At the 2001 Defence + Industry Conference in Canberra, there was an expectation that Defence would announce the results of the competition for the supply of a new combat system for the Collins-class submarines. The choice lay between the ISUS90-55, offered by STN Atlas and its Australian partners, and the Raytheon CCS Mk.2, in service with the US Navy.
It was known that the DMO and the Submarine Capability Team had recommended the RAN acquire the low risk ISUS90-55 combat management system rather than a downsized USN Virginia Class combat control system. There was some consternation therefore when Defence Minister Peter Reith, on a visit to the United States in July 2001, announced that the selection of the combat system for the Collins submarines ‘cannot proceed at this time’ reasoning that a comprehensive arrangement with the US Navy on submarine issues was in Australia’s best strategic interests.
He went on to note that the Australian and US Navies were entering a ‘Statement of Principles arrangement’ to maximise cooperation on submarine matters. The statement did not elaborate on how a new combat system was to be achieved to replace the ‘fast track’ systems on Sheean and Dechaineux, or the original underperforming systems on the remainder of the fleet.
This meant a continuation of the ‘augmentation program’ a rolling upgrade program designed to eliminate the acknowledged faults with the existing combat system and replace the troublesome Tactical Data Handling System (TDHS) entirely, using an evolutionary approach.
It was the USN’s remedial support for the shortcomings of the Collins combat system as well as assistance in other areas, such as acoustics, that lay behind the decision not to proceed with the combat system competition. Put bluntly, the USN was not prepared to continue providing technical assistance, including access to weapons data, if the European ISUS combat system was installed in the Collins submarines. This was the genesis for the Statement of Principles.
Genesis
On 10 September that year RAN Navy Chief VADM David Shackleton and USN Chief of Naval Operations, RADM Vern Clark, signed the submarine cooperation SoP in Clark’s office in the Pentagon. As we know, the following morning that building was severely damaged in the 11/09/2001 terrorist attack. While Clark’s office was unaffected physically by the strike, the wholly unexpected turn of events brought the concept behind the co-operation agreement – and thus its implications – into sharper focus than perhaps anticipated.
The following month, after discussions between RADM Kevin Scarce RAN and RADM Phil Davies USN, it was confirmed that the Australian submarines were to receive the same command and control system as the Virginia Class NSSNs, the CCS Mk.2, under what was now termed the Collins Replacement Combat System (RCS) program. An Alliance arrangement between CoA, combat system developer Raytheon, STN Atlas (sonar processing), and Thales (sonar arrays) was formed to manage the RCS program. It was felt that the Alliance would help redress industry’s uncertainties about the benefits of RAN/USN cooperation on submarines. This was because proposals for enhanced cooperation between the two navies, espoused in the SoP, were heavily into joint operations and exercises, but appeared to offer little opportunity for Australian industry participation.
Warren King, then Raytheon’s general manager for naval programs and engineering, now the DMO’s CEO, emphasised the opportunities for SMEs in the Collins program saying, that the new Tactical Command and Control (TCC) subsystem would provide a gateway for R&D sonar applications. And that was about it − while DSTO and others might have hoped for some input into improving the TCC and other subsystems behind the closed gate, this was not to be and has, to some extent, stifled further development of Australian expertise which had been evident in the SME’s contributions to the fast track augmentation program.
The augmentation, conducted under the auspices of Project Sea 1446, also developed interface gateways to bypass deficient software areas on the existing combat system, and to act as a new 'connector' between sonar sets, crew and weapons, re-scoping system specifications to remove the technical difficulty and high-effort/low-priority items. Along with NUWC (whose input was around 16 per cent, Australian small-to-medium enterprises provided the technical expertise and facilities for the platform and combat system augmentation.
For example, Acacia delivered three shipsets of its newly developed Tactical Data Management System, purchased by the RAN as part of the Collins combat system augmentation. Cirrus, specialist in real time data management software, supplied and integrated its sonar classification processors and tactical data recording systems into the augmented combat systems. Acoustic Technologies was also involved in the fast track project including development of the audio data management and sonar data recording systems for the augmented platforms.
It was clever SMEs like these that were helping to overcome the acknowledged faults of the existing combat system, especially the troublesome Tactical Data Handling System (TDHS), which they augmented, for the two 'fast-track' boats, HMAS Sheean and Dechaineux.
Background
Let’s have another look at the events leading to the decision to replace the underperforming combat system and, with the benefit of hindsight, ponder again whether the USN/RAN submarine cooperation arrangement, as set out in the Statement of Principles, which effectively precluded our acquisition of the preferred STN−Atlas ISUS90−55 combat system and also gave us a heavyweight torpedo, that may not have been the RAN’s choice in other circumstances, was really to this country’s benefit.
