JSF lines up next milestone

Although Australia is still two years away from a formal decision to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the de facto point of no return is fast approaching.
If the Joint Strike Fighter program meets its targets, and Canberra and Washington can resolve their differences over technology transfer, 2006 is the year Australia will commit to purchasing the JSF under Project Air 6000 - New Air Combat Capability.

Although formal second-pass approval for the purchase of up to 100 F-35A JSFs isn't due until 2008, if Australia joins the eight other partners in signing the JSF Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) MoU at the end of this year, effectively it's game over. Australia's taxpayers will be faced with an acquisition bill of $12-15 billion over the next 10 years or so.

So what does it take to achieve MoU signature, and what's the current status of the program as far as Australia is concerned?

The NACC project office states that Australia won't sign the PSFD MoU unless two conditions are met: firstly, that the government is convinced the F-35A will mature into a platform that satisfies the ADF's future air combat requirements.

And secondly, Australia will not sign the MoU unless it is assured of necessary access to technology and data to operate and support the JSF. This point was made unequivocally by the Head of Australia's Defence Staff in Washington DC, RADM Raydon Gates, to the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March. British and Italian Ministers and officials made the same point to the same committee on the same day, underlining a chronic, potentially debilitating issue in the US's relations with its allies and coalition partners.

Gates also stressed that while progress had been made in streamlining the US's cumbersome export control regime, more work was needed in the future.

The federal cabinet gave Defence approval in May 2005 to begin the PSFD MoU negotiations, which involve all the partner nations. The fourth of five rounds of negotiations was held in March this year with the final round due around mid-year.

According to Defence's Capability Development Group negotiations over the technology data transfer issues are progressing well, both at the multi-lateral MoU level and one-to-one in talks with the US Government and Lockheed Martin: "Government remains confident the issue will be resolved in time to sign the MoU in December 2006," ADM was told.

As to Defence's confidence that the JSF will do the job Australia needs, progress on the JSF program thus far suggests the aircraft will live up to its promise, according to the NACC project office.

The project has regained the momentum lost during the F-35C STOVL variant's weight loss program; this was successful, and also benefited the other two variants. The Critical Design Reviews (CDR) for the F-35C and F-35A CTOL variants were completed successfully during 13-17 February and on 31 March the Pentagon's Defence Advisory Board (DAB) approved long-lead funding for the first batch of five Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft. LRIP begins in 2007, Full Rate pProduction (FRP) in 2015.

The completion of the CDRs has bolstered Pentagon confidence in the JSF sufficient to resist the US Government's General Accounting Office's (GAO) call for further testing before the start of F-35 production. "The JSF acquisition strategy provides the most cost effective balance of technical risk, financial resources and the US Services' operational needs," according to the Pentagon.

All the F-35 has to do now is fly successfully. The first F-35A test article is currently being prepared for the start of flight testing at Lockheed Martin's Ft Worth facility. Its first flight is scheduled for the final quarter of this year and is undoubtedly a critical engineering and psychological milestone, both for the project team and for the nine governments negotiating the PSFD MoU.

However, a successful first flight is unlikely to silence critics of the RAAF's plan to acquire the JSF, some of whom have been mounting a campaign to quash the F-35, extend the lives of the RAAF's F-111 strike aircraft and acquire the F-22A Raptor fighter.

Criticism of Defence's F-35 program has centred on the fact that the production aircraft has yet to make its maiden flight, flight testing and integration of the avionics and sensor suite has yet to begin, the performance of the aircraft (including its essential stealth capability) has not been verified, and the price the RAAF will pay for the F-35 is still uncertain.

The argument is being played out in, among other arenas, the Federal Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, which held is conducting an inquiry into the ADF's regional air superiority and held its first public hearings in Canberra on 31 March.

Taking pricing issues first, in a written response to questions taken on notice, Defence told the committee that the Average Unit Procurement Cost (AUPC) of the F-35 is US$63 million per aircraft at 2002 prices, or about US$67.3 in current-year dollars. The AUPC is a precisely defined term in US procurement policy, Defence points out: it refers to the average cost of the aircraft plus ancillary equipment, logistics support, training equipment and spares. It does not include development or facilities costs.

This figure is based on the current US production schedule alone and does not include UK, Australian or any other partner nation's production or country-specific project requirement such as weapons. "Hence this is not an Australian unit production cost but is indicative of the relative cost of the [F-35] system versus other systems," Defence says.

The F-35 AUPC is calculated thus:

* The total procurement budget for the F-35 is US$154.3 billion (2002 prices)

* This is for 2,458 aircraft

* The AUPC for the US program is therefore USS63m per aircraft (2002 prices - or approximately US$67.3m per aircraft in 2005 prices)

This is the average cost for all three variants, and as noted earlier doesn't include production figures and costs for the other eight partner nations; the RAAF's preferred F-35A CTOL is the least expensive variant.

The AUPC for the F-22A, using the same arithmetic, is US$175 million.

