Taking the fight to the enemy

An Australian Army specialist in armoured warfare suggests that the M113 upgrade doesn't go far enough in addressing the needs of the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA).
The M113 Upgrade project, for which full-rate production was due to start last month, will deliver 350 upgraded APCs to the ADF within the next five or six years. It has been something of a running sore for the DMO ever since early attempts to overcome the M113's operational deficiencies morphed into the current program. This aims to upgrade the vehicles to standards substantially different to that originally envisaged, at a cost of around $1 million each, depending on the variant.

The first rifle company of mechanised soldiers from 5/7 RAR in Darwin should be equipped with the upgraded vehicles by the end of this year.

However, critics of the program maintain the upgraded M113 won't meet the aims of the Chief of Army's Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) concept.

Discussion over whether they should be equipped with real firepower and greater protection or replaced by a more suitable platform to fight alongside the new Abrams tanks, such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle or the UK's Warrior-has been active in various military forums and blogs over the past few years.

This debate has in part been sparked by the inclusion in the 2004-14 Defence Capability Plan of Land 400 which is about enhancing the survivability of land forces in combat operations through the provision of new warfighting systems, possibly along the lines of the US Future Combat System.

According to Land 400 the life of type of current land fighting vehicle systems (M113AS3 and ASLAV) is about 2020 and it goes on to state that this project would enable the ADF to engage in development programs and to commence replacement of some elements of the system from about 2015.

Much of the discussion centres on the adequacy of the M113AS3/4 in likely future combat operations in the interim, including close combat in urban settings where RPG-7s and IEDs may be the norm.

And the protection of infantry is a very big issue with MajGen Robert Scales (US Army Retd), a former commandant of the US Army War College, who has firm views on the role of infantry in urban warfare. In a recent article1 he provides a soldier's view of urban warfare, where American big war technologies are negated by enemies, who move the fight into complex terrain such as the cities where urban clutter allows the enemy to hide.

"Familiar terrain, the presence of supporting populations, and a useful infrastructure gives the enemy the advantage of sanctuary in the midst of the occupying power, an advantage impossible to achieve in open terrain. He can become indistinguishable from the indigenous urban masses that shield, protect, and sustain him," Scales says.

With the possible exception of night vision devices, GPS systems and shoulder-fired missiles, Scales says the American infantryman has no appreciable technical advantage in a close battle against even the poorest, most primitive enemy.

"Too many soldiers and Marines die needlessly because they enter tactical fights without adequate protection. What threatens them most? Since the end of World War II, the greatest killers of American close combat soldiers have been mortars and small arms. In the global war on terrorism (GWOT) the weapons most feared are RPGs and roadside bombs."

Scales says recent experience in Iraq reinforces the truism that in limited wars a mounted soldier's chance of dying in the close fight is less than that of a soldier fighting on foot. He says armoured vehicles are particularly useful when fighting in cities, the layer of relatively impenetrable steel preventing all but the most powerful explosive devices from causing harm. Speed of movement and the ability to carry communications equipment gives mounted soldiers dominance in an encounter with insurgents armed with RPGs, mortars and automatic weapons.

In summary, one of the lessons of recent US combat experience in Iraq has been the rediscovery, once again, of the importance of armour for both patrol and combat roles in asymmetric counter-insurgency urban warfare.

The M113 Upgrade program addresses one part of this issue in providing much higher levels of protection for the crew and occupants of Army's upgrades APCs.

However, LTCOL Mick Rozzoli, a mechanised infantry specialist and military tactician, holds that the wrong equipment could seriously jeopardise HNA aims, adding that the M113 upgrade does not deliver a suitable 'fighting' vehicle to support the HNA initiatives.

LTCOL Rozzoli is the author of an article in the Australian Army Journal* entitled 'Putting the Fight into Infantry Fighting Vehicles' which, he says, aims to increase awareness within the ADF of what constitutes the type of mature mechanised capability required by the Army if the HNA concept is to be fully realised.

In this regard he suggests the Army should be aiming to provide its forces with equipment that has significant advantages in operations across the spectrum of conflict, and he sees lack of firepower as the most acute capability deficit of the M113 upgrade program.

And his carefully constructed reasoning has an advantage over much of the opinion, informed and otherwise, expressed by laymen observers and reporters. Not only has he first hand experience serving with the 5th/7th Battalion (Mechanised) RAR as part of both INTERFET and UNTAET but he also has taught doctrine and tactics to US mechanised infantry company commanders in preparation for operations in Iraq.

Rozzoli says there are eight discrete elements required to make the Army's mechanised capability world class. These are armoured cavalry, direct fire gun platforms (tanks), infantry, indirect fire support (SP guns), combat engineers, armed helicopters, air defence artillery, and logistic support. In his article he describes the roles of each of these elements, all of which share protection, mobility, integrated communications and complementary layers of firepower that generate influence in the battlespace.

Of these elements he sees the tank as the core of the mechanised force element, providing mobile firepower for mechanised formations, allowing them to close with and destroy opposing armoured forces.

