From The Source: Air Marshal Mark Binskin, AM Chief of Air Force | ADM Mar 2009

He spoke to ADM Editor-at-Large Gregor Ferguson in February 2009.

Air Marshal Mark Binskin, AM - PROFILE
1978 Joined RAN
1982 Exchange posting RAAF
1998 CO, 77 SQN Williamtown
2000 OC, AEWC Program Office, DMO
2003 Chief of Staff, HQ Australian Theatre
2004 Director, US Central AF Combined Air & Space Operations Center, Middle East
2004 Commander, Air Combat Group, Williamtown
2006/07 Director General Capability Planning, Air Force 2007 Air Commander Australia
2008 Chief of Air Force

ADM: With 2nd pass Approval due later this year for Project Air 6000, are you confident the F-35A Lightning 2 is the right aircraft to replace the F-111 and Hornet?

Binskin: Yes, I am.

I don't want to get into too much detail with the White Paper and the Air Combat Capability Review Part II being considered, there will be some areas that I just can't discuss - it's up to the Government.

However, we've done more analysis on this platform than any other platform in the acquisition history of the Australian Defence Force.

We've got about 50 DSTO scientists that conduct detailed analysis on it on a full-time basis; we've got advanced simulations; we've had air crews - and that's fighter and strike pilots, fighter combat instructors and test pilots flying high fidelity JSF mission simulators.

We're working at a systems analysis rather than just a single platform approach.

So I'm confident we've got good knowledge about what we're considering, and what's going to be put to the Government.

ADM: How much work have the RAAF and ADF more broadly needed to do to satisfy itself about the capabilities of the F-35?

Binskin: I don't take anything at face value, I'm a fighter pilot. But I've talked regularly with AVM John Harvey, who's responsible for this in the DMO.

A lot of analysis is verifying the information that they are getting [from Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon].

They do independent data verification and the analysis to make sure that what we've been told is actually correct.

ADM: On the current DCP we're looking at an investment of $12.5 to $16 billion for Air 6000; is there a danger that investing that sort of money, particularly in the current climate, could then preclude the ADF acquiring other types of weapons, other types of capabilities that might be more applicable to low intensity conflict would be the best thing at the moment?

Binskin: No, this is why JSF would be a good aircraft for us.

It's a multi-role aircraft so it can cover the spectrum; while you might have some specialised low-end aircraft potentially available out there and you've got specialised high-end aircraft out there, specialisation comes at a cost.

I would much prefer a multi-role aircraft with a selection of weapons that can work across that spectrum rather than, concentrate on something like a dedicated counter insurgency platform.

If we went for just the counter insurgency type aircraft, that leaves you open asymmetrically to high-end war fighting.

Whereas if you look at the F-35, you can counter the low end asymmetric approach but can also counter the high-end war fighting threat.

We are looking to make sure that we've got a spread of weapons that are capable of being used, with the appropriate sensors, across a wide range of operations: weapons such as the Small Diameter Bomb, and don't forget - the gun is still valuable in a lot of low-end scenarios as well.

So we're making sure as a system we get a suitable platform and then an appropriate selection of weapons that go with it to give us that flexibility of response.

ADM: How will the ADF develop the long-range surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities necessary to support aircraft like the F-35 and Super Hornet, and especially when they are equipped with long-range stand-off strike weapons?

Binskin: I'm happy at the moment that we're investing in the systems that are the glue that binds it all together, and again, that's being considered as part of the White Paper and I don't really want to go into a lot of the detail.

We've developed a very robust targeting process now: we've got the Air Operations Centre (AOC) in the process; we've got access to the systems and have developed thorough targeting methodologies.

As part of that methodology you look at minimising collateral damage and achieving maximum effect for weapons.

We've got the ability to pass that data to the aircraft.

For dynamic retargeting we are able to network a lot of information in real time, rather than have the pilot launch with just data on his kneepad and work towards the target.

The advantage of these networked modern systems is that a lot of that info can be passed around in real time and therefore you can get tight response times.

ADM: How important are enablers such as Wedgetail, Vigilare and the MRTT in delivering the full combat potential of the JSF?

Binskin: They're critical to this whole capability.

We're looking at IOC for the KC-30As about the middle of next year, and that's travelling quite well at the moment.

Vigilare is coming along; they're doing the first phase in NORTHROC at Tindal, and IOC will be around the middle of 2010.