The AUPC figure of US$63 million for the F-35 differs strongly from the US$45 million Unit Recurrent Flyaway Cost (URFC - also at 2002 price levels) normally quoted for the F-35A. But the URFC includes only the airframe, mission system, vehicle systems and propulsion system. Therefore the AUPC is more indicative of the actual cost Australia will pay for its aircraft, though even this doesn't include other project costs and overheads, nor Australia's share of common investment in R&D, production tooling and T&E.

Defence regularly points out that signing the PSFD MoU doesn't commit it irrevocably to buying the F-35A. A significant increase in price, or a significant delay, could still see the Government re-examine its options, given that a formal purchase decision isn't due until 2008.

Similarly, regardless of the cause, any significant delay to the JSF program would impact heavily on the RAAF: it might have to think about a further life extension for the F/A-18 Hornet or even revisiting some of the original Air 6000 contenders such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Boeing F-15A Eagle or F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. These would all be mature systems by that time.

In terms of F-35A platform performance, the competitive demonstration phase which saw Lockheed Martin's F-35 defeat Boeing's F-32 JSF contender, validated convincingly the models used to predict platform performance and handling characteristics. There's no reason to think these models haven't been improved still further so barring any unexpected surprises in flight testing (always a possibility) the performance of the F-35A is a reasonably safe bet.

The recent controversy over the stealth of the F-35 (or alleged lack of it) was also addressed by Defence in its written response to the JSCFADT. It was originally feared that the F-35's Very Low Observable (VLO) rating had been downgraded to Low Observable (LO) - seen as a quantum step in stealth capability.

"The JSF will be a Very Low Observable (VLO) aircraft," Defence stated. "The JSF radar signature requirement has not changed since we joined the project and ongoing analysis confirms that the F-35 will meet its requirements."

What those requirements are, of course, hasn't been disclosed - but Defence has consistently justified its support for the F-35 in part on the aircraft's stealth characteristics and the difference these make to survivability and combat effectiveness.

Even the JSF's most ardent supporters acknowledge the highest-risk element of the program is due to begin later this year: flight testing and integration of the F-35 air vehicle and its software-intensive avionics and sensor suite. Much of the risk is being addressed through the early testing of sub-system components and the use of a Boeing 737 Cooperative Avionics Test Bed (CATB, or CAT Bird) to fly a complete F-35 avionics and mission system with a crew of software and systems engineers to carry out testing and integration in-flight.

While the CAT Bird isn't scheduled to fly until August, the JSF radar, EW, Distributed Aperture System and countermeasures systems are already flying aboard surrogate aircraft. And the performance of the overall system continues to undergo extensive testing in manned tactical simulator exercises involving pilots from all nine partner nations.

Assuming no significant delays in platform and mission system flight testing and integration, the first RAAF aircraft will be delivered in May 2012 as part of the 4th LRIP Batch. The RAAF expects to begin training its first squadron in the USA using the interim Block 2 avionics capability. Once Block 3 completes its Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) in late-2013 the RAAF's aircraft will be brought up to this standard and the squadron will transfer back to Australia to be declared operational in 2014.

However, if Block 3 is delayed, one fall-back option for the RAAF is to declare Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with Block 2 avionics, which the NACC project office states endows the F-35 with a capability that is still superior in almost all respects to the F-111 and upgraded Hornet in both air to air and air to ground modes. This is apparently sufficient for the US Marines which currently plans to declare IOC of its F-35Cs with Block 2 Avionics in 2012.

And it has become clear the JSF will lack stand-off land attack and anti-ship missile capabilities at IOC, even if Block 3 comes in on time. The Lockheed Martin AGM-158 JASSM stand-off missile, which the RAAF has ordered for its upgraded Hornets, is part of the threshold group of weapons to be integrated with the F-35, but this won't happen until the Block 4 avionics capability becomes available in 2015.

Furthermore, there is no dedicated anti-ship missile currently planned for the F-35. Australia, Norway and Lockheed Martin are studying whether the air-launched version of Kongsberg's NSM anti-ship missile (which is still under development) can be carried internally and externally on the JSF. Defence's initial planning is to have the weapon included in the Block 4 avionics upgrade if the missile program is sufficiently mature.

The early retirement of the F-111 has infuriated many of the aircraft's supporters. The arguments for retaining the F-111 ignore many of the fundamental realities of operating an ageing aircraft (not least the unquantifiable risks of structural and system failure) and the distorting effect on the rest of the defence budget of the investment required to modernise and sustain an evolved F-111.

A former commander of the RAAF's Tactical Fighter Group said in a submission to the JSCFADT inquiry, "It seems often a fact that the more ridiculous the proposition, the harder it is to refute. Given that it took the world's best aerospace companies 8 years and A$600 million to integrate the [AGM-142] standoff missile in to the F-111, the suggestion to refurbish the F-111 sufficient to take it to 2040 simply cannot be taken seriously."

