Austal a chance in US LCS contest

For the first time there is a real chance that an Australian company, and its home-grown technology, will play a significant role in a major US Navy shipbuilding program.
The US Navy plans that its Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be a small specialised variant of the DD(X) family of future surface warships. It is intended that the LCS will be fast, manoeuvrable and comparatively inexpensive. The US Navy's goal is to develop a platform that can be fielded in relatively large numbers to support a wide range of joint missions, with re-configurable mission modules a major enabler of its flexibility.

After a range of initial concept and scoping studies the US Navy announced in July last year that three preliminary designs for the LCS would be undertaken by teams from Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and Raytheon under contracts worth about $US10 million each. Austal USA is a member of the General Dynamics team and their proposal for the LCS is based on Austal's 126 metre high-speed aluminium trimaran hullform. Austal Ships is currently building a 126 metre trimaran ferry for a European operator.

Results of recent US Office of Naval Research sponsored high-speed trimaran studies completed by Bath Iron Works, another member of the General Dynamics LCS team, will be coupled with the Austal trimaran design to create a highly automated ship capable of speeds in excess of 50 knots. It is intended that this ship will have significantly lighter displacement than the Navy's FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class of frigates and be capable of extended independent operations with a crew of just 25 to 30.

According to the General Dynamics team the advanced trimaran design offers outstanding efficiency and performance in all sea conditions, endurance and reliability for sustained independent operations and a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to meet evolving military requirements through open architecture and modular configuration. It says the system will enable advanced operational concepts such as those employing high speed, enhanced manoeuvre, distributed forces and reduced signatures as well as the ability to efficiently embark from a broad array of aircraft, amphibious, land and marine vehicles.

The idea behind the LCS is to transform naval operations in littoral regions. The LCS is envisioned by the US Navy to be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals. This relatively small, high-speed combatant is planned to complement the US Navy's Aegis Fleet, DD(X) and CG(X) by operating in environments where it is less desirable to employ larger, multi-mission ships.

It will have the capability to deploy independently to overseas littoral regions, remain on station for extended periods of time either with a battle group or through a forward-basing arrangement and will be capable of underway replenishment. The vessel will operate with Carrier Strike Groups, Surface Action Groups and in groups of other similar ships.

The LCS specification calls for capability to operate at low speeds for littoral mission operations, transit at economical speeds while retaining capacity for high speed sprints that may be necessary to avoid or prosecute a small boat or submarine threats.

Among primary missions planned for the LCS are anti-surface warfare against hostile small boats, mine counter measures and littoral anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The LCS will be capable of carrying unmanned air, surface and undersea vehicles and other sensors that complement the substantial ASW capabilities planned for DD(X) and the follow on Advanced Cruiser (CG(X)). So-called revolutionary advances in propulsion, materials and hull forms are being incorporated into what are referred to as "transformational design concepts" for the LCS.

The LCS seems to have much going for it but not everyone is convinced. A 2003 analysis by David D Rudko noted that the US Navy stated that the LCS must incorporate endurance, speed, payload capacity, sea keeping, shallow draft and the ability to easily reconfigure for various missions. According to Rudko constraints in current ship design technology make this desired combination of design characteristics in small ships difficult to realise at any cost. "Speed, displacement, and significant wave height all result in considerable increases in fuel consumption, and as a result, severely limit LCS endurance," he says.

The thrust of Rudko's argument is that the requirement for the LCS to achieve 48 knots dictates the use of heavy propulsion systems. The weight of these engines along with weapons, sensors, command and control, self-defence systems and modular mission packages will in his estimation account for 84% of the vessel's full displacement, and as a result substantially limit the LCS's total fuel carrying capacity. He says that initial LCS mission profiles required the high-speed capability for at most five percent of the time and that the end result will be an LCS that has very little endurance and a high-speed capability it will rarely use.

Of course, there are also those who are critical of Rudko's analysis and suggest that he is out of step with leading edge high speed vessel technology. A particular point of contention is the consideration of heavy engines and propellers in the analysis when high performance light weight engines and waterjets are likely features of any future LCS.

A report released in February this year by Robert O Work of the US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments takes a more positive and network centric view of the LCS. According to Work, "...the LCS is less of a ship, and more of a battle network component system, consisting of a sea frame, a core crew, assorted mission modules, assembled mission packages, mission package crews, and a reconfiguration support structure. The total system aims for a level of battle modularity that will allow for an LCS's complete mission reconfiguration-including operational testing of its combat systems and crew readiness for follow-on mission tasking-in less than four days. If successfully demonstrated, the LCS's high degree of modularity would be without precedent in naval history, and would afford the 21st century Total Force Battle Network a unique ability to adapt itself to confront any existing or evolving access challenge."

