Army's Euro duo

Army's two new helicopter types look set to transform the service's combat capability and tactical mobility.
The sight of the first two Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) at the handover ceremony at Oakey on 15 December last year must have brought a collective sigh of relief from the DMO, Army and the Minister's office, so long has the project dragged its feet and promised so much. Now it seems, Army is finally primed to realise the potential of what will arguably be one of the most capable and versatile combat helicopters flying the world's skies.

In fact, the configuration of the Tiger ARH seems to have appealed to Spain, which in late 2003 selected 24 examples of a very similar variant of the Tiger (known as the HAD) over the AH-64 Apache. The French, too, have also made it clear they will reconfigure a quantity of their 80 Tigers to the equivalent HAD version.

It is by no means an exaggeration to state that the Tiger ARH represents an entirely new and untapped capability for the ADF, and Army is right to be excited by its pending introduction into service over the next few of years. Once 161 and 162 Reconnaissance Squadrons bring all their Tiger ARHs online in late 2008/early 2009, each squadron will be able to provide six aircraft ready for operations 24/7. So wherever an Army force goes, whether it be an AFV-centric 1st Brigade battlegroup or a lighter, air mobile group from 3rd Brigade, the Tiger ARH will be close by.

Predominantly though, the Tiger ARH will work with Army's existing cavalry units, especially the Darwin-based and ASLAV-equipped 2nd Cavalry Regiment, much as the extant 206B-1 Kiowas do now.

Not surprisingly, the Tiger ARH will outperform its predecessor in every respect and will be able to fly faster, further in all weather, day or night while still carrying a full weapons load. Its sensors will detect, identify and track targets well before an enemy can get a visual or audible fix - 8-13km by day, 4-7km by night. It will also be infinitely more survivable thanks to an integrated electronic warfare and countermeasures system.

A quantum leap forward in capability over the Kiowa from any perspective, the sensor package consists of the roof-mounted Strix sight incorporating TV and thermal imaging sensors, laser rangefinder and laser spot tracker linked to helmet-mounted sights/displays. The Tiger ARH need only expose its main rotor and canopy roof to gain a visual fix on a target, the rest of the aircraft remaining behind cover.

Perhaps the real ground-breaking aspect of the Tiger ARH will be its ability to provide accurate and responsive aerial fire support for ground forces, a capability sorely lacking over the last 30 years. While the Air 87 tender cited that fire support missions would account for 35-60% of all missions, it is likely that once commanders get a taste of the quality of the firepower the Tiger ARH can bring to the fight the proportion of fire support to reconnaissance missions will begin to rise. The likelihood of this role transition is particularly pertinent given the increasing trend to use UAVs to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in both a tactical setting and beyond the forward edge of battle area.

Coupled to the considerable precision firepower possessed by the ASLAV-25 gun trucks and now the Protector Remote Weapon Stations being installed on the ASLAV-PC variant (which is likely to be fitted fleet-wide in time), the Tiger ARH's weapon systems will translate into an enhanced ability to hit targets outside the maximum range of small arms and RPG fire with a high first-round hit/kill probability. Although it must be said that the Tiger ARH is not able to carry as much ordnance as its former Air 87 rivals the AH-64A/D Apache, AH-1Z Viper and Rooivalk.

Nevertheless, the sharp end of the Tiger ARH is led up front by the Giat THL electrically-driven chin turret fitted with the 30-M781 30mm automatic cannon, which can fire 30x113mm ammunition of various natures at 750rpm out to at least 1500m (1200m against airborne targets).

The heavy hitting Lockheed Martin AGM-114M Hellfire II air-to-ground missile (AGM) is carried only on the inboard underwing hardpoints using the standard M299 4-round launcher. The M model Hellfire II AGM features a blast fragmentation warhead for engaging a broad spectrum of hard targets.

Australia has opted for the TDA 70mm unguided rocket system in 19-round and 7-round pods firing the FZ (Forges de Zeebruges) range of 70mm rockets. Already qualified on the original Tiger, the FZ rockets for the Tiger ARH will come in five types of warhead and sub-munitions: high explosive general purpose, high explosive anti-tank, smoke, flare and practice.

In general terms, a ty
Such a warload would give the aircraft the ability to engage AFVs and main battle tanks with fire-and-forget Hellfire II AGMs out to approximately 8km; area targets such as troops out in the open or assembly areas with rockets from 3-6km; and a wide variety of point targets such as AFVs, troops behind cover and field fortifications, masonry and other hardened structures, surface vessels in port and even other helicopters with the 30mm gun, the accuracy of which is widely regarded as superior to that arming the Apache.

