Bushranger held up
It seems everybody underestimated how difficult it is to develop and integrate even the simplest military armoured vehicle; nevertheless, ADI's Bushmaster holds much promise and could enter production early next year.
Project Bushranger, which is to deliver Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicles (IMV) to the Land Force, has been delayed.
Both the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and the vehicle manufacturer, ADI Ltd, have been frank in confronting the issues facing the project and are working towards changes to both the vehicle specification and the contractual arrangements necessary for production to commence. Both parties say they are committed to the project, but that the successful progression is subject to the outcome of negotiations that should be completed by the end of this year.
Under the $200 million contract for up to 370 vehicles signed in June 1999 ADI was originally expected to commence manufacture of the vehicles at its Bendigo heavy engineering facility in early 2001. This schedule has progressively slipped owing to difficulties encountered in entering the production phase.
The Bushmaster was selected over the Taipan IMV offered by Australian Specialised Vehicle Systems after a comprehensive and robust six-month trial program. The Bushmaster is reported to have significantly outperformed its competitor and according to the DMO also represented better value for money.
Of the three vehicles constructed for the trial process two vehicles (B1 and B3) were subsequently deployed to East Timor where they performed well. Their role is essentially that of a "battle taxi" whose purpose is the safe carriage of troops over long distances to augment Army mobility and not to perform as a fighting vehicle in its own right. The design is based around ballistic and mine blast protection requirements and 80% of the vehicle's mission profile is on roads and tracks. The idea is that the IMV delivers soldiers fresh and ready to fight close to where the action is taking place.
According to the Warrant Officer in charge of the Bushmaster detachment in East Timor as quoted in the DMO's On Target magazine, "The two trial vehicles covered over 2000 kilometres and did not suffer any mission critical failures...requiring the replacement of only standard service items".
However, in light of experience with the Bushmaster both in East Timor and during the earlier trial process some shortcomings needing rectification and opportunities to enhance the design were identified. Rectification work was to be at ADI's expense while the Commonwealth would fund enhancements. A prototype vehicle that incorporated a number of refinements instigated by both the DMO and ADI was delivered in April 2000 and much time has subsequently been spent in testing and evaluating it.
A number of further changes either have been or are to be made and the delay caused has led some observers to question how a vehicle that is reported to have performed very well in testing can need so many changes. The explanation offered by both parties comes down to difficulties encountered when taking what was essentially a concept demonstrator and turning it into a production vehicle.
The main issue is reliability. According to the DMO, the Bushmaster's mission critical reliability is "quite close" to the specification and it is "logistic reliability" that represents the DMO's main concern at the moment. The DMO is seeking to refine the Bushmaster design to decrease its maintenance requirements and thus reduce its logistic liability and life cycle costs.
To achieve this the DMO requested in June this year a Contract Change Proposal (CCP) from ADI. The CCP will address a number of issues overlooked in the original contract and one of its fundamental elements will be a Reliability Growth Program (RGP). The RGP is described as a "considerable effort" that will take some time. The DMO estimates that one cycle of the RGP will take six to 12 months to complete, with significant impact on the production schedule should that cycle need to be repeated.
According to ADI both parties are highly committed to the RGP as neither want to field an unreliable vehicle. While the data does not yet exist to quantify precisely the savings on maintenance brought about by the proposed RGP, the DMO is expecting these to be significant.
Neither the DMO or ADI would be specific as to which components or subsystems were causing reliability concerns. However, changes known to have been made by reason of either rectification or enhancement since contract signature include a new engine and transmission package and the reconfiguration of the vehicle's interior to carry an extra passenger, a move that increases Bushmaster's capacity to 10.
The engine change was brought about by the original Caterpillar unit being superseded and replaced with a later model that is 10% more powerful. The transmission is now a ZF seven-speed automatic instead of the original Allison unit. This change was made so that the vehicle could meet the specified requirement for the controlled descent of 60° gradients. The internal reconfiguration also necessitated other modifications to the driveline.
Further changes include a larger back door and relocated hatches. Army is also seeking to fit the vehicle "for but not with" a grenade launching system, an automatic fire and explosion suppression system and "run flat" inserts for the tyres. An additional internal appliqué armour kit is also under consideration.
The CCP was expected to have been delivered by ADI by the end of September at which time it will receive detailed consideration by the DMO. It is anticipated that the ensuing negotiations between the parties will be complete by the end of the year clearing the way for commencement of the Reliability Growth Program during 2002.
An independent evaluation of the measures being taken to finalise the Bushmaster design and production process has been undertaken by senior engineering and technical staff from two unnamed overseas specialist military vehicle manufacturers; one from the US and the other from France. Their conclusion is that the Bushmaster is "close" to being able to go into volume production.
The most recent publicly available schedule for project Bushranger would have seen delivery of an initial production vehicle by the end of this year, however this will not be achieved and a new production schedule is expected to be available by the end of this year. No valid in-service date is currently available.
The number of vehicles to be manufactured and their cost is also unclear until CCP negotiations are complete. The current contract is for 370 vehicles in a range of variants, including troop carriers, command vehicles, ambulances and assault pioneer vehicles but according to the DMO, "everything is on the table as we go to negotiations. We are looking at the possibility of reducing that number slightly, but Army's requirement is still for in excess of 300 vehicles."
According to ADI there have been both cost increases and savings, but there is an expectation that there will be an increase in the total contract value driven by the CCP. The company described the CCP as very detailed with a significantly expanded work breakdown structure. ADI says it is working co-operatively with the DMO, and others such as the DSTO, to achieve the necessary solutions. Its partners in this project, companies such as Caterpillar, ZF and Meritor, are world leaders who have worked closely with both parties to check the integration of their products into the Bushmaster design.
Responsibility for the delays to the Bushranger program falls partly on both the DMO and ADI. It is now apparent that insufficient recognition was given to the developmental nature of this project and that there was a widespread misunderstanding of the true status of the vehicles evaluated in the 1998 trial process.
It seems that underlying this insufficient recognition of the Bushmaster as a concept demonstrator at that time is an assumption on the part of some that vehicles are at the lower end of the spectrum of challenges presented by the manufacture of defence equipment. It was thought that any bugs found on the way to production would be quickly and easily ironed out.
With hindsight it is clear that no military vehicle is easy to design and bring into production.
Despite the problems experienced to date, both ADI and the DMO maintain that the vehicle is a good design that is within 80 to 90% of where it needs to be. The Bushmaster, they say, will end up providing Army with greatly enhanced mobility with an unparalleled degree of safety compared to the soft skinned vehicles currently used.
The evaluation of the Bushmaster by the soldiers of Army's motorised 7 Brigade is reported to be very favourable, and they are said to be keen for the vehicle to enter production as soon as possible. Their enthusiasm for the Bushmaster is understandable. Would you rather march for days down dusty and possibly mined tracks, be bounced down those same tracks for hours on end in the back of a soft-skinned truck or ride in an air-conditioned, blast resistant armoured vehicle?