C4I: What lies ahead for JP129 TUAV? | ADM Nov 08
Tom Muir
It is apparent that smaller unmanned aerial systems are more than filling the tactical UAV capability gap left by the stranding of JP129.
This being the case, one has to ask whether we should be investing more money in reviving what is virtually a legacy capability in terms of the now dated requirements, or should we be moving with the times (and actual operational experience) and re-evaluate the need for a Tier 3 TUAV capability.
The original requirement, detailed in the RFT, is instructive.
As stated, the intention to acquire the TUAV was to enhance the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of deployed forces for both land operations and selected maritime operations.
We have no argument on that score nor that it would improve the timeliness of decision making, thus enhancing the Brigade combat power by providing adequate early warning of threats and reducing the commanders decision cycle through the exploitation of Near Real Time (NRT) imagery.
Again we have no quarrel with the statement that the system would be one of the ground manoeuvre commander’s principal ISTAR assets, contributing ‘knowledge edge’ effects such as enhanced situational awareness and decision superiority for the supported commander.
The TUAV was also expected to provide a broader ADF surveillance and reconnaissance capability as a force level asset in a Joint Task Force (JTF) scenario.
Thus a TUAV capability might be cued by other ADF surveillance capabilities, and be used to inform at the operational level.
However where the original requirements display their legacy status is in regard to the distribution of information.
Leaving aside the means for command and control of the air vehicle, specific reports on contacts and mission results would be forwarded to the Brigade using the JP2065 integrated broadcast system (IBS), BCSS or voice communications.
This reporting might include still imagery annotated with target location and image analysis and other information by GCS personnel.
The TUAV capability would rely upon the ground control system (GCS) interfacing with BCSS to ‘enable seamless reporting.’
Remote Video Terminals (RVTs), displaying imagery direct from the UAV, could be embedded in a unit requiring near real time (NRT) data, or within an HQ element for immediate data review.
The only limitation on the siting of the RVT was that it required line of sight communications with the air vehicle although a single RVT could be connected directly to a ground control system (GCS) by via a cable network.
Because the Brigade’s receiving unit or cell would be unable to provide real-time data processing the GCS would have to provide recorded video and still archived imagery in a medium suitable for later intelligence review.
How immediate is all of that?
Demand for Real Time
UAVs generate data in real time (RT), just like the human eye, and such data may have a very short ‘use-by’ date, perhaps no more than a few minutes in a critical engagement.
And as the UAV’s primary sensors generate video that human beings are best adapted to interpret, the overwhelming tendency is to transmit video in RT.
However, due to the excessive bandwidth demands many specifications, including JP129, adopted a band-aid by specifying Near Real Time (NRT) whatever the latency period may be.
But NRT is problematic in time-critical battlefield situations where the observer or shooter is confronted with a situation that needs RT.
For JP129 further band-aids are proffered that involve processing video data from a UAV by the ground control station that also manages the operation of the aircraft. Expert analysts in the ground control station decompose the data that is received from the UAV into coordinate and other data to the shooter, with such data being able to be integrated into the battlefield picture that can be transmitted on a narrow bandwidth bearer.
As specified JP129 TUAV would be capable of providing invaluable surveillance and battlefield situation data, but in high intensity operations, including fast-moving counter insurgency campaigns, reliance on NRT data may be a liability especially where air support is requested.
Well aware of the shortcomings of NRT data in ADF operations in the MEAO, and the potential now offered by the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL), Defence has initiated the rapid acquisition of a number of L-3 Communications’ ROVER III video display terminals, which provide real-time full-motion video from various UAV and other air platforms. RAAF AP-3Cs are being equipped with TCDL as will the JP129 TUAV.
And just two months ago Defence called upon the services of the RPDE organisation for one of their QuickLook assessments of TCDL technologies, to better inform it of the range of issues, such as interoperability, it faces in adopting this new tactical capability.
Air vehicle choice
In announcing the cancellation of Boeing’s JP129 TUAV contract, Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon was succinct:
“Since contract award, Boeing Australia and its subcontractors have experienced a range of technical issues making it increasingly difficult to deliver the full scope of the contract within a timeframe acceptable to Defence.