And then going into Williamtown and looking at FOC about the middle of 2011.

I'm comfortable with the way Vigilare is being phased in and the fact we will prove that capability in Tindal before we retrofit Williamtown.

And Wedgetail is progressing at the moment.

We are still looking for in-service delivery at the end of this year, but acknowledging that the platform will take a couple of years to get up to IOC and then another one or two to FOC.

It was always going to be three or so years from in-service delivery to FOC. At the moment we're looking at Full Operational Capability at the end of 2012.

ADM: There's been a fair bit of coverage of Wedgetail recently, particularly in relation to the level of capability that it'll actually deliver. I have two questions: will you get the capability that you actually want; and if you don't, will the capability that you do get be good enough?

Binskin: The contractual side of the capability I will leave with the DMO and AVM Chris Deeble, the Project Director.

From my side, I've got an operational requirement that I have to prepare for, to meet the needs of Government.

So what I'm looking at is a platform to meet those operational requirements.

At the end of the day, if Wedgetail meets those operational requirements then I'll be happy; if it doesn't then we'll begin to look at what our options are.

At the moment I'm comfortable that it will eventually meet our operational requirements.

ADM: How has the RAAF coped with the capability gap between the retirement of the Boeing 707 tanker and the introduction of the MRTT? Are Hornet crews maintaining their tanking skills satisfactorily?

Binskin: Through our transition plan we had to retire the 707 to free up maintenance and operational personnel to go across to the KC-30.

We've structured exercises with coalition members around this period so that there will be tankers involved and are maintaining our skills that way.

If we have to deploy overseas on exercises, we do look to lease the tankers when required.

So the basic skills are being maintained and they're being integrated into the larger exercises.

ADM: What does the introduction of a single-seater like the F-35 mean for the long-term future of the ‘navigator'/ ‘Air Combat Officer' specialization within the RAAF? Are there any specialist skills here that we're in danger of losing for ever?

Binskin: The ‘navigator' specialisation has broadened.

They, the AEO and Air Defence Controller specialisations have been banded into the Air Combat Officer (ACO) stream, with particular sub-specialisations within that stream.

The ACO is an important specialisation which will be quite broad in the future air force.

Obviously we're going to have Super Hornets for at least a decade and so that brings a new skill set requirement for the ACO, a far more complex environment than the F-111 navigator used to be involved in.

Our C-130Hs will still have ACOs on board until their retirement.

The AP-3Cs and their replacement will have ACOs as well.

So there is still a broad requirement for ACOs.

In the fast jet arena, the retirement of the Super Hornet will be when we would potentially start to see a reduction in overall ACO numbers.

My concern, and it's something that we've been studying, is I need a certain number of air crew from each of the different platforms to build the headquarters, command hierarchy and overall structure to be able to provide all the capability development advice as well as run operations and then be able to develop and grow the skill sets up and through that hierarchy.

When we retire the two-seat fast jets at some stage in the future, we will need to have a close analysis of what that is going to do to our hierarchical structure, and whether we could man it.

That study will be done over the next decade on how we meet the needs of the broader Air Force but with a smaller aircrew numbers in some areas.

Now, for example, that could be partly resolved in the fast jet world by, say, a higher pilot to jet ratio, because you get the numbers back - but that would come at an increased cost.

If we weren't to do that then we're going to have to look at other ways of meeting our future staff and operational requirements.

ADM: What's the current fast jet aircrew situation? Reportedly each F-35 is intended on operations to be matched to three pilots, so you can maintain an almost 24/7 rate of effort. What does that imply for RAAF in terms of training, because again reportedly, the ratio of pilots to fast jets is not terrific just now.

Binskin: Okay, let's talk about that ratio for starters.

The ratio of aircrew that you're talking about isn't aircrew to total acquired platform numbers.

When we refer to ratios and operations we talk about ratios of what we would be planning to deploy.

So for example, at any one time you are going to have a number of aircraft in deeper level maintenance, so that will reduce your aircraft numbers; there are attrition aircraft, plus you've got to factor in the number of aircraft and instructors you'll need to train the force.

That leaves operations, where you'll have a certain number of aircraft and pilots that you'll always need to maintain the operational cycle.

So when we talk ratios we're talking about the ratio of pilots to the number of aircraft that we're contracted to provide to Joint Operations Command for a specific task or operation.

So that's the first part.

