How will soon-to-be-selected land combat vehicles, designed for today’s concepts of conventional war, fare against extreme future warfare threats, which have yet to be determined? That’s the problem.
As we understand it, the aim of the Land 400 capability is to enhance survivability and combat effectiveness of ground forces in close combat through the provision of a cost effective, integrated Future Combat Vehicle System (FCVS).
Official indications are that complex urban terrain will be the most likely conflict environment. In particular, low to mid- level technology adversaries will seek to use complex urban terrain to reduce effectiveness of long range sensors and weapons. Aside from national armed forces, adversaries may include a mixture of irregular and third party forces, local and international criminal elements. In this environment, land forces will be required to undertake a wide range of tasks, simultaneously, and at short notice.
It is against this backdrop that L400 is expected to deliver a system which incorporates platforms capable of being employed in a variety of roles including infantry fighting vehicle; armoured personnel carrier, command and control post, reconnaissance and surveillance, and so on.
These are fine words, gleaned from official sources, but are they really relevant to the kind and manner of hostilities which may confront this country over the next 25 years and beyond? How will the L400 LCVS, selected from those with the most advanced capabilities, superbly adapted to conventional warfare, perform in 20-30 years’ time, against threats with which strategic planners are still grappling?
Australian Strategic Policy Institute intern Daniel Nichola had a point in his February 2014 post on The Strategist when he drew attention to the difference between Defence's strategic guidance as provided by the government, and Land 400's operational guidance, which he saw as essentially an Army view of its role.
As Nichola saw it, Australia had to decide whether Army’s primary role should be leading non-conventional missions, such as the Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands stabilisation operations, as implied by strategic guidance, or fighting conventional wars as implied by L400 CONOPS. Put simply, there’s tension between Defence’s strategic guidance as provided by government and L400’s operational guidance as developed within the department.
But what was missed here is not the difference between capabilities needed for conventional warfare and those sought to support this country’s regional defence engagement policies, but the difference between today’s advanced warfighting capabilities and those needed to win in the unconventional, assymentric wars of the not too distant future.
Look at the L400 acquisition timelines for the Phase 2 LCVS:
- Life-of-type of current vehicle fleets to be replaced 2020-2025
- Year of Decision 2018-19 to 2020-21
- Initial Materiel Release 2023-24
- Initial Operational Capability 2026-27 to 2027-28.
Assuming these figures are reasonably correct, they imply that LCVS capabilities selected for their effectiveness against extant L400 requirements in the next four years or so, may, in another 25 years, be more than adequate when facing a range of less intense contingencies. On the other hand, their offensive and protective systems, doubtless maintained and upgraded over the years, may be no match for the more extreme aspects of future warfare they may well encounter.
To put it another way, this may be a period, when well-sustained combat vehicles, acquired under the L400 program, with years of life ahead of them, are found to be wanting as an offensive capability, against methods of future warfare, embracing advanced techniques, about which there currently appears to be a dearth of knowledge or understanding.
Future warfare
So what do we know about future warfare? Aside from the environmental aspects, including those complex urban terrains which hinder the use of long range weapons, future threats include the uncertainties of assymetric hostilities, cyber and biological attacks and electronic attack on a major scale.
According to the Future Land Operating Concept Future (FLOC) conflict will display the trends of diffusion of lethality, the proliferation of technologies and ideas, disaggregation of the battlespace, and a retreat by our adversaries into complex terrain. As a result of these trends three characteristics will emerge: detection and discrimination thresholds, the dominant narrative, and operational uncertainty.
The paper adds that to maintain a strategic capability advantage, the ADF will acquire the most capable platforms and systems to offset the relatively small size of our forces and give them a war-winning edge. Exploiting and applying new advanced technologies will be crucial to achieve this. These apparently include Counter-WMD/CBRN capabilities and Cyber Warfare. In the past decade the growing importance of operations in cyberspace has become more apparent. The potential impacts of such attacks have grown with Defence’s increasing reliance on networked operations. Army must be able to play its part in operations in cyberspace, the FLOC adds.
In the current Australian Army Journal, Major Nicholas Rose draws on USMC warfighting doctrine to look at the offensive concepts of cyber warfare – concepts currently foreign to the ADF’s defensive approach to cyber operations – but which he feels have application for the conduct of future land and joint warfare.
He sees the characteristics of future cyberspace operations as likely to provide military planners with unique battlespace-shaping tools including cyber-reconnaissance, cyber-isolation and cyber-strike. If these tools are employed in conjunction with other warfighting functions, aligned with appropriate strategy and developed by planners and cyber specialists working together, the conduct of future campaigns will be significantly enhanced, he says. Conversely in the hands of hostiles, these will require counter systems such as strengthened networks which may take years to develop.
