• The 76th Iraqi Army Brigade graduation parade marks the completion of their training with the combined Australian and New Zealand force at the Taji Military Complex, Iraq. Credit: Defence
    The 76th Iraqi Army Brigade graduation parade marks the completion of their training with the combined Australian and New Zealand force at the Taji Military Complex, Iraq. Credit: Defence
  • In 2004, Jim was deployed to Iraq as Chief of Operations to lead a multi-national force of 300,000 troops. In a rapidly changing situation, facing a new style of insurgency, the Molan plan achieved results which included the first democratic elections held in Iraq and rebuilding and protecting Iraq's infrastructure, including vital oil production. Credit: ICMI
    In 2004, Jim was deployed to Iraq as Chief of Operations to lead a multi-national force of 300,000 troops. In a rapidly changing situation, facing a new style of insurgency, the Molan plan achieved results which included the first democratic elections held in Iraq and rebuilding and protecting Iraq's infrastructure, including vital oil production. Credit: ICMI
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The Answer is Strategy - Part 3: Leadership

29 January 2016
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Former ADF general and one time coalition operations chief in Iraq during 2004-05, Jim Molan presents the third of his four part series entitled "The Answer is Strategy".

Jim Molan | Canberra 

World leaders take time to learn when and how to intervene with force, something which seems to be learned only by doing.

An example is that if the coalition or the US had left a residual force of 10,000-15,000 troops in Iraq after 2011, it is likely that Daesh would never have taken or held any portion of Iraq. Obama, against advice, did not insist. He has now re-engaged in Iraq – initially indecisively –and is even extending a residual force in Afghanistan.

 

"The US formed a 65-nation coalition to combat Daesh and then refused to lead."

 

The US formed a 65-nation coalition to combat Daesh and then refused to lead – an essential part of any coalition on almost anything is still US leadership and this is what makes the US at least a little bit “exceptional”.

The most important national strategies for Australia are those of the US, which essentially become those of the coalition. In simple terms, the US Government’s policy is to counter Islamic extremism.

In 2004, Jim was deployed to Iraq as Chief of Operations to lead a multi-national force of 300,000 troops. In a rapidly changing situation, facing a new style of insurgency, the Molan plan achieved results which included the first democratic elections held in Iraq and rebuilding and protecting Iraq's infrastructure, including vital oil production. Credit: ICMIIn November 2014 the White House released its grand strategy. It had nine lines of operations of which only two were specifically military – Denying ISIL Safe-Haven (the air campaign) and Building Partner Capacity (the advise and assist campaign). The rest were to do with funds, domestic protection, humanitarian support, foreign fighters, intelligence, governance, and exposing the true nature of Daesh. Each of these nine lines of operations is brought into being through its own operational strategy.

This was a good policy and a comprehensive grand strategy. Up until recently where it failed in relation to the two specific militarily lines of operations was in the translation into operational concepts, plans, resources and tactics. This what I think Obama meant when on three occasions he admitted to not having a “strategy”.

The result has been until recently a very slow development of the ISF, an air campaign that was more rhetoric than effect, and a dislocation of plans by external events. Many called for more effective Rules of Engagement, expanding the building partner capacity campaign by accompanying the Iraqis into battle as mentors as well advising and assisting, and increasing the effectiveness of air support to Iraqi units. The aim of these suggestions was to achieve both a more effective Iraqi ground force leading to victory in, importantly, a shorter period of time.

Over the last few months, this has more or less happened. We can assume that the rules of engagement are not as restrictive because the coalition air forces are actually doing. There are reports of US and British special forces both accompanying into battle and directing air support, and innovative ways have been used to direct air support remotely. Not as effective an operational strategy as I would recommend, but far better than a year ago.

 

"2015 was a hard year for Iraq, Syria and those that oppose Islamic extremism. 2016 may not be easier."

 

So, post-Paris and post-San Bernadino, the US is approaching the conduct of the war in Iraq in a much more logical manner. There are still no guarantees that this good policy and grand strategy, and better operational strategy, will deliver success. However the probability of defeating Daesh, at least in Iraq, is increasing daily and the actions of the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria, the militias between Baghdad and Mosul, and the Iraqi army in the west are positive. It would be my judgement that a counteroffensive against Mosul may still not occur this year. 2015 was a hard year for Iraq, Syria and those that oppose Islamic extremism. 2016 may not be easier.

It should be remembered that the coalition’s grand and operational strategy stipulates a direct military involvement only in Iraq, except for the bombing of Daesh in areas of Syria relevant to Iraq, and very small deployments of special forces. The coalition strategy is to handle Syria through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and assistance to anti-Assad forces. This is a strategy I totally support given the complexity of the Syrian problem.

The best thing that we can do for the Syrian people is to decisively defeat Daesh in Iraq.

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