Land Warfare - Space Effects: Integrating space effects the ADF | ADM Oct 08
The ADF is discussing the integration of space effects into its joint operations, although mostly as a future concept. However, this approach is too slow considering that the ADF is already operating within the space environment.
SQNLDR Lyle Holt
Brendan Nelson remarked in 2006 that the ‘great challenge in defence planning is to be prepared for the unknown, for it is that which must shape and influence our future.’ Nelson’s ‘unknown’ is influencing the comprehensive modernisation of Australia’s military capabilities to allow the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to better support Australia’s increasingly complex and crowded global security agenda.
To address this security agenda, the ADF’s Defence Capability Plan (DCP) is delivering capability with four directed themes - versatility, robustness, joint and integrated. It will do this in a seamless, integrated manner using a network as its foundation.
While the network will be the heart of the ADF’s future war-fighting vision, space effects will form the critical backbone of this vision. Space effects will be essential to the ADF’s operational flexibility, survivability and lethality, yet progress to integrate space’s critical warfighting effects into the ADF’s joint operations has been sluggish.
The ADF does recognise the importance of space effects and is considering a way ahead; however there are international lessons available right now that could help the ADF integrate space effects into its joint operations.
To determine how best to integrate space effects into Australia’s joint operations, this article will first contextualise the problem, then evaluate several international models to finally analyse how Australia might apply international lessons in order to effectively integrate space effects into their joint operations.
The aim of this article is to propose a method of integrating space effects into Australia’s joint operations.
Defining space effects
The space warfighting environment can deliver both enabling and direct space effects.
A direct offensive space effect would disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive or destroy an enemy’s space capability.
It could either target an enemy’s orbiting satellite or destroy a critical element of that satellite’s terrestrial infrastructure.
While both of these examples might achieve the same net operational effect, they will employ very different means. Australia can employ the latter form of direct offensive space effect today.
The second direct space effect is defensive in nature, actively or passively protecting friendly assets from an enemy’s space capability - an action defined as a direct defensive space effect.
An example of a direct defensive space effect is calculating an enemy satellite’s trajectory and sensor footprint in order to determine periods of satellite detection vulnerability for friendly terrestrial forces. Australia might also like to employ this space effect now.
An enabling space effect would include space-based services such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, environmental awareness, position, navigation, timing, communications and spectrum management.
These types of enabling space effects form the core of what is considered Australia’s routine military activities, and these effects also form the backbone of a networked military environment.
Applying space effects to Australia’s joint operations
The ADF aspires to operate in a seamless, integrated manner utilising a network as its foundation.
This network, as described in the Network Centric Warfare Roadmap 2007 (NCW07), will underpin the ADF’s ability to provide warfighters with actionable information and it will enable the ADF to conduct effective manoeuvre warfare.
Despite not being mentioned in the NCW07, space effects will form the backbone of this ADF future war-fighting vision.
However, integrating space effects should not be considered a future concept in 2008.
While Australia has no national approach to space and the ADF does not currently ‘fly’ its own satellites, the ADF is arguably conducting and/or using elements of both direct and enabling space effects today.
Therefore steps must be taken today to integrate space effects into the ADF’s joint operations.
The first step toward achieving this goal is to understand the nature of space power.
While space power’s environment and operating culture are unique, the degree of commonality between space and air power characteristics (such as perspective, reach, tempo, and precision application) suggests that the piecemeal control and apportionment of space power would be inefficient and ineffective.
The RAAF FASOC’s doctrinal definition of command and control (C2) supports this concept:
‘C2 in an air power context is the authority to direct and integrate systems, procedures, organisational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, information and communications for the planning and timely execution of air campaigns as part of joint, national or coalition campaigns.
This includes the battlespace management process of planning, directing, coordinating and controlling air and space capabilities, forces and operations. C2 is cross-functional, and is an essential element of all air operations because of its importance in binding air and space power functions together to joint ends, and in providing the foundation for networked operations.’
It follows, therefore, that space power should be employed in the same manner as air power - centralised control and decentralised execution. However, while the ADF recognises that something must be done, it is yet to determine a way ahead.
The good news is that the ADF does not need to reinvent the wheel to integrate space effects into its joint operations.