The next part is we've got to be capable of training the numbers that we need, and then we take an assessment of how we're going to utilise the aircraft on operations and all those sorts of things.

I won't come out with the numbers, but at the moment I'm comfortable with the ratio that we have and the ratio that we're targeting to achieve for F-35s.

ADM: Leaving aside the general shortage of personnel, including air crew, what are the specialisations and skills the RAAF's recruiters need to concentrate on today in order to forestall significant potential problems in, say, five or ten years time?

Binskin: At the moment, pilot-wise, we actually have our numbers, but that doesn't tell the whole story.

My concern is making sure I've got the right profile and the right experience matched across the air crew numbers.

That's where I think we have concerns in some areas: making sure that we can retain our experienced air crew so that we've got the right ratio of experienced to lesser experienced air crew.

In short, with respect to raw pilot numbers we're not hurting but there are some specific areas that we do have a concern with experience.

We do have concerns with growing the ACO numbers to those that we need, and we have a strategy in place for that.

Air traffic controllers are always an issue for us, and we're working for better conditions for our air traffickers, including more tailorable remuneration.

A similar plan to what we are currently working for our air crew.

Then we start to get into areas that concern us because they are the enablers that ensure we can sustain and complete operations and sustain those operations.

We're talking about airfield engineers, geo-spatial imagery analysts, aircraft structural fitters, electricians and plumbers, electronics engineers and communications electronics technicians.

These specific areas concern us more, sometimes, than just the pure air crew numbers, because they are the people required to make it a total system.

ADM: Given the constant state of change that the RAAF will be facing in terms of platform replacement over the coming decade, what affect will this have on your training and recruitment strategies?

Binskin: Again, it's not just the training and recruiting strategies.

I'll go to our current retention rates: our retention rates are very, very good and traditionally have been in Air Force - it's a good outfit to be in.

We're currently down to an exit rate of I think 6.5 or 6 per cent; but that's almost getting on the unhealthy side of retention because it doesn't give us that flow-through to be able to bring on the newer workforce and skill them up for the newer capabilities.

When managing retention we aim to retain the people we really need to maintain our capability.

The other key part in managing retention is transitioning from one capability to another without a decrease in capability, a challenge when there are fixed workforce numbers to work within.

We've been working on this for a couple of years now and you're starting to see some strategies coming out to do just that.

We've set up transition teams very early so that we get a very good understanding of what the requirements are for the new platforms.

We're working to make sure that the skills that are required for these new platforms are starting to be taught now.

On top of all that we have Project AFTER running in Air Force - that's Air Force Training and Education Review - which aims to look at what the professional military education and training system needs are across the board in order to own and operate all these new systems that we are acquiring.

But it's not an easy task and it is going to be a challenging time for us over the next decade as we bring in these new platforms.

ADM: To touch on one of those stress points, on current plans the RAAF's Surveillance and Response Group will be fielding both a manned Maritime Patrol Aircraft and a new multi-mission UAV at roughly the same time in the middle of the next decade (around 2015-16). Do you feel these schedules need to be de-conflicted? If so, how would you do that?

Binskin: The timing of all this will be in the Government's White Paper.

We have worked to de-conflict the transitions because you couldn't have transitioned both together.

We acknowledged that about two years ago when it was starting to go that way, and have spent a fair bit of time and effort to de-conflict that now.

ADM: On the same track, do you expect Australia will join the Global Hawk SDD and P-8A Poseidon Spiral 1 development programs?

Binskin: I can't comment on that one because it is part of the consideration in the White Paper.

ADM: What sort of issues do you see shaping the RAAF's airlift capability, and its choice of aircraft, over the next couple of decades?

Binskin: The first part is taking into account all the requirements of the airlift capability. We need to take oversized loads all the way down to small loads around the globe, both efficiently and effectively.

From there, as I work down, I'm looking at commonality as being an issue.

I would prefer us to have similar systems where possible, from both the supportability point of view and a training point of view.

I want to make sure that we've got inter-operability between the various systems, both internally within Air Lift Group, the wider ADF, and then the broader coalition community that we'll be operating in.

That interoperability goes down to the ability to carry common loads, common pallets, and those sorts of things in order to minimise the stress on an operation.

I also don't want to go down a developmental path.

If there's an off-the-shelf solution, my preference would be to go for the off-the-shelf solution.

