Electronic Warfare: The fate of the C-Pearl | ADM May 08

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The Rafael C-Pearl electronic support measure (ESM) system aboard the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) Adelaide-class FFG frigates seems likely to be replaced by an alternative system unless it is clear by the middle of the year that a number of deficiencies can be remedied.

By Julian Kerr, Sydney

The full extent of the problems with C-Pearl became clearer in testimony given to Parliament's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade committee in late February by Warren King, General Manager, Programs, of the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO).

However, the first disclosure that all was not well came in a report late last year by the Australian National Audit Office.

This quoted the Commander of the RAN's Surface Combatant Force Element Group as saying that the performance of C-Pearl during sea trials aboard HMAS Sydney had "not provided Navy with the confidence that the system will meet operational requirements in the short/medium term".

ESS deficiencies were the most significant barrier to the RAN using HMAS Sydney in an operational environment, he added.

During the Pacific 2008 maritime exhibition earlier this year, representatives of C-Pearl's manufacturer, Israeli company Rafael, were adamant that the system could be considered operational.

They pointed out that four of the six systems being supplied to Australia had already undergone successful acceptance testing in Israel in the presence of prime contractor Thales and the DMO, acting as project authority.

The system's two other international customers - undisclosed but known to be India and Singapore - were satisfied with its performance, and it was now a matter of agreeing with the RAN how to prove that the system worked.

It was also suggested that performance in some cases might vary in line with operator training.

But in testifying to the Parliamentary committee a few weeks later, Warren King advised that Thales had found deficiencies in the antennae, some of the hardware, and the software.

Emphasising the complexities of ESM, he pointed out that there was no simple pass/fail criteria for the system; a range of performance specifications were involved in meeting the requirements.

"For example, the system has to be able to accurately detect up to a million pulses a second.

"What happens in that environment is that both the system itself and the systems that you use to test it are quite complex," King said.

"Getting that baselined and accurate requires a lot of coordination and trials programs to be actually certain what results you are getting."

Testing times
Testing was fundamentally complicated by the large number of transmissions present in the modern environment.

However, King disclosed he had demanded from Thales acceleration of a properly structured test program also involving Rafael, the RAN's test unit and the DMO, with what he termed a "no-go" position by mid-year.

This involved deciding at that time whether C-Pearl had a high probability of meeting the contractualised requirement, whether the Commonwealth would implement its contractual remedies and, in parallel with that, whether to initiate a risk mitigation program to introduce another ESM system.

King did not give details of the potential replacement but it is likely to be the EDO-ES-3701 which already equips the RAN's six Collins-class submarines and is a strong contender to be fitted to the RAN's future air warfare destroyers.

According to its US manufacturer, the ES-3701 mono-pulse direction-finding system provides situational awareness, precision over-the-horizon targeting, self-protection and surveillance, and can track 500 signals simultaneously in the 2-18 GHz frequency range.

An alternative could be to upgrade the SLQ-32(V) 2 ESM systems removed from the FFGs in favour of C-Pearl.

The SLQ-32(V) 3 variant equipping USN DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers adds electronic attack jamming capability, and the system is expected to remain in service for many years to come.

Risk management
King cautioned, however, that it would be foolhardy to assume the alternative would not carry any of the risk of the current system.

"The current one has taken many years to get to the position it is in and you learn an awful lot about your ship and your transmissions and your reflections and everything else in this process," he commented.

Hence it would be remiss to quickly embark on an alternative program without a rigorous risk analysis.

Understandably, Thales Australia has preferred to maintain a low profile during the debate over C-Pearl.

However, Chris Lloyd, the company's Vice President, FFG Upgrade, told ADM in a statement that the detailed assessment of C-Pearl Electronic now underway "includes comprehensive performance trials intended to determine whether the system meets its contracted specifications and provides sufficient operational capability for the RAN.

"The activities in the assessment are being directed by a stakeholder working group chaired by Commodore Drew McKinnie (Director General Major Surface Ships) and including senior representatives from all parties.

"The assessment is expected to conclude by the end of May."

As King pointed out in his testimony, Thales does not get paid until the situation is resolved satisfactorily, and the contractual deadline for this is November.

For Rafael, rejection of C-Pearl by the RAN would be a heavy blow to the system's credibility and hopes for future sales, including as part of a full counter-measures suite for the RAN's AWDs and LHDs.

Light at the end of tunnel

By Katherine Ziesing, Canberra

In light of the issues that C-Pearl and the wider FFG upgrade program have gone through, DMO's director General of Major Surface Ships Commander Drew McKinnie is optimistic about the program getting back on track.

Below is an excerpt from his From the Source interview as seen in the April 2008 edition of ADM.

ADM: Last year's ANAO Report quoted the Commander of Navy's Surface Combat Force Element, saying the performance of the C-Pearl ES and the Underwater Weapons System was disappointing.

What were the problems?

Have the been rectified?

By who, how?

And if not, what's going on?

McKinnie: ANAO was a snapshot in time and, yes, it reflected the view at that time that the system performance was disappointing for ES and UWS.

Chief of Navy did not agree to Initial Operational Release of the ship and that was predicated mainly on the Electronic Surveillance system.

Those problems have been identified and we've now got a Senior Stakeholder Group and integrated product team mechanisms in place to go after the known problems, provide the fixes to software and hardware, reinstall antennae, re-test, re-demonstrate the system.

We've got to demonstrate that capability again to Navy later this year.

It's being dealt with. Underwater Systems - we know that the systems are working.

The sonars are transmitting, they're putting the energy in the water, they're receiving the energy; the issue has been about data presentation and presentation of information to a level that Navy can live with.

Again, we're working with Defence Science and Technology Organisation to see what fixes we can do to simplify information presentation.

Copyright - Australian Defence Magazine, May 2008

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