The problem began with the original design specification for the Collins combat system in those pre−personal computer (PC) times which sought a fully integrated system with data from the various sensors, mainly sonar but also ESM, radar and optronics, provided to each of seven workstations for analysis, target detection and if necessary weapons engagement.
According to Derek Woolner², one of the fundamental early decisions made by Navy was that the CDS (Combat Data System) would be developed separately and supplied under a different contract from that covering construction of the submarines. By the end of 1982, it had decided that the electronic combat systems of the new boats would be fully integrated.
Instead of the then standard central computer performing all data analysis, the new submarine CDS would use a data bus to distribute information to a number of smaller computer work stations. Each of these would be capable of acquiring and processing information from whichever of the submarine's sensors was relevant to the current task.
This philosophy of distributed processing was expected to improve operational effectiveness and to reduce the lifetime maintenance costs. The latter would result from eliminating the need to cut open the submarines during modernisation programs to remove a bulky mainframe computer, with the system being upgraded instead by substituting new software.
In January 1983, in what was in fact the first step to involve industry with the project, Navy took advertisements calling for registration of interest from suppliers of 'modern integrated combat systems'. By going down this path, instead of holding open the option of evaluating the best system deployed in a submarine, the CDS itself became a factor in the selection of the new boats. The design of the new submarine would have to be capable of accommodating the independently developed CDS. As experience was soon to prove, few were.
And indeed the system was so complicated it negated the very flexibility that was one of the major aims of the design and it seems full performance was never going to be achievable. From 1995 close relationships were established by the RAN with the US Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) which had experienced similar problems with the US AN/BSY−1 and the UK’s SMCS submarine combat systems. It was this knowledge, wielded in part by RADM Phil Davis USN, that subsequently facilitated the Collins combat system augmentation program and the fast tracking of these enhancements to Dechaineux and Sheean. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.
In 1996 Rockwell sold some of its businesses to Boeing, reportedly surprised that it had acquired a combat system contract that was losing money and frustrated over Defence’s refusal to relax the requirements. Boeing then found that the contract was effectively preventing them from producing a combat system that would work and called in Raytheon to help. With improvements underway (Defence had finally agreed to de-scoping of the contract), Raytheon with considerable experience with tactical control systems for US submarines, then acquired Boeing’s naval systems division and the remainder of the contract.
Quoted in that excellent work, The Collins Class Submarine Story1, John Dikkenberg who managed RAN test and evaluation of the Collins after 1996, said after one at−sea test of the combat system that:
It had difficulty tracking contacts, it had difficulty taking periscope cuts. Half the system wasn’t integrated…The electronic warfare system wasn’t integrated. Half the sonar functions weren’t working. You couldn’t even really be certain that the results on the sonar were all that good. I mean it had huge problems.
Heading the Submarine Capability Team at that time, RADM Peter Briggs, in charge of the fast track program involving augmentation of Sheean and Dechaineux, argued that continuing with the original CDS, augmented with US supplied components, was unsupportable in the long-term. He said the critical path was the combat system, and also the most expensive single item. The original system augmented with US equipment he saw as a system based on flawed foundations. He said it was cheaper, in any sort of sense over the medium-term, to replace this combat system with current generation technology equipment.
This was the conclusion reached in the McIntosh and Prescott report to the Defence Minister. They recommended that work on the old CDS be wound down and procurement of a new combat system 'using only proven in-service systems' commence. This course was eventually approved by the Government and tenders called to provide 'an off-the-shelf, open systems, modular and proven system.
In late 1998 Defence invited the major contenders for the Collins remediation process, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, STN Atlas, Raytheon and Thomson Marconi Sonar, to review the requirements set out in an earlier market survey, and provide firm costed proposals for a replacement combat system. There were four responses to Navy’s request for proposals for the new combat system for the Collins Class.
- BAE Systems with STN Atlas and Nautronix (proposing the Integrated Sensor Underwater System ISUS);
- Thomson Marconi Sonar and Thomson−CSF (Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System SUBTICS);
- Raytheon (Combat Control System CCS Mk.2);
- Lockheed Martin with RLM Systems (proposal believed limited to Navy to choose ‘plug and play’ COTS components – ARCI?)
By May 2000 it was evident that there was a clear winner from the responses to the request for costed proposals for a new replacement combat system. STN Atlas teamed with BAE Systems and Nautronix (integrator) offered a complete solution based on the ISUS90−55 combat system with elements of BAES submarine combat system and Lockheed Martin’s Naval and Electronic Surveillance System (nee Librascope) for the integration of the Mk.48 torpedo and Harpoon into the combat system.
