RFIs released in 2006 and in 2010, the latter seeking broad costing and other information on the capability offered by respondents, as well information on product supportability, identified project risks, and any other information that industry wished to provide. These have helped with the development of LCVS requirements and presumably those respondents and others are anticipating the release of a draft RFT for comment in the 2014-15 timeframe, about the same time as First Pass approval. Nevertheless the Year of Decision for L400 is currently at 2018-2021 and with Initial Operating Capability set at 2026-2027, there may well be further delays driven by a tight Defence budget.
Land 400 will deliver a Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV), an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), a Manoeuvre Support Vehicle (MSV) and an Integrated Training System (ITS). The program will allow a staged retirement of the in-service ASLAV and the M113AS4 APC fleets in line with their technical Life of Type and reducing tactical utility in the contemporary operational environment that involves increasing levels of lethality and complexity.
The IFV will replace the M113AS4 beginning in 2025. The M113AS4 is expected to last as long as 2030 but its 'fit for purpose' suitability is decaying given current and emerging threats. It is not expected to be deployable for anything other than low intensity/low risk missions beyond 2025.
But shouldn’t L400 be used to fast track the acquisition of its priority capability, the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, before getting bogged down in the definition, evaluation, testing and acquisition of the project's other capabilities of lesser importance? We don't need an officially endorsed future force structure to know that M1A1 firepower alone isn't going to win any battles without suitably protected infantry moving up in close formation, and the M113AS4 may not adequately satisfy this role.
LCVS contenders
According to Defence, the LCVS platforms are anticipated to be Australianised versions of MOTS designs, with development work undertaken only where necessary to achieve systems integration outcomes. This does not preclude either an Assembled and Supported in Australia (ASA) or Manufactured and Supported in Australia (MSA) option for some of the capabilities (platforms) that are envisaged.
Procurement of the LCVS may be achieved through a combination of staged market solicitation activities and Government to Government arrangements such as FMS. Opportunities for Australian industry will be available in both the acquisition and sustainment phases of the project. In the acquisition phase, local industry opportunities will depend on the acquisition options presented by industry, including their cost, schedule and technical risks which will be assessed in light of the strategic nature of the LCVS capability.
Notwithstanding, Australian industry will be expected to support the delivery of the required capability, in particular sub-systems and system of systems engineering and integration, simulation, facilities and integrated logistics support (ILS).
We are not privy to the actual contenders for the LCVS requirement but since only those actually submitting tenders for the requirement will know what particular configurations and what protective and other capabilities are included, we see no point in attempting to compare their respective offerings drawn from websites and other sources. Nevertheless we believe that contenders for the L400 combat vehicle capability are likely to include some or all of the following AFV/IFV systems and their mission variants:
- Tracked Puma AIFV offered by PSM (KMW/Rheinmetall),
- Tracked ASCOD 2 SV (GD Land Systems Australia),
- Tracked CV90 Mk.III Armadillo (BAE Systems Australia),
- Tracked Bionix AFV (Kinetics Singapore Technologies),
- Tracked PMMC G5 APC (FFG Germany)
- Wheeled Centauro AFV (Oto Melara Consortium)
- Wheeled RG41 (BAE Systems Australia),
- Wheeled Patria AMV (Patria Vehicles/Lockheed Martin),
- Wheeled VBCI Nexter (Giat Industries/Renault VI),
- Wheeled Piranha V (GD Land Systems Australia),
- Wheeled Boxer ARTEC GmbH (KMW/Rheinmetall),
- Wheeled Arma (Otokar).
What is particularly important in the choice of capabilities, apart from our concerns over contemporaneous capabilities that may not match future warfighting, is that this country is not locked into inflexible, expensive technology likely to be superseded in the near future.
Those missing pieces
Relevant to our headline we note that while the L400 CONOPS outlines the role of the CAFS in amphibious operations, including both Littoral Manoeuvre and Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM), there is no requirement for specialised ship-to-shore connectors, or other forms of watercraft, other than through use of the LHDs and their LCM-1E watercraft. While the latter have the ability to be used OTH and thus fulfil the distance aspect of STOM, planning is to use them for the ship-to-shore transfer of men and equipment in uncontested landings – a narrow interpretation of amphibious capability.
In an article in the Australian Army Journal on the shortcomings of the amphibious deployment and sustainment system (ADAS), Captain Anthony Bamford notes that it is now widely recognised that ADAS, in its current proposed form, would be incapable of operational manoeuvre from the sea (OMFTS) in the littoral environment.