With a largely composite airframe and structure and foldable main rotor blades, the Tiger ARH will reduce the support effort required for amphibious operations, thus minimising the size of the aviation support detachment embarked.

For a source selection which was, for most informed observers and analysts, a bit of a 'no brainer', the 31 August 2004 decision on Army's new trooplift helicopter took far too long. Even before the request was made for a more detailed tender response early last year, the outcome should never have been in doubt: the MRH 90 was effectively the only viable choice for Air 9000, a decision which for all intents and purposes could have been made by Defence with equal confidence after evaluation of the first round of tender responses in October 2003.

One of the problems throughout the tender evaluation process was that very few people within Defence were actually in possession of the requisite expertise to evaluate the ramifications of selecting the wrong aircraft for Phase 2/4 of Air 9000. The steady yet thorough erosion of Army and Navy expertise in amphibious warfare left barely a handful of people in the entire ADF with adequate subject matter knowledge to make an informed and long-sighted judgement.

A whole range of issues made for a fairly clear choice between the Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk and Eurocopter MRH 90. These included but were not limited to the latter's advantage in: design age, main rotor blade fold time, degree of marinisation, rear ramp and larger useable cabin volume for increased load type flexibility, latest generation avionics, higher availability rates, lower maintenance man hours per flight hour, better suitability to operations from amphibious ships and the ability to maximise the capability inherent in the planned LHDs. These things set the two helicopter types apart. The MRH 90 also makes use of the same Sextant helmet mounted sight/display, Eurogrid battlefield management system and electronic warfare system as the Tiger ARH.

The existing industrial footprint of Australian Aerospace and its performance on Air 87 were also significant factors in favour of adopting the MRH 90.

But in the end, this author remains unconvinced that the government made its selection based on the right reasons. Thankfully, all such musings will become irrelevant and Army will soon get on with successfully introducing what will undoubtedly prove to be the best helicopter for the job.

Despite all the rhetoric about fast-tracking acquisition of the new trooplift helicopters under Air 9000, the need to embark on a clear rationalisation plan for the ADF's rotary-wing fleet and the key role a local strategic partner would play in making all this a reality, Defence made a mess of this prime opportunity to continue its reasonable record of commercially sound decisions over the last couple of years.

By ordering just 12 MRH 90s instead of the 40 it demanded Australian Aerospace predicate its bid on (48 Black Hawks for Sikorsky), the DMO has done neither itself, the ADF nor Australian industry any favours whatsoever. Shifting the goalposts in such a fashion has only served to cast doubt over Australian Aerospace's planned and achievable AII package for the MRH 90, in turn casting doubt over all other industry matters such as sub-contracting to SMEs.

While the DMO's much vaunted Aerospace Sector Strategic Plan called for Air 9000 to be among the first foundation stones of a new Defence approach to acquiring and supporting aerospace capability in Australia and attracting industry participation which is meaningful and sustainable over the longer term, it has in fact placed Australian Aerospace in a position where commercially its Air 9000 AII proposal will be so watered down as to be virtually impotent in playing a role in the formation of any future Australian aerospace industry.

Remarkably, the pending New Zealand Ministry of Defence source selection of around 10 new utility helicopters for the RNZAF (the NH 90 is believed to be favoured) may hold the key to what the DMO can reasonably expect Australian Aerospace to offer it as far as AII goes and what Australian Aerospace can actually provide locally from a purely commercial feasibility viewpoint. With the Kiwis also onboard with NH 90, the likelihood of the Air 9000 AII package being fulfilled as per the 2004 RFT are high; without them there is virtually no chance of local assembly for just 12 aircraft.

In addition to the 28 additional (12 plus 28 makes 40) MRH 90s thought likely to be ordered in the next 12 months or so, the follow-on potential of the MRH 90 to fulfil other roles within the ADF should be equally as obvious. This includes taking over the maritime utility, trooplift and vertical replenishment roles currently performed by the RAN's big cabin Mk50 Sea Kings. The most logical course for such a move would be via a later phase of Air 9000, as originally planned until Project Air 9001 grew legs.

With selection of the NH 90 as the future maritime helicopter aboard numerous European surface combatants, it similarly takes no great imagination to envisage a suitably equipped MRH 90 naval version replacing the S-70B-2 Seahawks early-mid next decade rather than pursue a costly upgrade of the latter on an already elderly airframe.

By Ian Bostock, Sydney