Defence Business: Choices and consequences - choosing the AWD design | ADM Feb 07
By David Shackleton
If Australia makes an incorrect choice of Air Warfare Destroyer, the RAN will have to live with the consequences until nearly the middle of this century, warns a former Chief of Navy.
Choosing the Air Warfare Destroyer design in 2007 will be the most significant decision made for a decade or more affecting the combat capability of the Royal Australian Navy.
There are two choices, and there are significant consequences. Those involved have an extremely hefty responsibility to all Australians.
The Australian Government will decide which of two competing ship designs is best for our country.
The choice is between an existing design that meets most, but not all operational preferences of the Navy now, but may not meet evolving needs in the future.
This is the route of lower technical risk, but greatest operational risk over time.
Or a design not yet built which promises to fully deliver the combat capability required, and has larger growth margins for future changes.
This is the route of higher technical risk, but lowest operational risk for evolving circumstances the Navy is likely to face.
A similar dilemma faced those deciding on the Collins-class submarine design: be overly focused on technical risk and accept distinct operational limitations, or believe that Australia should have one of the best conventional submarines in the world.
With perseverance, those who understood the long term benefits of overcoming technical risk have been proven correct, and the nation as a whole has benefited by accepting that challenge.
Projects of this nature can be nation-building, but only when that risk is confronted.
The sailors of the Navy have a lot riding on this destroyer design decision.
So do all the other members of their extended family.
In the late 1990s, our plan was to cut the Anzac Frigates in half, add a section, install a version of the Aegis combat system, and then weld it up again.
Extensive studies showed this would not offer the bang for buck we were looking for and the project was cancelled.
Defence then explored in great detail the possibility of buying three ageing Kidd Class Destroyers from the US.
The Australian Government was not persuaded, and so they decided to incorporate the construction of at least three large destroyers in the Defence White Paper of December 2000.
The point here is that the Government had decided that a marked increase in Navy capability was necessary to support its new defence policies.
These ships, along with the large amphibious landing ships and an enhanced Army and Air Force, would enable a more powerful military force to be deployed and protected.
For the Army particularly, this is a critical issue for their mission success.
They would also make a serious contribution to any high end allied or coalition operation the Government thought necessary.
Three very capable AWDs can provide a powerful naval task force in support of our friends and allies.
These ships would be referred to as Air Warfare Destroyers, a term chosen because of their primary role.
But like all destroyers, they are multi-role warships and will be fitted with an extensive range of sensors and weapons to give it combat dominance in all of those operational environments Navy people at sea have to deal with.
Australia needs an advantage in what can be a very lethal business.
We have to play to win, losing is not an option.
The new ships will become the Hobart Class Destroyers.
But we need to decide which ship to build.
The Spanish shipbuilder and designer Navantia, and the US ship design and engineering company Gibbs and Cox are competing for this.
The Government will have costed options to compare and select a winner by mid 2007 on current plans.
Both contenders have an excellent pedigree.
Navantia's F100 is in service with the Spanish Navy.
Four have been built and a fifth is on order.
This is the Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) contender required by the post-Kinnaird capability development and acquisition process.
Gibbs and Cox have designed nearly 200 naval vessels and over 60 per cent of the US Navy's current surface combatant fleet is built to its designs.
They designed the former Charles Adams-class DDGs and Perry-class FFGs that are in Navy service now.
Gibbs and Cox are the parent designers of the US Navy's DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class, and it is a derivative of that design they are proposing for the RAN; it is called the Evolved Design.
The two designs are apples and oranges.
The F100 was designed in the late 1990s and is much smaller at 5,800 tonnes full load, compared with the 8,100 tonne Evolved Design which, if selected, will complete detailed design in 2008.
The F100 carries one hangared Sea Hawk versus two in the Evolved Design; two helicopters give a lot more operational options than a single machine.
Gibbs and Cox have drawn significant ship survivability lessons from the Iraqi dual-salvo Exocet attack on the Perry-class FFG USS Starke in 1987, and the suicide bomber attack on the DDG 51 USS Cole in October 2000 - an important matter given the increasing lethality of weapons and explosives.
The F100 has a cruising range of 4,800 nautical miles at 18 knots, whereas the Evolved Design will have at least a 5,500 nautical mile range at the same speed; many places from Australia are a long way.
The F100 has a crew of 202, while the Evolved Design is incorporating the technical solutions for a crew of near 180.
Both utilise the Aegis combat system, but therein lies the greatest difference between them.
The F100 is fitted with a 48-cell vertical launch system, whereas the Evolved Design has 64.
The Adams and Perry class both had/have magazines for 40 missiles, which is fine when the only role is air defence; now it surely must also include land attack and potentially Ballistic Missile Defence.
You can never have too much ammunition, especially since you cannot replenish missiles until return to harbour because replenishment at sea is not yet possible.
Gaining 8 cells is a useful but minimal increase on our current FFG capability; but the extra 24 missile cells of the Evolved Design provide a very significant increase in firepower and mission flexibility.
The weapon load-out can be tailored for the mission.
Each missile cell can take up to four short range ESSM, but one only of SM2/SM3/SM6/Tomahawk.
Each major capital acquisition program is normally required to have one MOTS option, and a competing second solution.
MOTS contenders do not have to satisfy every requirement, but provide the benchmark against which more advanced options are compared.
Other than incorporating specific Australian statutory requirements and replacing unsupportable equipment, a MOTS option does not have the freedom to be further developed.
This methodology helps prevent the 'gold plating' charge often levelled at the military, so forcing both the customer and potential supplier to avoid requirements creep and buying 'nice to have' features.
This is where it gets hard.
Those examining the options will need to weigh the operational advantage of a tailored solution against the MOTS.
