AIR POWER-Air power as a deterrent
Air power as a deterrent
The Defence White Paper has re-confirmed the importance of air power for both defence of our northern approaches and our ability to strike at aggressors where they are most vulnerable. John Cashen analyses the deterrent value of Australia?s air power assets.
Deterrence is a perception of a country?s military capability, and will, to inflict unacceptable losses upon an adversary. It can be argued that the main purpose of a country?s military in this age is to deter aggressive international (or even intra-national) behavior that includes, or may result in, the use of military force. The most successful defence strategy results in a country enjoying peace and security and never having to actually employ its military force in war.
In the air, as on land and at sea, deterrence can be both defensive and offensive. Defensive counter-air deters when the potential attacker believes he cannot achieve his objective. An air superiority force deters when a deployed fighter force is perceived by the enemy as capable of inflicting unacceptable kill ratios upon it.
Today, we may regard Australia?s defensive deterrent to be our fleet of F/A-18 Hornets with their modern weapons and effective command, control and surveillance. We endeavour to make the Hornets a believable deterrent by keeping the force in a high state of operational readiness and regularly performing realistic training exercises. Their future deterrent credibility will depend on the growth of the counter-air and strike capabilities of potential adversaries. How long will we continue to regard the F/A-18s as a deterrent? When our own confidence flags, then one can be sure that some adversary will also cease to be deterred.
The capabilities of the RAAF?s proposed Wedgetail AEW&C system were developed five years ago as the result of an analysis by DSTO that showed that our F/A-18 force might have difficulty responding fully to an air strike on Darwin. The analysis assumed a very small penetrating force of unescorted fighter-bombers intent on destroying high-value ground targets. The adversary aircraft types considered were already in service within our region and the study assumed they would be forward-based at the closest existing airfield to Australia. An adversary, using open literature information, could have easily done the same analysis. The addition of a single AEW&C aloft and forward-deployed over the Timor Sea provided the additional time necessary for F/A-18s on strip-alert to provide a complete defence and an assured deterrent.
Offensive deterrence is when an adversary believes he will suffer unacceptable losses if he takes some aggressive action. He will be deterred if he believes he will suffer casualties beyond his endurance from, say, weapons of mass destruction. A conventional strike force can also be a deterrent if it makes the adversary perceive that his high-value, fixed targets can be destroyed with near-impunity.
The strike capability of the RAAF?s F-111s may have represented this form of offensive deterrent in the past. They represented a capability unmatched in our region. Even the Peoples? Republic of China had nothing comparable. On the other hand, the reported refusal of the US to include them in the Gulf War coalition and in a later Gulf deployment indicated a weakness or vulnerability of the force.
After a very effective Gulf War deployment of its own force of F-111s, the USAF subsequently retired them with no obvious replacement entering service. This suggested that they were no longer efficiently maintainable in the USAF and begged further force availability or vulnerability questions. It matters not what the RAAF?s F-111 true combat availability/effectiveness is if there is a perception of weakness or vulnerability. The willingness of our political leaders to use our strike force in such a way as to build deterrent credibility has never been tested. Are the F-111?s a truly credible deterrent into the future, or for that matter today?
Perhaps the best offensive deterrents we have today are our Army?s Diggers. Few, if any, countries in our region have shown the willingness to deploy a combat-ready force as impressively as we have just done in East Timor. The perception that Australia will deploy a combat force into harm?s way offshore to support and protect our vital interests and those of our neighbours is very impressive. The initial INTERFET deployment was a potentially very dangerous ?Peacemaking? operation. Its success, in no small part, may be due to the perception of overwhelming military strength the force presented to the situation.
Offensive deterrence may eventually be achieved with the Collins-class submarine force. When the Collins are fully combat-capable they can represent a fearsome force to maritime targets which may be very difficult to counter. Of course, all the ?negatives? about Collins have to be put to bed and their peacetime deployments have to demonstrate their full capabilities and the political will to use them.
What about Australia?s future deterrents? Clearly, an airborne defensive-air capability must emerge to counter new generation fighters, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles targeted against Western Australia, the Northern Territory and our offshore territories and economic assets. We should not only consider a fighter replacement, but also a modern surface-to-air missile system: most credible air defence systems in the world employ both capabilities. Our future offensive-air deterrent should probably be based on the new paradigm established by the recent Kosovo air war: the political imperative insists there must be no aircrew losses and minimum collateral damage.
Maritime-based offensive deterrence, with the possible exception of the Collins force, is simply out of our reach. The only true maritime deterrent in the Western Pacific is the US Seventh Fleet. We should learn to count on it because it will be there for Australia and America?s other Asia-Pacific allies, at least for the next 20 years.
Our Army is an emerging deterrent already and we [I?S SUGGEST SAYING - the Defence White Paper has endorsed the need to] make the investment in rapid, sustainable deployment by sea and air of its light mechanized/air-mobile infantry and supporting arms.
A force?s combat capability is the key to its deterrent value and not it?s size, per se. In today?s world, often a quickly-deployed small force of extremely high capability can be a more effective deterrent than a large, low-capability force. The USAF certainly believes that its force of 21 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers is a far greater deterrent factor than its force of over 90 B-1 Lancers. A small force of, say, 12 F-22 raptor stealth fighters can be expected to provide a stronger defensive counter-air deterrent than the RAAF?s current force of 70 F/A-18s.
It is this analyst?s opinion that the best ?Defence of Australia? and its interests is to appear to be strong militarily. This is best accomplished through nurturing our overall relations with the United States and, in particular, the Defence ties, and through making a reasonable investment (I would recommend about 2.5% of GDP - more than the White Paper has promised) in maintaining and enhancing the ADF?s capabilities, with a long view of at least 20 years.
The idea Australia might instigate some form of arms race or escalation if it introduces a new capability into the region has no basis in recent history. Certainly, India and the PRC make arms decisions without regard for Australia. The arms buildup and introduction of new weapons by our more immediate neighbors over the last decade has occurred uninfluenced by our apparent run-down of the defence budget and our generally static military capability.
We should emphasize the ADF?s structure and assets to maximize those deterrents that we can best leverage. This probably means re-balancing the roles and missions of the three services and giving up some cherished roles and capabilities to gain new ones. We should not shy away from considering tactical-range missiles, both cruise and ballistic, as cost-effective offensive deterrents. Similarly, we certainly should consider defensive deterrents to such weapons, e.g. Patriot PAC-3, since it is likely we will be worrying about these threats in the near future.
Dr John Cashen Flaxton