Since that time ISUS90 systems have been fitted to numerous sea going submarines around the world including those in Greece, India, Israel, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey, and subsequently to Israel for its Dolphin II submarines, the German Navy for its Batch 2 Type 212s and the Turkish Navy Type for its new Type 214s. These contracts mean that the ISUS 90 is the most prolific conventional submarine combat system in the Western world today.
The ISUS90-55 offered to Australia had seven multi-function consoles, was based on a mature, fully-developed COTS-based system in service with conventional submarines worldwide, carried a low risk and had an open growth path. The system was to be manufactured and integrated here in Australia by STN Atlas's local partners, Sonartech Atlas, BAE Systems Australia Ltd (whose UK parent has contributed some of the system functionality, based on software and systems expertise applied in the UK's own submarine program), Nautronix and Lockheed Martin.
All of the necessary Intellectual Property was to be transferred to Australia to support what the STN Atlas team says would be an Australian-owned solution through its life of type. Some of the smartest elements of the bid are sonar processors such as SARPS and SARTEPS, developed by Sonartech Atlas at North Ryde and now being examined closely by the US Navy as a Los Angeles-class retrofit.
In selecting the ISUS90-55, Australia would become part of a global user group with a massive installed customer base. Furthermore, being an Australian-owned and -controlled system means that the interface between this and any US-sourced submarine smarts in the future would be non-porous, sources argue. There could be no risk to sensitive US technology and IP and so no impact on the ability of the RAN and US Navy, and on their respective contractors, to cooperate closely in the future as the Collins-class design evolves. The STN Atlas proposal was seen as clearly superior and meeting or exceeding RAN requirements without need for significant modification while the Raytheon CCS2 system did not.
And all of this was given up in favour of RAN/USN cooperation on submarines as espoused in the Statement of Principles!
RAN/USN Submarine Co-operation
So let’s have a look at that Statement of Principles on submarine co-operation. The preamble to the formal document notes that Australia and the US aspire to the defence of mutual interests with both recognising a common goal in employing submarines to achieve these aspirations.
In essence the rationale behind the agreed arrangements is that the RAN can provide highly capable diesel submarines for operations and exercises in shallow water environments together with support facilities for weapons firings, signature measurements, and forward support of common systems or weapons.
In turn the USN can contribute to the proficiency of the RAN by providing loyal opposition for submarine versus submarine exercises, test ranges and other equipment and facilities. There is considerable emphasis on the benefits for both submarine forces in training, noting that the type of training that is most suitable for instilling operational capability is in exercising at sea with other ships and submarines.
Perhaps it should be noted here that the two navies do enjoy quite a high level of co-operation in joint operations (Gulf War, East Timor), in exercises (e.g. RIMPAC and others), and in the use of maritime ranges (the USN’s PMRF, Hawaii and the Australian Underwater Training Range). However we understand that combined exercises and other joint activities cannot be raised to a higher operational level, including NCW scenarios, since neither the two−tier RAN ships, nor the submarines are equipped for engagements of this type.
The scope of the SoP covers much the same ground as the rationale with reference to interoperability, collaborative activities, shared training and data exchange. It also covers access to and use of their respective facilities, equipment and personnel, specifically the Collins class submarines (but no reciprocate access to USN submarines!) as well as access to each other’s base and research facilities, defence laboratories, equipment and access to orders and doctrine as necessary.
Perhaps for industry the most important feature of the SoP lay in cooperation in R&D and engineering projects such as those to improve the acoustics characteristics of submarines, improvements to combat systems, projects to enable submarines to achieve their full operational potential, and finally projects to develop improvements jointly for software updates for a common combat system. Aside from workflow to Raytheon’s considerable engineering establishment in this country on modifying the US system to handle the Collins CS requirements, we have yet to notice workflow in the opposite direction and the upgrade to the Collins sonar data system.
End note
Was it really necessary then to eschew a first class combat system solution, tested and found superior in performance by DSTO, in favour of a US system, insufficiently modified to win Ministerial endorsement, for RAN/US cooperation on submarines that was happening anyway?
Had Peter Reith, the Minister concerned, actually read through the Statement of Principles or did he rely solely on the Chief of Navy’s support for what we see as the US Navy’s overbearing approach to cooperation on submarines?
1Peter Yule and Derek Woolner: The Collins Class Submarines Story, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2008.
2Derek Woolner: Getting in Early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement. Research Paper No. 3 2001–02 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 18 September 2001
NB: Much of the material for this article was drawn from issues of the Australian Defence Intelligencer over the years 1998 − 2002.