"With a Defence imperative to field a TUAV capability as soon as possible, and the potential for a number of lower risk alternative systems, the DMO and Boeing Australia have agreed to terminate the contract on mutually acceptable terms.”
What Fitzgibbon didn’t say was that the major technical issue was Boeing’s inability to deliver the TCDL, which had been specified for JP129.
While Boeing laboured, other contenders for the TUAV capability, including the AAI Shadow 200, the Hermes 450, and the Northrop Grumman Fire Scout, are all currently operating with their TCDLs provided and fully integrated by Cubic, which is now challenging L-3 in this fast moving TCDL and HIDL field.
Fitzgibbon added that this ‘decisive action’ would enable Defence to focus on the earliest acquisition of an alternative TUAV to meet the JP129 requirement.
Due to schedule delays with JP129, an interim TUAV capability had been introduced by the fielding of two systems, the Elbit Skylark and the Boeing-Insitu ScanEagle.
Shortly after the cancellation of the JP129 contract, Boeing’s ScanEagle service in the Middle East was further contracted, and Elbit was pleased to announce that it had been awarded yet another contract to supply the Australian Army with more Skylark I UAV systems for an estimated value of ‘several million dollars’ with sources close to the project citing a figure of between $5-$7 million.
So what are the choices?
Do we revive JP129 with perhaps IAI’s I-View 250 back in contention with a fully integrated TCDL, courtesy perhaps of Cubic? Or do we re-evaluate other Tier 3 TUAV contenders, such as Elbit’s Hermes, no doubt again on offer by Thales Australia with ME operational experience building up?
Or do we continue with the current ‘interim’ capabilities, which appear to be doing such a good job, and let our AP-3C’s handle the wider area reconnaissance tasks?
Let us look briefly at the lower tier UAV capabilities currently in ADF operational service.
Skylark1
This was Defence’s third Skylark order, following an initial order for the Australian Army in 2005 when the then Defence Minister announced that miniature UAVs were to be deployed to Iraq to provide increased protection for Australian soldiers in the southern Al Muthanna province of Iraq.
Four Skylark miniature UAVs were deployed to assist the second rotation of the Al Muthanna Task Group.
A further two UAVs were held back in Australia for training and preparation purposes.
Transported and operated by two soldiers (less than 40 kg overall) and requiring no special skills, the Skylark I system includes two high performance stabilised Daytime EO payloads comprising colour CCD cameras with 10x optical zoom and FOV varying from 46 to 5 degrees.
The night vision payload comprises a similarly stabilised uncooled bolometric IR camera operating in the 8-12 μ range.
Weighing only 700 grams, the payload’s capabilities include very wide area coverage, continuous tracking of moving targets and a higher resolution rate than any of its predecessors.
The entire mission is flown autonomously, feeding real-time continuous video and telemetry data to the portable ruggedised ground station.
The mini UAV is quickly assembled before the mission and is launched by hand.
Recovery is performed by a deep stall manoeuvre, which lands the vehicle safely on a small inflatable cushion, at a pre-designated point, the cushion protecting the payload on landing.
Elbit developed the Skylark I manpack system for tactical close-range (‘over the hill’) surveillance and reconnaissance missions, artillery fire adjustments as well as force protection and perimeter security.
In operation the Skylark system has a variety of flight modes:
• Hold - the AV orbits at that point;
• Fly to Coordinates - and then Hold;
• Route Navigation - waypoint flight plan can be changed in flight;
• Camera Guide - AV heading slaved to EO payload LOS; and
• Link Loss - climbs and holds for 60 secs. If link not recovered proceeds autonomously to the RH (return home) waypoint and recovery.
Boeing/Insitu ScanEagle
In late 2006 Boeing Australia was awarded a contract to provide reconnaissance and surveillance services to the Australian Army using the ScanEagle autonomous UAV.
The services provided by ScanEagle were first used in southern Iraq by Australian soldiers operating with the Overwatch Battle Group (West)-2 in Operation Catalyst.
Within six months Boeing was awarded a six-month $20 million contract to provide ScanEagle UAV-based services to the Australian Army in Afghanistan.