ADM: How about the bottom end of the airlift spectrum? At the moment there's a hazy demarcation line between the C-130, the Caribou and the Chinook. Are Chinook numbers and capabilities factored into ADF broader airlift thinking these days, or is that still considered very much a tactical battlefield issue?

Binskin: When you look at the airlift requirements, we are very joint - very collegiate across the board.

We look from the high end strategic, right down to the tactical delivery requirements. And then we look at the best balance of platforms across that.

ADM: What level of in-country support do you feel we need for the F-35? What do you believe are the things we must be able to do in this country to maintain a sovereign, self-reliant combat capability?

Binskin: Our position hasn't changed over the years on this.

We need to ensure we get access to the information specific to the system in order to provide the level of self-reliance we require.

I am very keen to maximise the Australian industry involvement particularly in some of the niche areas where we have the ability to compete on a world market.

I don't think Australian industry should win something simply because we're Australian, but I think we do have some companies in Australia that are very competitive.

We'd like to make sure that they get the opportunities.

We would aim to do all the aircraft and airframe operational maintenance, depot-level maintenance and the weapons integration stuff within country.

We need to do that to be able to maintain our own capability, in order to be able to support this aircraft when it deploys.

We also need to get a better understanding of the autonomic logistic global sustainment solution that's been put forward, and the Electronic Warfare (EW) side; and we need to have the flexibility in our EW reprogramming and development to cater for any emerging threat.

ADM: What about things like low observables and so on? That's an entirely new area for us in capability and technical terms.

Binskin: Obviously you can't have a situation where you damage an aircraft like that and then have to wait six months to get it repaired.

So we do need to have an understanding of those areas, and that's why we need to be able to do the airframe operational maintenance.

ADM: Do you believe UCAVs will have a role in the RAAF?

Binskin: I think they will in future, but like a lot of things, if we got into it right now we'd be getting in at the ‘bleeding edge'.

So I don't think now is the time for us to get into it as an Air Force capability.

That being said, it's probably a good idea for DSTO to keep engaged at some level because it is the way of the future.

We want to monitor this as the technology matures and get a good understanding of it.

But I don't see it in the current round of air combat capability development.

I think the UCAV has matured at maybe a slower rate than people envisaged a few years ago.

UAVs on the other hand have matured a lot faster.

It's a capability though that is eventually going to develop; so I think it's something that we need to keep watching

ADM: Do you envisage any requirement at any time for STOVL F-35s to operate from the LHDs? Not having that capability means one of the major attributes of these expensive ships will not be utilised.

Binskin: Again, the White Paper will consider all these things in the Air Combat Capability Review.

I'll put up some general thoughts on this though.

First, you have to consider the supportability issues of the logistics chain, being able to get ordnance, fuel, spares and support, all those sorts of things to a forward-based or ship-based squadron.

Then you have the protection requirements of that squadron.

So if you stop and think about all the support and defence requirements, unless you add proportionately to these capabilities as well, you will probably distort your force's forward position so much that they would be supporting themselves and protecting themselves and not necessarily doing what they're there to do.

All these factors need to be considered.

Additionally, you don't have commonality in platforms; you have different training streams and supportability requirements.

So in broad terms, when people debate STOVL versus conventional I think they tend to forget about all those underlying issues that need to be addressed to ensure a viable capability.

ADM: Where do you believe the demarcation line should fall between RAAF-owned UAV capabilities and Army owned Tactical UAV capabilities?

Binskin: The way I look at it is down two lines.

You've got the ‘classical' smaller UAVs that are used by the ground commanders to provide a limited capability and support for a specific ground force.

They don't require a lot of infrastructure for support, they don't range too far and wide, and don't tend to be integrated into the overall Air Battle Plan - I would see this as a tactical UAV system.

When you start getting into the area of HALE and MALE UAVs, you have air-base infrastructure requirements, higher level air worthiness and governance considerations; the requirement for integration into the overall air battle plan and associated processes and systems to de-conflict it and get the maximum effect across the battle space - you're looking at something that can provide theatre-level ISR and a theatre-level effect.

If the UAV sare networked through the broader CAOC system, that information is going far and wide across a large domain; that's different to a tactical UAV providing information to a specific ground commander and his immediate force.

This is where I think you're getting into the Air Force domain because it's integrating totally into the air battle plan.

While there is no hard and fast ‘demarcation line' these would be the general guidelines I would use.