"The Abrams Tank Systems' ability to synchronise high tempo, distributed manoeuvre via digitised situational awareness and the fusion of inputs from onboard and remote battlefield sensors make it a very potent element of mechanised capability.

"As the Chief of Army has pointed out the most efficient and safest way to enhance the Army's combat weight and protect Australian troops is through the replacement of the ageing Leopard with a more robust main battle tank."

Here Rozzoli adds that recognising the requirement for a world class tank has allowed the Army to bypass a process of expensive, but ultimately ineffective, upgrades to what was already an outclassed and outgunned platform.

Why then, he asks, is it so difficult to recognise that the M113 (which in many cases was older than the Leopard tank) is not an efficient or safe Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) for the mechanised infantry?

Here we might pause briefly to consider how Infantry Fighting Vehicles differ from their lower capability cousins, the Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) noting that such differentiation involves not only semantics and technological aspects but also operational issues.

While the two have similarities in that they are designed to transport infantrymen-preferably a section-into battle, in general IFVs differ from APCs in their enhanced armament, allowing them to give direct-fire support during an assault, and usually have improved armour. Some IFVs have firing ports allowing infantry to fire personal weapons while mounted.

IFVs are ty
A global survey of Infantry Fighting Vehicles in a recent issue of Military Technology describes a score of IFVs that are in production, under development or are receiving major upgrades based on official programs. MT classifies as IFVs and AIFVs those tracked or wheeled vehicles that:

* can carry an infantry squad in addition to their crew

* are armed with a turreted medium calibre weapon mainly intended to provide fire support to the dismounted infantry squad as well as engage similar enemy vehicles (in virtually all cases the turreted weapon is an automatic cannon with calibres ranging from 20mm to 50mm)

* are able to accompany MBTs on the battlefield by moving across the same terrain.

Rozzoli puts it this way: "The role of an IFV is to provide mobile protected transport of an infantry section to critical points in the battlespace. An IFV must have sufficient armour to protect the crew from artillery, mines, IEDs and small arms fire. The vehicle should also have armament with medium and long range firepower to deliver precise lethal fires in order to support dismounted infantry and to suppress or defeat enemy tanks and fighting vehicles.

"The IFV should be a fully armoured, fully tracked vehicle designed to carry mechanised infantry into close and intimate contact with the enemy. It must have sufficient cross-country mobility to keep up with the Abrams MBT."

For Rozzoli the main problem with the M113 upgrade project is that it is delivering an APC in lieu of an IFV for Australia's mechanised infantry. While acknowledging that the upgraded M113 will be a better platform than the Army currently has, he nevertheless queries whether an upgrade to an existing platform is not a flawed way of approaching the requirement for an IFV capable of surviving in complex combat environments

And while the lack of firepower is the M113's single biggest drawback, Rozzoli points out that the problems with the M113 exist on several levels. "Primary among these is the chasm between the capabilities of an APC and those of an IFV. A secondary concern is that in order to ensure that Land 400 and the Future Combat System Vehicle (FCSV) system deliver a world class IFV capability there is a conceptual gap that must be spanned."

Any future system with even a modicum of additional firepower will enable the Army to fight across a broader range of the spectrum of conflict. A more capable IFV would reduce the effect of the lethality paradox and provide a truly complementary system to operate with the M1 Abrams and the Tiger ARH as part of the manoeuvre battlefield operating system. (The lethality paradox: when one part of a military system (eg Abrams) becomes more capable and lethal, the threat to those parts that are less capable (eg M113) becomes greater).

The author suggests that the locally manufactured Delco turret, used on current ASLAV-25s, and equipped with the 25mm M242 Chain Gun, if fitted to the M113, would create a lighter version of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. However operation of the Delco turret requires two personnel with problems for the tightly capped manpower levels of the current HNA mechanised organisation.

Here we should add that it has been suggested that the 18 tonne stretched AS4 versions of the upgraded M113 might be the most suitable variants for up-arming with Delco turrets.

Another consideration might be to use the 'Sharpshooter' turret system from the Canadian Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light, which is an upgraded M113 variant. This FNSS/BAE Systems co-development has similar capabilities to the Delco turret and includes a stabilised 25mm Bushmaster cannon and a co-axially mounted 7.62mm machine gun together with thermal day/night sights. Rozzoli says that the attraction of this option is that it is a one-man turret and is in service.

Finally Rozzoli puts forward the option of pairing the ADF's new M1A1 Abrams with its traditional stablemate, the M2A2 Bradley. "One of the main aims in the development of the M2A2 was to match an IFV to the Abrams tank, creating a mature mechanised capability.

"The additional cost of procuring the Bradley might seem difficult to justify, however the main advantage of such an acquisition would be that, in one leap, the Army would have a mature and potent mechanised capability that could be employed in coalition operations."

Acknowledgements
MAJGEN Robert Scales, 'Urban Warfare: A Soldier's View', Military Technology, Vol XXX, Issue 3 2006, Moench Publishing Group, Bonn, Germany.

LTCOL Mick Rozzoli, 'Putting the Fight into Infantry Fighting Vehicles', Australian Army Journal, Vol III, No.1, 2005-06, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra ACT.

By Tom Muir, Canberra