The LCS program-were we dudded?

While Austal has done very well out of the LCS program, but without the prospect of an RAN order it seems other Australian firms face an uphill battle to win a share of the work.
Squeezed out of participating in the provision of systems for the first LCS Flight 'O' mission modules, Australian companies may feel they are also being squeezed out of future LCS flights as US industry circles the program like vultures.

While Austal of Henderson WA, scored extremely well in the US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, partly due to its highly original and successful hull design but also to the effort the company put into securing such an important role in the LCS program, the promise for other Australian companies, offering a range of capabilities for the various missions the USN had in mind, appears to have evaporated despite the DMO's strong initial support.

When the program was first mooted the purpose of the littoral combat ship was primarily to counter asymmetric threats in the littoral environment and while the operational concept had yet to be developed the primary missions of the ship was the prosecution of small boats, mine-countermeasures, and littoral anti-submarine warfare.

And there is little change here-the LCS is to be optimised for warfighting in the littoral with a unique design to suit a unique environment. They will be fast manoeuvrable ships of shallow draft and are targeted at what the USN sees as critical capability gaps: mines, small craft and diesel submarines.

They will help to counter growing asymmetric threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. They will also perform intelligence gathering and scouting using helicopters and UAVs, offer some ground combat support capabilities, and share tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units. Swappable mission modules, UAV robot aircraft, and robotic UUV and USV vehicles will give these small ships the specialised capabilities they require for each of these roles.

And their mode d'emploi (CONOPS) is now virtually determined. One to three LCS will be assigned to each Strike Group (Expeditionary or Combined) their mission configuration complementing other strike group combatants. The ESG/CSG Commander will determine the mission configuration.

In Strike operations the LCS will be forward deployed as a first response capability and integrated with Joint Force assets. The LCS will undertake only limited independent operations which might include mobility mission tasking in a known threat environment, and rapid response to contingency mission tasking.

The LCS process has been brisk. Six companies were awarded 90-day $US500K fixed-price contracts for concept studies to further refine USN requirements and knowledge of technology options for the proposed Littoral Combat Ship and future ship classes.

They were down selected to two designs and the keel of the first which was laid in June this year is being built by a team led by Lockheed Martin with Gibbs & Cox. This design has focussed on on high-speed maneuverability, agility and sprint speed. Designed to operate quickly in a shallow-water environment, this design is capable of speeds up to 45 knots and can operate in water less than seven metres deep. It is due for delivery in late 2006 and unsurprisingly, LCS-1 has been named Freedom.

The other LCS contender, General Dynamics (Bath Iron Works) was recently awarded a USD$223 million contract for the design and construction of its innovative trimaran-hulled LCS for delivery to the US Navy in 2007. The GD/G&C design features the high-speed trimaran hull based on the proven Austal (Australia) design that is currently operating at sea. It will have one of the largest useable payload volumes of any USN surface combatant-of interest is that this will provide it with the flexibility to carry out one mission while a separate mission module is in reserve.

The GD LCS's large flight deck sits higher above the water than any USN surface combatant and will support near-simultaneous operation of two SH-60 helicopters or multiple unmanned vehicles. The ultra-stable trimaran hull allows for flight operations in high sea conditions. In addition, the deck is suitable for landing much larger H-53 helicopters, should that become a future requirement.

These two Flight 0 prototypes will be followed by the construction of six Flight 1 vessels beginning in 2008. Although there may well be opportunities for Australian industry in the innovative requirements for the various LCS mission modules for the subsequent Flight 1 LCS, this will not apply to the three Flight 0 modules which are to use existing US industry 'toolkit' systems.

Initial plans are for these modules to be developed for three stated missions: shallow-water mine warfare (MIW); anti-submarine warfare against advanced diesel submarines (ASW); and anti-surface warfare against the threat from swarming small boats (ASuW). Other primary missions include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Homeland Defence/Maritime Intercept, Special Operation Forces support, and Logistic Support.

But aside from the modules, the Littoral Combat Ship requires core systems for all mission configurations with capabilities to:

* detect, identify, track, and protect itself against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and threat aircraft

* conduct precise littoral navigation to avoid previously identified minefields, and enable the employment of off- or on-board sensors to perform mine avoidance along the LCS' intended track

* detect and classify threat torpedoes at sufficient range to permit initiation of effective countermeasure and/or maneuver action to defeat the threat

* conduct multi-sensor search, detection, classification, localization and tracking of surface contacts in its assigned area of responsibility

* protect itself against small boat attacks, including the use of speed and maneuverability, and have the core capability to conduct warning and disabling fire.

Due to the program's short time frames?first metal cut in 2005, the first demonstrator hull in the water in 2007, another to start in 2006 and to be serviceable by 2008?which virtually precludes the development by US industry of new, littoral technologies-- the US Navy invited a number of countries with extensive littoral expertise to collaborate in the program.
Insofar as Australia just about leads the world in certain littoral technologies such as underwater systems and fast catamarans, the Defence Materiel Organisation in particular saw this as an opportunity for Australian industry to engage in the global supply chain and went to considerable lengths to support a push by Australian industry to win involvement. And this is one Team Australia push (and we've seen a few) which appeared to have some real momentum.