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Integration of space effects by middle powers
To determine how middle powers integrate space effects into their joint operations, this article examined open source data from Canada, the UK and India, each of whom design and operate indigenous space assets.
India: Vice Admiral Raman Puri’s 2006 description of the integration of space effects into India’s joint operations reflects Australia’s current position.
While space will form the core of an NCW-based Indian Future Joint Operating Concept, India had yet to derive a C2 model through which to integrate and effectively employ space effects.
UK: Unlike India, the UK’s integration of space effects into their joint operations is doctrinally more advanced.
However, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Strategy 2006 acknowledged that they were only just beginning to address the processes, structures and education ‘necessary to understand, maximize and develop the potential benefits of space capability’.
The UK, like Australia, functionally positions space effects within their broader air power roles and missions.
Procedurally, UK joint planners integrate space effects as an air component effect within the broader campaign plan.
The UK Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and their supporting air staff interpret that plan and then conduct operational level air and space planning.
However, it is a significant challenge for UK planners to integrate space effects typically provided and informed by globally distributed assets in and outside of military C2 architectures, throughout the joint force commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.
To facilitate the joint planning and execution process, the Royal Air Force (RAF) FASOC asserts that a cadre of space expertise must be evolved.
The RAF concept specifies that the space expertise cadre should comprise a mix of space-literate operators and actors who can service the front-line, headquarters and reach back elements, acting as part of a centre of excellence and/or within command structures.
This qualifier implies that selected personnel will come from a broad variety of operational and operational-support backgrounds, albeit from within the RAF.
Nevertheless, and despite the RAF’s apparent doctrinal focus on training and employing RAF-only personnel to deliver fundamentally tri-service British outcomes, there appears no reason why space-literati should not also be drawn from the British Army or Royal Navy.
The benefits are that space effects would be integrated throughout all aspects of the UK’s joint operations, delivering global kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
Canada: While there was no Canadian space doctrine accessable at the time of writing this article, the Canadian Forces do conduct a Space Operations Course (SOC) that graduates civilian Department of National Defence and uniformed Canadian Force’s personnel with a strong space advisor-focus, including in the employment of space systems in support of military operations.
SOC graduates are employed, among other locations, within the US Air Force’s (USAF) 14th Air Force (14th AF) space AOC located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
Integration of space effects by the US
The US integrates space effects into its joint operations via a Space Force of approximately 26,000 personnel to deliver an asymmetric advantage based on space superiority.
To deliver that advantage, the USAF is ‘operationalizing’ space, integrating and normalizing space effects at the operational level via traditional air power C2 methodology.
US space C2 at the operational level. ‘C2 of space operations is challenging due to the fragmented sources of space capabilities and the interdependence between global and theater space forces,’ according to the 2006 USAF Doctrine Document 2-2: Space Operations. USAF space C2 is achieved through the 14th AF space AOC and/or a specified theatre CAOC.
Situation and force dependent, space effects planning and execution may be accomplished via distributed operations (theatre CAOC), reachback (14th AF space AOC), or a mix of the two.
Reachback involves operational combat support from the rear while a distributed operation indicates physical involvement in the theatre planning and/or execution processes.
US space planning at the operational level. US doctrine specifically integrates space into each phase of a campaign plan, detailing how the joint intelligence (J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4) and command, control, communications, and computer systems (J6) planners analyse the role and contributions of space effects, with respect to their directorates.
Planners identify space forces and capabilities that relate to friendly and adversary centres of gravity; tasks for US space forces; and an adversary’s ability to control and/or use space capabilities against US forces.
Space planning also articulates the role of military, civil, and commercial satellite communications required for campaign C2.
Finally, space forces and capabilities are wargamed along with land, sea, air, and special operations forces to inform the JFC campaign decisions.
US space operations at the operational level.
Supporting the JFC’s campaign plan is the joint air and space operations plan (JAOP) which includes the tasking of all assigned or attached space forces, as well as requests for theater support from global space forces.
The tasks for assigned or attached space forces are integrated into tactical operations via the air tasking order (ATO), while non-assigned space forces are tasked via the 14th AF’s space tasking order (STO).
The ATOs and STOs deconflict, synchronize, and integrate space operations within a theatre through parallel air and space tasking processes on the same battle rhythm, as depicted in figure 5, and would require resident space experts within both the CAOC and SAOC.
US space education.