If there is no price difference this will be straightforward - but a tailored solution will almost certainly cost more.
So this competition is inevitably leading to the dilemma of comparing apples with oranges.
All of this complexity is wrapped up in a simple phrase: best value for money.
How do you assess best value for money in the context of buying warships with a sail away price close to $2 billion each of Australian tax payer's dollars?
In addition to the raw price and technical risk assessment, there are three primary considerations to be balanced and judged against any premium that is to be contemplated.
They are:
* combat capability
* growth potential
* through life costs
These ships will go in harm's way.
Australians would expect the AWD to defeat every threat the Navy may face over their operational life, out to about 2050.
The men and women who crew these ships must be able to fight and win without loss of life or major damage.
The right number, when talking about loss of life for Australian sailors, is zero.
During the life of this destroyer we can expect many technologies to change dramatically and new ones to emerge.
International relationships and security challenges will change.
There may be strategic shocks that introduce friction or conflict we have not anticipated.
We cannot predict the future with certainty; for those who are sceptical, look back over the past 30 years.
Ballistic missile defence is not yet a Government requirement, but Australia is collaborating in related research and development activities with the US.
In addition to North Korea, it is estimated that over 30 countries now have a ballistic missile delivery capability.
If needed, having access to US technology already fitted to US-designed warships will enable Australia to field a sea-based capability relatively quickly.
At this stage, however, the USN does not have a dual role missile that can meet ballistic missile and air defence requirements.
The number of missiles carried in the ship is finite; hence, a choice of the number and type embarked will have to be made to ensure that it is not marginalised in combat operations.
More missile cells give a distinct strategic and operational advantage.
A significant percentage of the geographic areas that Australia's Army may operate in, particularly in Australia's region, lie close to the coast.
Being able to provide area air defence support to the Army, as well as very long range precision land attack and extremely accurate gunfire support on instant call, is highly valuable in these circumstances.
At one end of the scale, Australia already has most of the necessary targeting infrastructure and could ask for release from the US of the very long range precision land attack missile Tomahawk, as the UK has done.
More missile cells give much greater operational flexibility.
The Evolved Design is also planned to incorporate a gun that can fire 127mm (5 inch) Extended Range Guided Munitions that use GPS to provide very accurate results to a range of about 100km from the ship.
Most soldiers would be happy with that.
These operational issues mean that very careful thought must be given to how much growth should be designed into the ship's hull, its electrical and supporting service systems as well as its propulsion system, at the very beginning of its life when it is practicable.
All warships are modified during their lives to become more capable, which means they gradually grow heavier.
Not planning for growth introduces the risk that the ship will have to be removed from service before its economical life is reached.
This is a consequence of it becoming too heavy and physically unable to remain within its stability limitations.
Based on their practical operational experience, the USN decided that the DDG 51 was to have a 10 per cent weight growth built in at construction.
To apply the same criteria to the AWD would mean that the Evolved Design should be able to grow from 8,100 to 8,910 tonnes, and the F100 from 5,800 to 6,400 tonnes over their life in the Navy.
Australia's understanding of how fundamentally important intellectual property is to Defence has become much more apparent since Australia has moved into being 'sole parent' owners of advanced defence technologies.
The well publicised Collins-class intellectual property dispute may be the best known, and it would be unfortunate if we were to forget those valuable lessons.
The Evolved Design by Gibbs and Cox incorporates release to Australia by the US government of the intellectual property associated with the design of the ship.
This means that Australia can modify any aspect of the design, and it also allows Australia to build subsequent ships based on that intellectual property.
Navantia's public position is not as clear and may be something less than this, simply because they have an active program of selling derivatives of the F100 design to other countries.
The through life costs of these ships will be large.
At around $6 billion dollars in capital costs, there will be close to $18 billion dollars spent in supporting these three ships over about a 30 year life.
We should therefore start from the proposition that these ships belong to all Australians and a dollar spent in Australia is better than one spent overseas.
It is up to the respective designers and ASC as the builder, along with the Commonwealth, to ensure that this philosophy is implemented to the maximum.
Looking beyond the AWD program is a responsible approach for Defence because the Australian Government will presumably want to be convinced that its already significant investment in shipbuilding is not a 'one off' activity that has to be repeated in the future.
Beyond the AWD program is the replacement of the Anzac Class frigates, with HMAS Anzac potentially to be withdrawn from service in about 2020.
What a marvellous opportunity we now have to leverage the knowledge we gain on this program and use it for another class of warships.
This would accord with the recent Senate Inquiry findings into Australia's naval shipbuilding industry.
Decisions of this magnitude come along every 30 years or so and are irreversible, once implemented.
There are two choices, but the consequences are considerable.
Going in harm's way is dangerous.
The biggest discriminators are combat capability and growth potential.
The F100 has 48 missile cells, and that is all it will probably ever have; planning now for through-life operational flexibility underscores that 64 is much better.
Two helicopters are better than one.
Longer cruising range is better.
Greater growth margin is better.
Survivability matters.
Lives definitely matter.
This decision is not simply about the lowest price; accepting a reasonable premium if necessary can still be very good value for money.
The draft updated Government Defence and Industry Policy acknowledges that accepting and managing risk is part and parcel of delivering an ADF that has a winning edge.
Australians should not accept second best.
In my view, the Evolved Design provides precisely what the Government was looking for in the December 2000 White Paper.
Vice Admiral (RAN Retired) David Shackleton AO, was Chief of Navy from 1999 to 2002 and contributed to development of the December 2000 Defence White Paper.
He is an advisor to RENK AG, a German manufacturer of main machinery gears that could be incorporated in either ship design.
Copyright - Australian Defence Magazine, February 2007