Super Seasprite under new shadow

As ADM closed for press, speculation was growing that the RAN's troubled SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite program would be terminated. The helicopter program is running five years late and it may be two years or more before they can be accepted into service.

ADM understands that, notwithstanding recent progress integrating the various components of the Seasprites' Integrated Tactical Avionics System (ITAS), more software problems had emerged within the past few weeks which have affected the flight safety of the aircraft and led to them being grounded indefinitely by the Navy. The Super Seasprites are intended to equip the RAN's Anzac-class frigates, but these ships are currently operating Seahawks, which were designed to operate in a different role embarked on the RAN's FFG frigates.

The minister for defence, Dr Brendan Nelson, told reporters on 15 May, "Late in March I specifically asked the Chief of Navy and the Chief of Defence to develop and provide me with all of the options that the government might consider: that is, continuing with the program and at what cost, and when would we get the capability? Secondly, what modifications could be made to the program and at what cost, and what would we get? And thirdly what would be involved were the government to decide to get out of Super Seasprite altogether, how would the capability be delivered and at what cost?"

The Super Seasprites have been plagued by delays. They were ordered in 1998 and scheduled to enter service in August 2001, but persistent software integration problems in the ITAS have delayed service entry.

However, the DMO's contract with prime contractor Kaman Aerospace Corp does not contain a liquidated damages clause, so the DMO has been unable to penalise Kaman without initiating a costly law suit for breach of contract.

The RAN was meant to be the launch customer for the Super Seasprite ITAS. This was intended to integrate the management of the helicopter's radar, infra red sensors, Penguin anti-ship missile, electronic warfare system and tactical datalinks and make the aircraft an extension of the surveillance and strike capabilities of its mother ship.

The ITAS was to be developed originally by Litton Integrated Systems, San Jose, Ca, under a fixed-price sub-contract from Kaman. But Kaman was warned by the RAN in late-2000 that Litton had run into serious difficulties and required more time and money to complete development and production of the ITAS.

Kaman terminated the contract with Litton and appointed two new sub-contractors to finish the ITAS development, CSC Australia Pty Ltd, and Northrop Grumman Integrated Technology of San Diego. CSC Australia was already Kaman's principal sub-contractor responsible for developing the SH-2G(A) fight simulator and software support centre at Nowra.

Northrop Grumman was contracted to complete development of the Tactical Data Management System and Link 11 data link; CSC was made responsible for developing weapons and sensor interfaces and for integrating these separate elements into a single package.

In 2002 the DMO considered suing Kaman but was advised against it, despite having already paid the company nearly 80 per cent, or some $780 million, of the total fixed-price contract value of $1.017 billion then-year dollars. At that time only six SH-2G(A)s had been built and these were in Kaman's possession at its assembly facility in Nowra.

The dilemma for the Australian government was that if it sued Kaman for breach of contract, it would likely end up without any helicopters and so have to start an all-new acquisition process taking several years. That dilemma persists to this day: back in 2002 Defence judged it was more likely to get an acceptable outcome by continuing with the project, despite the difficulties, and that is still one of the options facing Dr Nelson today.

"At every stage over the last decade the Department of Defence and the government have made what it considered to be the right decisions," Dr Nelson said 15 May. "We have been constantly reassured by contractors and others that the software problems can be resolved, and it's quite possible that they can be."

"But from my point of view I'm determined to make sure we get to the bottom of it; I want to make sure that we bring certainty to our naval aviators; I want to make sure that the taxpayer gets good value for money; and in that sense it's important that as the Defence Minister I present to the cabinet the full range of options that are before us."

In simple terms, Defence's options are: to continue with ITAS, or a modified version of it; or to cancel the Super Seasprite program entirely and replace them with a new helicopter. Likely candidates would be the maritime version of the Eurocopter MRH90, which has already been ordered by Army as its Additional Trooplift Helicopter; or ane x-US Navy Seahawk helicopter. This would have a radar, data links and dipping sonar already, and would also be able to fire the Penguin missiles which Australia has already bought and paid for. It would likely also have some logistics commonality with the RAN's existing fleet of S-70B2 Seahawks, even though their mission systems would be entirely different.

"One of the things that I am also determined to deliver is to rationalise our helicopter fleet," said Dr Nelson, acknowledging the possibility of replacing the Super Seasprites. "At the moment we've got ten different types of helicopters across the Australian Defence Force. There may, in the review of this project, be a further opportunity to bring some rationalisation of our helicopters and the kind of technology that's required to support them."

A decision on the future of the Super Seasprites could be bundled with Federal cabinet consideration of Phases 4 and 6 of Project Air 9000; these are expected to see the replacement of Army's existing S-70A9 Black Hawks and Westland Mk50 Sea Kings, respectively, with the MRH90 widely seen as the front runner to replace both types in ADF service. In that case a further order for MRH90s in a maritime configuration could seem attractive, but much the same logic would apply to an order for a dozen or so SH-60 Seahawks in an appropriate US Navy configuration.

By Gregor Ferguson, Adelaide