Defence acknowledges that the F-22 is a highly capable air dominance fighter, but it costs at least twice as much as the JSF and cannot conduct the full range of roles the ADF requires. The JSF has a wider range of sensors - an Electro Optic Targeting System and Distributed Aperture System and an enhanced radar. The JSF also has enhanced communications capabilities to maximise its networking capabilities.

The JSF also has the capability to carry larger weapons internally than the F-22, meaning that it can attack a wider range of targets while still retaining its stealth characteristics.

And in many areas the JSF has evolved beyond the F-22, both in terms of the sensor fit and the mission systems architecture. The requirement to update F-22 systems has already been identified by the USAF. Even if the F-22 was available to Australia, the small numbers involved would provide little scope for Australian industry involvement while Australia would become liable for at the very least a proportion of the cost of any upgrades required. The JSF program allows Australian requirements to be considered and incorporated in the design stage and, says the NACC project office, is considered a more cost-effective solution, regardless of the F-22A's availability.

What happens once Australia signs the PSFD MoU? ADM was told this would commit Australia to a pro-rata contribution for shared production tooling costs and program management fees. Exactly what this would amount to is still subject to ongoing negotiation, but $180 million has been suggested. But the NACC project office points out that as a partner in the PSFD phase Australia's representation in the JSF Program Office will increase: this is vital to ensure that Australia's requirements continue to be met as the JSF program develops over the years.

Importantly, bearing in mind the RAAF's needs for strike and anti-ship weapons, Australia will be involved in defining the scope of the first JSF platform and avionics upgrades following completion of the current SDD phase, which funds the avionics development only as far as the Block 3 avionics capability.

The current plan is that avionics and software upgrades will be made every two years. Block 3 functionality has been driven overwhelmingly by US and UK requirements, so Block 4 is Australia's first opportunity to push for the inclusion of capabilities such as the NSM; this may benefit other F-35 users and undoubtedly upgrades and enhancements championed by others will provide some benefit also to the RAAF.

"By being a small part of an expected fleet of 3,000+ aircraft, we get 100% of the benefit of developing these future upgrades but pay only about 3% of the cost," according to the NACC project office.

One of the key reasons for joining the SDD phase of the JSF program was to provide opportunities for Australian industry to participate in the largest military aircraft project ever undertaken.

As a Tier 3 partner, there were always going to be limits on Australia's access to opportunities, especially as the major partners - Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems and Pratt & Whitney - had been working on the project for half a decade before Australia signed up.

Nevertheless, the competitive nature of the international industry program has opened up opportunities for Australian industry, though not always for some of the traditional aerospace and defence industry players.

To date, 19 Australian companies have won some 40 contracts worth about US$70 million in the SDD phase of the program. Some companies have won 'promises' of a further US$110 million worth of business in the LRIP phase, which is not yet in contract. Extrapolating from the contracts won thus far, last year's estimate (which appears to have come from industry minister Ian Macfarlane's office) that Australian companies can expect over $490 million worth of work on the LRIP and FRP phases is probably reasonable and may even be conservative.

Generally speaking, contracts won on the SDD phase puts the contractor in the box seat to carry out the same work on the LRIP and FRP phases. Of course, pure mechanical or software design work won during SDD won't necessarily be repeated in LRIP and FRP phases, but companies that have won such work are hoping it may open up engineering management opportunities during the production and sustainment phases.

Australian companies have so far won contracts to manufacture engine and airframe components, carry out structural design work and software development and develop simulation and training packages.

Defence has pointed out also that Australian firms, who have so far performed well on SDD, may be exposed to fresh opportunities when production ramps up and Lockheed Martin and the major partners and supplier start seeking reliable second sources for F-35 airframe, engine and avionics components and sub-assemblies.

The NACC Integrated Project Team says it is working with Lockheed Martin to develop an Industry Participation Plan that can help deliver good long-term outcomes for Australian industry over the life of the Program. ADM understands that a number of promising new opportunities have been identified, but at the time of writing these were still commercially sensitive.

The sustainment phase of the JSF program has particular challenges for Australia. To support the global JSF fleet in service Lockheed Martin is establishing a JSF Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS) system. This could include Regional Support Centres (RSC) in strategic spots around the world. Self-reliant support of the F-35 in Australia is a fundamental requirement for the RAAF, so BAE Systems Australia is heading an Australian JSF Industry Advisory Coalition (JIAC) seeking to establish one of these RSCs in Australia to support visiting US and regional JSF aircraft.

While many new industry players have done well out of the SDD program, a number of traditional aerospace industry players did not: the sustainment phase, and the pursuit of an Australian RSC, may be the mechanism for re-engaging this pool of industry talent in the JSF program.

However, logistics support for the JSF is a complex issue as new technologies in the JSF, including stealth, and expected improvements in the reliability of components and systems mean the JSF's support demands may be quite different from those of legacy aircraft.

The JIAC and the NACC IPT are undertaking a study to specify the in-country support capabilities needed to satisfy Australia's strategic requirements. The results of this analysis will inform a JIAC study to determine whether Australia can build a business case for a competitive RSC.

By Gregor Ferguson, Adelaide