The first step in the use of cyber warfare on the battlefield – cyber-isolation – may comprise the isolation in cyberspace of a military objective (a L400 combined arms team?) or operating area as a preliminary to land operations. Such isolation can include the denial of battlespace IP communications, disruption of cyber systems in an adversary network, and the denial of external IP communications. Cyber-isolation would be particularly useful during the decisive phases of an operation in which limiting or disrupting enemy communications internationally may contribute to achieving military objectives.
In regard to cyber-strike, the US Navy is reportedly developing airborne electronic warfare systems that will be able to ‘fire’ malicious codes into closed adversary networks from up to 200 miles away. In a similar fashion the US Army is reportedly experimenting with techniques to insert and extract data from sealed or wired networks from a stand-off distance.
Such technology has been termed ‘electronic warfare-enabled cyber’ and attempts to transmit code via radio signals into targeted computer systems. The potential for such weapon systems in future conflict, with the capacity to enable stand-off disruption to enemy networks, is significant. In the hands of opponents, a well-armed networked Australian battlegroup, isolated from its own battlefield communications, could be at an extreme disadvantage.
L400 LCVS proposals
We have been advised by industry colleagues that contenders for the L400 combat vehicle capability are likely to include the following vehicles and their suppliers:
- Tracked Puma AIFV offered by PSM (KMW/Rheinmetall Land Systems),
- Tracked ASCOD 2 SV (GD Land Systems Australia),
- Wheeled CV90 Mk III Armadillo (BAE Systems Australia),
- Wheeled VBCI Nexter (Giat Industries / Renault VI),
- Wheeled Patria 8x8 AMV (Patria Vehicles/Lockheed Martin),
- Wheeled Piranha V (GD Land Systems Australia),
- Wheeled Boxer ARTEC GmbH (Krauss-Maffei Wegmann / Rheinmetall),
- Tracked Bionix AFV (Kinetics Singapore Technologies), and
- Wheeled Arma (Otokar).
According to the Land 400 CONOPS, LCVS will be required to operate across the full spectrum of threats and environments which may be encountered by the Australian operational forces (AOF), including hybrid enemy capabilities. The LCVS will be capable of defeating comparable enemy combat systems. The AOF operating context necessitates a combat force capable of amphibious and expeditionary operations. The LCVS must be capable of being projected for sustained operations against an adaptive enemy in complex terrain.
Further on, the CONOPS says the LCVS will be characterised by precision lethality, survivability, integration and sustainability to enable an effective combined arms close combat capability. Sensibly the CONOPS adds that specific characteristics for LCVS components will be defined as the user requirement is further developed. It concludes that the LCVS will be able to be flexibly configured based on threat, environment and mission profile.
Presumably most of the above contenders meet the LCVS requirements, no doubt drawn up in part by reference to previously submitted proposals. However one would hope their suitability for future warfighting, including advanced personnel and network protection, Counter-CBRN capabilities and so on, goes beyond the requirements set out in the LCVS CONOPS.
For constrained urban-type operations, even the now-cancelled US GCVS program had focussed on the development of a new vehicle-mounted Active Protection System that could identify, track and destroy a wide range of incoming enemy fire to include rocket propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. It seems that this work, regarded as one of the most challenging technological areas, was being undertaken by the US Army since foreign APS technologies were not mature enough to field on US platforms.
LCVS acquisition
The LCVS platforms are anticipated to be Australianised MOTS designs, with development work undertaken only where necessary to achieve systems integration outcomes. This does not preclude either an Assembled and Supported in Australia (ASA) or Manufactured and Supported in Australia (MSA) option for some of the capabilities (platforms) envisaged.
Procurement of the LCVS may be achieved through a combination of staged market solicitation activities and Government to Government arrangements such as FMS. Opportunities for Australian industry will be available in both the acquisition and sustainment phases of the project. In the acquisition phase, local industry opportunities will depend on the options presented by industry, including cost, schedule and technical risks, which will be assessed in light of the strategic nature of the LCVS capability. Notwithstanding, Australian industry will be expected to support the delivery of the required capability, in particular sub-systems and system of systems engineering and integration, simulation, facilities and integrated logistics support.
In his address to the 2014 ADM Congress, the Assistant Minister for Defence, Stuart Robert, made extensive reference to the L400 program and the manner of its acquisition, including his desire for an innovative solution, predominantly manufactured and supported in Australia, most-preferably not an FMS solution and one which engaged industry to the maximum extent possible. In regard to future warfighting perhaps he summed it up when he said:
“While we may not know where the potential future flashpoints and conflicts may be, we do know that there will be a requirement for vehicles that have high levels of protection, vehicles that will be able to communicate and interact with all capability elements – on the ground, in the air and on the sea.”