The development of a space professional cadre is recognized as an enabling capability for employing integrated space capabilities that support the full spectrum of military operations, according to the 2004 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1: Counterspace Operations.
The US develops space warfighting professionals to deliver space effects, just as the RAAF develops personnel to deliver air power effects, across the spectrum of military operations.
The development of this space force includes exercising US space forces alongside air and information counterparts both overseas and in the US.
Non-space professionals are provided space training so that they can better understand the application of space effects in military operations.
AUSTRALIAN JOINT OPERATIONS - AN ANALYSIS
The situation today - a comparison
To reiterate, Australia does not have a national approach to space as do the countries examined above; the US space cadre is numerically superior to the RAAF; and the RAF are developing their space cadre.
That said, it is not all bad news for the ADF.
Procedurally, the ADF plans joint operations similarly to the UK, US and Canada, with Australian ‘J’ staff developing campaign plans for exercises and operations within the Joint Operations Command (JOC).
Likewise, translating a joint campaign plan into a JAOP and an ATO is accomplished in the RAAF-run CAOC.
The CAOC plans and exercises C2 over assigned air assets by employing subject matter experts (SMEs) who represent each of the participating Force Element Groups (FEGs, including army and navy aviation assets), a selection of specialists (such as Legal, etc) as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance experts.
These SMEs and specialists are drawn from their respective parent organisations on an as-required basis, and are functionally distributed within the CAOC’s strategy, combat plans and combat operations cells - the same as the US and UK CAOCs.
Where the ADF differs from the UK, US and Canada is that it currently has an under-developed approach to the integration of space effects into its joint operations.
While the RAAF is a small, resource constrained force, the ADF must have the ability to effectively integrate space effects into its joint operations or risk both its NCW07 concept and FJOC.
Recognising its limitations and learning from the international models detailed above, the ADF (and RAAF) must progress a way ahead from the following options:
1. do nothing;
2. sub-specialise operators and operational-support personnel;
3. establish an indigenous Australian space specialisation; and/or
4. establish an ADF centre of space expertise.
Option 1: Do nothing
The ADF currently integrates space effects into its joint operations in an ad hoc manner across several specialisations.
Only a handful of ADF personnel possess either post-graduate space education or professional military space training.
Doing nothing means continuing to minimally invest in space education and training for a narrow range of operators and operational support personnel - a seductive option in a resource constrained environment.
While this small pool of trained personnel provide a degree of space advocacy, this approach does not integrate space effects fully or efficiently across the ADF’s battlespace.
Without space expertise scattered throughout the joint and air planning environments, the ADF would continue to be no more than an informed customer of space effects, reliant on our coalition partners for input or support to employ or utilise just a fraction of the available space effects.
Further, without a cadre of space expertise to employ space effects within the CAOC, the threat to the ADF’s joint operations is the inefficient employment of space effects in a networked environment and the subsequent failure of the NCW07 concept and FJOC.
This option should be discounted.
Option 2: sub-specialise operators and operational-support personnel
To avoid the long-term strategic pitfalls of the ‘do nothing’ option, the ADF could expand its current post-graduate space education and professional military space training program to a broader range of tri-service operators and operational-support personnel.
This wider targeting of specialists would allow the ADF to educate - via overseas universities, and domestic and internationally provided space warfare courses - and employ space-literate personnel from all services for JOC and/or CAOC 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 directorates.
With the larger space-literate gene pool that this cadre would offer, ADF joint planners could comprehensively identify space forces and capabilities that relate to friendly and adversary centres of gravity; tasks for available space forces; and an adversary’s ability to control and/or use space capabilities against Australian forces.
With this level of indigenous space literacy, the ADF could then also offer a greater operational planning contribution for coalition activities.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of this approach is that space cadre personnel would be subject to posting and employment churn.
Given their primary role is fighting in their parent FEG or specialisation, they may not be regularly releasable for JOC or CAOC space advocacy duties.
Therefore, greater numbers of personnel would need to undertake space education and training, placing an even greater burden on a resource constrained ADF.
Both the member’s parent unit and the organisation tasked with managing such a space sub-specialisation would be subject to this burden.
Given this personnel churn, the capability return on training investment for this approach to integrate space effects appears to be very poor.
Therefore this option, by itself, should be discounted.