Boeing noted that the level of ScanEagle services to be provided there would be at a significantly higher operational tempo than those concurrently provided in Iraq.
By September 2007, Boeing reported that the ScanEagle UAV system had provided 5000 hours of eye-in-the-sky surveillance and reconnaissance services to Australian Army forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This milestone was achieved through the provision of ScanEagle flight services in the Dhi Qar Province in Iraq and the Oruzgan Province in Afghanistan at a consistently high operational tempo.
ScanEagle is an economical, long endurance UAV and is claimed to be the only UAV in its class with an inertially stabilised camera turret, designed to track an object of interest for extended periods of time, even when the object is moving and the aircraft nose is seldom pointed at the object.
The turret can house either an electro-optical daylight or infrared camera.
ScanEagle differentiates itself from other UAVs due to a claimed 20+ hours endurance, 6kg payload and 18kg MTOW, 16 000ft ceiling, 70kts max speed, 100 km camera range and low altitude stealth features.
ScanEagles can also operate in swarms, which can loiter overhead until needed by forward deployed forces for ISR or communications missions.
The centerpiece of ScanEagle is an integrated camera in an inertially-stabilized pan/tilt nose turret.
Visible or infrared cameras can be fitted for day and night operation.
The daylight camera has an acuity about 50 per cent better than that of the unaided eye at the telescopic end.
It can resolve objects such as small vehicles from at least five miles away.
The operator can command the camera to pan back-and-forth for wide-area search, or to remain locked onto an object while the aircraft manoeuvres.
In January 2007, the US Air Force initiated an assessment study for the deployment of the ShotSpotter sniper gun fire detection and location system.
ScanEagle and the ShotSpotter system provides additional force protection for military convoys and military bases against sniper fire.
New developments
Other development programs are underway to examine the installation and deployment of other payloads including a lightweight high-resolution radar.
In partnership with ImSAR, Boeing and Insitu successfully flight-tested NanoSAR, the world’s smallest Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), aboard the ScanEagle.
During the 1.5-hour flight in January this year, the duo completed several passes over the target area at various altitudes and ranges.
The targets included vehicles, structures and corner reflectors.
Data collection onboard the ScanEagle worked as planned, and SAR imagery was later created on the ground.
The next step in flight testing will be to create imagery aboard the UA in real time.
The NanoSAR is a 2-pound system approximately the size of a shoebox.
The weight of standard SARs ranges from 50 to 200 pounds.In the past, the advantages of SARs’ all-weather imaging capabilities have been the exclusive domain of only larger unmanned aircraft.
Now ScanEagle can carry both an electro-optical or infrared camera and a SAR payload at the same time, says Carol Wilke, ScanEagle chief engineer for Boeing.
Another development of considerable interest to the ADF, which is acquiring ROVER III (remote operations video enhanced receiver) described in an adjoining article, are moves to upgrade ScanEagle to ROVER III compatibility.
ScanEagle has a 900MHz UHF datalink and a 2.4GHz S-band downlink for video transmission.
Since ScanEagle video data is retained solely at UAV ground stations and could not be digitally transmitted to other locations, L-3 developed the VideoScout display tablet for use by the USMC with their ScanEagle UAVs.
With VideoScout field commanders receive and distribute ScanEagle video over tactical networks across the battle space.
However Boeing was last year contracted by the USMC to extend ScanEagle services through a number of system upgrades including Rover III forward display system compatibility for the new ScanEagle Block D air vehicle, which would also receive an enhanced infrared payload and a mode C transponder.
Comment
In view of ScanEagle’s capabilities, both those well tried in ADF operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those that are emerging to take advantage of the very latest surveillance technologies, consideration must now be given to whether the system should be adopted for the long term, either as an ongoing contracted ‘provide and support’ service by Boeing (with emphasis on continued improvements as system enhancements emerge) or as an acquired system to be owned and operated by the ADF.
Whether it meets the original capability requirements set for JP129 may be of little moment in light of the operational scenarios the ADF now faces, and how the system handles these, in contrast to those scenarios conceived in Russell offices, which may have shaped the original requirement without the benefit of current user experience.