M113 upgrade problems emerge

The M113 Upgrade has taken a long time to deliver very little so far; and what will be delivered may not be enough for the modern battlespace.
The upgraded M113 fleet is one of the cornerstones of the Army's vision for a harder, networked force.

The new M1A1 Abrams tanks due in 2007, the ASLAVs currently providing sterling service and the self-propelled howitzers planned for introduction around 2008-2010 will collectively and individually provide substantial boosts in their respective areas of capability.

But without upgraded M113s the mechanised infantry which these platforms are designed to support will be so in name only. The capabilities provided by the upgraded M113 fleet will also be central to Army's plans for a second mechanised infantry battalion.

With the mechanised 1st Brigade as the centrepiece of the hardened and networked army concept, it is clear how pivotal a sound mechanised infantry capability will be to its battlefield relevance. The importance, therefore, of a properly capable vehicle for the mechanised infantry should be equally obvious.

But ADM has been advised of problems here. Project Land 106 M113 Upgrade itself is in no danger of being scrapped, but the capability of the vehicles the project, and prime contractor Tenix Defence, is required to deliver gives cause for concern.

Land 106 is behind schedule. That in itself is not a significant issue if threats and strategic circumstances remain more or less stagnant. But the fluid nature of the threats facing our land forces in the modern battlespace and the pace at which these continue to evolve most certainly is.

Established in 1997/1998, the functional specification for the upgraded M113 - in particular the armoured personnel carrier version (to be designated M113AS4 APC (S)) - has not been revised or updated since that time. This means that by the time the first company group of upgraded M113s is delivered to Army in 2007, they will almost certainly need further enhancement in at least three key areas. The first is armour protection.

The upgraded vehicles' baseline armour will provide protection against 5.56mm and 7.62mm ball projectiles, and 14.5mm armour piercing projectiles when fitted with the applique armour suite. The latter, made from ultra high hardness steel with a Brinell rating of around 700, may need to be sourced by Tenix from an overseas supplier as no firm in Australia manufactures steel plate of this grade.

Regardless, this level of protection will prove inadequate against the latest generation of RPGs, which seem to proliferate in the world's hot spots. The US Army's 8x8 Stryker vehicle has a similar level of protection, but combat experience in Iraq has seen rapid acquisition of a bar armour type system (akin to that installed on Army ASLAVs) to provide additional protection from the RPG threat.

The spall curtains to be fitted to the rear troop compartment of the M113AS4 APC (S) are understood to be only moderately effective against spall and provide no secondary ballistic protection for the hull, unlike the Armatec contact spall liners recently installed in those ASLAVs operating in Iraq.

Should Army demand that its upgraded M113s be capable of operating in concert with 1 Brigade's new M1A1 Abrams as part of an all-arms battlegroup - as per standard practice - they will need extra protection against RPGs the very day they are delivered.

Closely linked to the subject of armour protection is mobility. Informed sources have indicated that a higher level of systems integration of key elements has been at the heart of ongoing delays to the program, with one example being the new MTU 6V 199 TE20 series diesel powerpack.

Pre-production testing has reportedly revealed that the vehicle is not fitted with adequate heat shielding, resulting in temperatures at the driver's station routinely exceeding 60 degrees Celsius during normal engine performance. It is unclear whether these readings were taken in conditions of high ambient heat, but such temperatures make the driver's job untenable.

It is understood that Tenix's solution has been to de-rate the 260kW engine by 25-30%. Losing that much power leaves very little growth margin for a future increase in vehicle combat weight, as additional/thicker applique armour and/or bar armour would unavoidably entail.

The loss of engine power is also likely to adversely impact vehicle speed and acceleration, and not just during tactical movement across difficult terrain. A reduced road speed could affect the vehicle's ability to keep up with trucks and other wheeled vehicles during convoy escort duties. This was the case with New Zealand's M113A1s when upgraded with Israeli add-on armour for deployment to Kosovo in the late 1990s: the extra weight of the amour reduced road speed to the extent that they were prevented from undertaking such tasks.

The M113AS4 APC (S)'s turret is the third major concern. ADM understands that the new turret Tenix has designed for the upgraded M113 is experiencing difficulties in meeting the specification contracted for. Should these difficulties prove insurmountable for Tenix, it is believed that the specification may be reduced to suit. Tenix has not responded to ADM's enquiries about the turret.

Equipped with a single M2 QCB 12.7mm heavy machine gun (HMG), the 900kg Tenix-designed and built one-man turret will deliver no more lethality, range or weight of fire than the Vietnam-vintage T50 turret does now. Accuracy, habitability and turret drive (electric) are improved, but although still useful in certain applications the .50 cal is approaching the twilight of its life as a main armament on AFVs and being superceded in other areas by a new generation of direct fire weapons.

While the .50 cal is still a hard-hitting weapon and effective against exposed troops, soft-skinned vehicles and some reinforced structures, the Australian Army is virtually alone in fielding this weapon in such a basic configuration on a mechanised fighting vehicle. All other users of tracked vehicles of similar size and weight long ago opted for medium calibre (20-30mm) cannon of some description.

Some observers have called for a halt to development of the Tenix 12.7mm turret and for a proven and more capable turret to be installed in its place. Aside from bestowing full commonality with the Army's existing 128-strong fleet of ASLAV-25s, the General Dynamics Land Systems two-man 25mm turret, as an example, would at least enable the principal M113AS4 APC (S) variant to remain effective in engaging current and emerging threats out to 2015-2020. The same cannot be said for the extant turret.

The venerable .50 cal will not provide ballistic overmatch against the baseline armour protection of many types of armoured vehicles. Even some so-called lightly armoured vehicles now come from the factory fitted with armour able to withstand 12.7mm HMG fire over the frontal arc.

Informed analysts believe it is likely that the three deficiencies mentioned can be rectified by local industry, with some specialised expertise from overseas manufacturers, at a reasonable cost and with acceptable levels of program disruption. Heat shielding, bar armour and stick-on spall liners are hardly rocket science. Nor would restarting the production line at GDLS-A's Pooraka facility for the fabrication, assembly and fit out of 25mm turrets be such a stretch.

This project seems to have been very hard work for the players involved. The outcome thus far, especially in light of the capability shortcomings reported here, seems positively to invite constructive criticism. Nearly a decade after the functional specification for the vehicles was written it may be appropriate for the customer to start asking precisely what it will and what it won't be able to do with its upgraded M113s.

By Ian Bostock, Sydney