Option 3: establish an indigenous Australian space specialisation
The establishment of an indigenous space specialisation would avoid personnel churn when integrating space effects into ADF joint operations.
Employing a version of the US model would allow the ADF to train a unique, specially educated breed of space warfighter for 21st century operations.
This indigenous tri-service ADF space specialisation would allow the integration of space effects into joint operations by a dedicated cadre who operate within and/or parallel to the JOC and CAOC processes.
As the UK examination identified, a balanced space force benefits from a mix of space specialists and space-literate operators.
However, the ADF is probably neither large enough nor would possess sufficient space forces to warrant an indigenous space specialisation, let alone one that stands alongside a cadre of space sub-specialist operators and operational-support personnel.
Therefore, while an indigenous space specialisation would offer efficient management of a space cadre and the greatest operational planning contribution for coalition activities, the balance between maintaining the ADF’s force-in-being and an additional cadre of space expertise may be unachievable.
This option should also be discounted.
Option 4: establish an ADF space centre of expertise
Perhaps the most appropriate and more sustainable solution for the ADF to integrate space effects into its joint operations is to sub-specialise ADF operators and operational-support personnel as described in option two and employ them in an environment that allows them to maintain a space focus and skillset while still supporting their core warfighting specialisation.
The Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG) is a RAAF FEG that operates across the ADF’s three services in this manner. AOSG’s Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) and Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Unit (JEWOSU) are examples where selected ADF personnel receive specialist training then apply that sub-specialisation from within AOSG in direct support of their parent FEG.
A similar construct for space specialists could be established.
As the ADF conducts exercises or operations, space experts from an AOSG space unit could be seconded to the JOC and CAOC to ensure the full integration of space effects across the joint campaign plan, just as the CAOC’s ISR component is currently drawn from AOSG’s 87SQN.
This type of AOSG unit may also offer a secondary career structure for military professionals who have sub-specialised in space, as ARDU offers for flight test personnel and that JEWOSU offers for electronic warfare specialists.
Resource constraints may still be evident as AOSG also suffers from a shortage of available ADF operators and operational-support personnel to fill all of its positions.
However, the tri-service and matrixed nature of AOSG’s operations has a demonstrated ability to apply cross-trained personnel across a variety of tasks.
There may also be opportunities for the employment of space educated APS members in some space specialisations utilising the AOSG construct.
The combination of options two and four, developing a tri-service organisation as a centre of ADF space excellence through the sub-specialist space education of ADF operators and operational-support personnel that offers the best chance of long-term success and should be pursued.
AOSG’s extant processes and operational linkages would enable a rapid and robust establishment of this vision.
At the end of the day
The success of the ADF’s future warfighting vision is conditional upon the successful integration of space effects into the ADF’s joint operations.
Whether it is as a user of enabling space effects or employing terrestrial-based direct offensive space effects, the ADF cannot afford to operate in general isolation from the space environment and its force multiplying effects.
It is not enough to recognise that an integration problem exists because the ADF is operating within, and is dependent on, the space environment right now.
In identifying a workable solution for the ADF, pursuing the do nothing option places the ADF’s future warfighting vision at great risk.
Middle powers and the US recognise that, as a functional sub-set of air power, space power benefits from centralised control and decentralised execution, placing its C2 firmly in the Air Force domain.
Yet looking beyond the C2 of space effects and applying the international lessons, it was shown that fully utilising space effects is best achieved by developing a cadre of space expertise, drawn from a breadth of core tri-service specialisations.
However, the US example of a grand, indigenous Space Force was assessed as an unsustainable option for the ADF and one that should not be pursued.
The UK’s approach of developing a space cadre comprising a mix of extant tri-service operators and operational-support specialists held the most appeal.
This approach ensured that space expertise could service the front-line, headquarters and reach-back elements acting as part of a centre of excellence, and within command structures.
With space expertise acquired from a mix of post-graduate space education (offered through international universities) and professional military space training, ADF operators and operational-support personnel could form a space sub-specialisation as part of a new AOSG unit.
This arrangement would provide long-term viability of the space capability by offering a secondary space career development stream for ADF personnel and the opportunity to supplement some space specialist positions with appropriately qualified APS personnel.
The ADF may not be able to afford to do anything less.
The full academic version of this paper first appeared in the Australian Defence Force Journal, issue 175, 2008.