Among the drivers for the push was the potential for a US build program of up to 60 hulls with follow-on 'flights' of ships incorporating the new technologies as part of the USN's spiral development philosopy. The DMO also saw obvious advantages for Defence in the sustainment of valuable Australian industry capabilities.

Industry was told that since US industry was supposedly unable to satisfy the demand for new, brown water technologies within the short timeframes of the LCS program, the US Navy has opened the door for countries with ship programs or technologies which may be applicable to the LCS.

It seemed that Australia scored well here. Leading the world in a number of littoral technologies, and with industry charge out rates some 40% less than their US counterparts, we appeared to be very competitive. There was no secrecy surrounding Team Australia participants, many of which already had US connections.

In addition to Austal's winning hull design(as part of the BIW team) ADI offered its hull composites capability and its AMASS mine detection and clearance system. Nautronix (Maripro) had already been doing significant business with the US Navy and doubtless offered is hydroacoustic tracking systems for mine hunting applications and their underwater communications systems

Thales Underwater Systems (TUS) offered its PETREL mine and obstacle avoidance sonar, and presumably their swimmer detection sonar to shield against covert in-harbour attack. We assume that TUS also be proposed their lightweight towed arrays. There would have been others of course including perhaps Saab Systems offering naval C2 systems, Silicon with their mine countermeasures and Acoustic Technologies with their sonobuoy acoustic analysis expertise.

We assumed that Metal Storm may have proposed a combined air defence and combat capability against Swarm and similar inshore threats employing their unique electronic ballistics technology. And we would have thought that CEA Technologies with its scalable phased array radars and submarine mast detection systems would have had their hand up too.

Warren King, who was with Raytheon at the time, and now heads the DMO's AWD project, led industry teams to the US on two occasions. At the time he said that while no decisions were likely until LCS operational concepts matured, he felt the approach likely to be formulated would be to offer Australian solutions for particular capability requirements. These might take the form of fully integrated modules for surface and sub-surface surveillance, incorporating radar, sonar and infrared capabilities and necessary data management, or for air defence and combat roles.

By offering proven littoral solutions he said these not only reduce the technological risk for LCS participants but also ensure schedule delivery within the USN's tight timeframes.

While the existing toolkit approach to developing the Flight Zero mission modules probably appears to make sense as an initial stopgap activity-although slotting Australian systems would have been a better approach-because it turns out that many of the existing systems were themselves under development or, if in-service, may provide major integration headaches when applied to the mission module. The Flight Zero MCM module is a case in point.

To save costs and overcome schedule constraints the baseline module will comprise seven organic MCM systems which have 'program of record' status under the US Defense Department's Acquisition Challenge program. As we have noted above, this program provides opportunities for the introduction of innovative and cost-saving technology in Defense acquisition programs. The POR systems comprise:

* Boeing's long range mine reconnaissance system (LMRS)

* Lockheed Martin's remote minehunting system (RMS)

* Northrop Grumman's airborne laser mine detection system (AMLDS) and their rapid airborne mine clearance system (RAMICS)

* EDO's organic airborne and surface mine influence sweep (OASIS)

* Raytheon's AQS-20 minehunting sonar and airborne mine neutralisation system (AMNS).

Early in the piece Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems was concerned that the USN's plan for mine warfare mission modules had too little industry involvement and proposed that the lowest risk and cost approach to fielding the above systems would be to maximise direct contractor involvement in systems integration and that the LCS mission system integration team should be expanded to include the MCM industrial partners listed.

The suggestion was that the mission system integration team should define and manage the interface requirements with individual contractors then tasked to design and implement a mission module variant of their system. While this was of little interest to Australian companies squeezed out of the Flight 0 mission modules, Raytheon's proposal for procurement of the Flight 1 and subsequent modules may be of concern to them.

Raytheon's proposal was that the US Navy should procure post Flight 0 modules through a multi-year, multi-flight, mission package system integration contract with the emphasis on delivering capabilities rather than systems. To this end Raytheon went on to suggest that the US Government should encourage Flight 0 mission module contractors to form a national team to bring rapid mission integration to the LCS.

At one stage Raytheon said Office of Naval Research (ONR), DARPA and industry innovation should be encouraged via the system integration contract but Australian companies may feel they would have a better chance of their capabilities being accepted for post Flight 0 modules if responsibility for the integration of mission packages was managed by the Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) or handled by an independent contractor without links to the suppliers.

Where this all went we know not, but it seems that the US Navy's enthusiasm to incorporate tried and true systems developed for the littoral environment has waned as US industry steps in. Did Raytheon Australia, or Lockheed Martin, firmly established in this country, do anything to boost Australian technologies for the LCS program? Perhaps General Dynamics/BIW, which is expanding in Australia, and had teamed with Austal so successfully for the LCS program, may now cast its eye over other Australian technologies that could find a role in the mission modules applicable to their very successful ship design. Freedom-an overworked term-was chosen for LCS-1, perhaps USS Southern Cross might be a nice name for LCS-2.

By Tom Muir, Canberra