In what surely would apply also to amphibious operations by Combined Arms Teams, Bamford says an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) would be unable to dominate the environment that lines the coast of both Australia and our neighbours (the POE). Even when in receipt of appropriate air support, the proposed landing craft would offer limited flexibility to a commander tasked with anything other than limited ship-to-shore manoeuvre.
The ADF’s POE is geographically diverse and complex. It is dominated by ocean with numerous landmasses separated by narrow maritime passages. Its littoral nature is characterised by the archipelagic, riverine and estuarine terrain, subject to large tidal variations and severe weather.
This means that the naval component of our ATF must be more diverse than just a floating staging base. If we are to set up the ARG for success—it should have the capacity to take advantage of the terrain within the POE and landing craft must have the flexibility to manoeuvre and deliver the ARG over an increased range and in a wider variety of sea-based environments as described above. To achieve this we must invest in this capability.
Noteworthy here is the role expected of the LCH replacements. JP 2048 Phase 5 will see the acquisition of six new heavy landing craft with improved speed and sea keeping capabilities, able to transport armoured vehicles, trucks, stores and personnel and land them over the shore. The primary mission of the LCH system is to provide operational (intra-theatre) and tactical amphibious mobility. This may be as an independent minor Amphibious Task Unit or as part of an Amphibious Task Group with the new LHDs and/or other LCHs. It must be able to perform its full mission capabilities within the operating environment of Australia and the immediate neighbourhood.
Bamford is not the first to have drawn attention to the riverine and estuarine terrain that forms such an important aspect of the littoral in this country’s POE. In a paper in a separate issue of the same journal, Captain Dean Clark discussed the effect of acquiring the amphibious deployment and sustainment system (ADAS), acquired under JP 2048. Under the title Australia’s Amphibious Ambition he argued that the project was largely ignoring the need to control river systems and shallow water areas that dominate our region’s geography.
JP 2048 as a whole appears to be increasingly focused on blue water capability, ignoring the need to control the river systems and shallow water areas that dominate the region’s geography. If the ADF is to engage in littoral manoeuvre, it must be equipped and trained to conduct tactical surface manoeuvre and apply force within shallow coastal areas and river systems.
While the ADAS system focuses on the transit to theatre, it is only part of the amphibious puzzle; the real challenges lie in the successful prosecution of littoral manoeuvre within the amphibious operations area.
Clark says that for the ADF to control amphibious areas of operation for extended periods, it must acquire a surface means of projecting and sustaining force across the spectrum of the amphibious area. Operating effectively within this environment requires amphibious vehicles, supplementary watercraft and a riverine capability, not just ship-to-shore connectors.
‘Currently, this capability is partially filled (somewhat poorly) by use of both the LCM8 watercraft and LARC V amphibious vehicle. To date the ADF has not identified a replacement for the ageing amphibian or the Army’s independent watercraft fleets, despite the fact that these are due to be decommissioned in 2017.’ Clark says failure to adequately address these key pieces of the amphibious puzzle may see the ADF unable to conduct anything other than an unopposed linear beach landing and helicopter insertion, and deny it the ability to conduct surface manoeuvre within the littoral and river systems - a critical weakness in the ADAS system.
In view of the foregoing could there not be a role for smaller fast attack craft such as the Swedish Combat Boat (CB90) or Stridsbåt 90H, for use by reconnaissance teams doing pre-beaching/insertion reconnaissance or replacing helicopters in remote stealthy troop insertions. Four CB90 fast attack craft were loaned to the Royal Marines for intensive trials as the Royal Navy is looking at acquiring a new class of ‘force protection craft’ capable of fending off enemy fast boats and dealing with threats on land. As a secondary requirement, the future boats will be expected to carry up to eight Royal Marines ashore during amphibious operations.
The CB90 has been in service with Swedish and half a dozen other navies since the early 90s (hence the craft’s name) and can carry up to 21 troops at speeds of around 40kts (46mph) – as well as mount machine-guns and grenade launchers. Such craft might be of great value in the protection of high value remote coastal and off-shore assets.
References
- Bamford, Anthony: ADAS: Further Investments Essential to Realise the Dream, Paratus Papers, AAJ, Vol. IX No 1, Autumn 2012.
- Clark, Dean: Australia’s Amphibious Ambitions, AAJ, Vol. VIII, Number 1, Autumn 2011.