Whichever view is ultimately proven correct there is no doubt that the trade off between speed, weight and endurance will occupy the various designers' minds, and is one of the reasons why Austal's efficient trimaran design is part of the mix under consideration. Following completion of a seven-month LCS preliminary design stage, the US Navy will select two builders to construct prototype ships. One vessel will commence construction in early 2005 and the other in early 2006. It is anticipated that in late 2007 one team will be selected to continue with the program, commencing construction of three ships in 2008 and four in 2009. The US Navy predicts that up to 60 Littoral Combat Ships may eventually be required.

By Daniel Cotterill, Canberra

LCS roadmap comes into focus - The roadmap for the US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship is becoming clearer, as are the threats and opportunities for Australian industry.

Within a month or two Australian companies seeking a role in the US Navy's proposed Littoral Combat Ship may have some notion as to how they are faring in this 'internationalised' program. This will be when one or two of the three ship hull designs, developed by consortia led by Raytheon, General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin, to whom they have been promoting their capabilities, are selected to continue with the program.

Current plans are for the US Navy to begin construction of two vessels in 2005 and 2006 to refine the new class' concept of operations. These Flight Zero prototypes will be followed by the construction of six Flight 1 vessels beginning in 2008.

Although there are likely to be opportunities for Australian industry in the innovative requirements for the various LCS mission modules for the subsequent Flight 1 LCS, this will not apply to the three Flight 0 modules which will use existing US industry 'toolkit' systems.

Initial plans are for these modules to be developed for three stated missions: shallow-water Mine Warfare (MIW); anti submarine warfare against advanced diesel submarines (ASW); and anti surface warfare against the threat from swarming small boats (ASuW). Other primary missions include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Homeland Defence/Maritime Intercept, Special Operation Forces support, and Logistic Support.

But the LCS requires core systems for all mission configurations with capabilities to:

* detect, identify, track, and protect itself against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and threat aircraft

* conduct precise littoral navigation to avoid previously identified minefields, and enable the employment of off- or on-board sensors to perform mine avoidance along the LCS' intended track

* detect and classify threat torpedoes at sufficient range to permit initiation of effective countermeasure and/or manoeuvre action to defeat the threat

* conduct multi-sensor search, detection, classification, localization and tracking of surface contacts in its assigned area of responsibility

* protect itself against small boat attacks, including the use of speed and manoeuvrability, and have the core capability to conduct warning and disabling fire.

Australian industry interest has therefore been focussed on promoting its specialist capabilities to the various consortia for the core system requirements of the LCS. One of these companies, CEA Technologies, has doubtless offered a range a number of its radar and communications technologies. We suspect these include the CEA-FAR scalable phased array radar, already in US Government service, the CEA-SCOPE submarine mast detection system, the CEA-MAST track management system, the CEA-SCS ship classification system, and the company's internal and external communications system. This last is in service aboard the RAN Huon class and has been selected for the Navy's new patrol boat. But how CEA's radar will fare against the three consortia's own radar offerings remains to be seen.

Another Australian company, Thales Underwater Systems (TUS) is understood to have offered the Petrel UMS 5424 mine and obstacle avoidance sonar (MOAS) and the Albatross UMS 5430 torpedo detection system, both of which are in RAN service and both particularly optimal as core systems sought for the Littoral Manoeuvre and Underwater threat self protection roles.

We assume that electronic ballistic expert Metal Storm has offered its Repeatable Access Denial System (RADS) which is intended for very close-in defence and can be utilised against small, lethal, rapidly moving hostile threats, either on land or at sea. It incorporates Metal Storm's new generation firing system which substantially reduces the complexity of the ballistic component of the weapon.

ADI Limited has proposed its AMASS minesweeping system which is reputed to have provided outstanding performance in the Gulf last year and which has already been acquired by the US Navy.

A possible advantage for innovative Australian companies lies with the Pentagon's Defense Challenge Program which, with its small business focus, provides any person, organisation, or government activity within or outside the DOD the opportunity to propose alternative technologies, product improvements, or enhanced processes.

Opportunities proposed, known as Challenge Proposals, at the component, subsystem, or system level of an existing DOD acquisition program, will be evaluated for resulting improvements in performance, affordability, manufacturability, or operational capability of that acquisition program.

While the existing toolkit approach to developing the Flight Zero mission modules probably appears to make sense as an initial stopgap activity it turns out that many of the existing systems are themselves under development or, if in service, may provide major integration headaches when applied to the mission module. The Flight Zero MCM module is a case in point.

To save costs and overcome schedule constraints the baseline module will comprise seven organic MCM systems which have 'program of record' status under the US Defense Department's Acquisition Challenge program. As we have noted above, this program provides opportunities for the introduction of innovative and cost-saving technology in Defense acquisition programs. The POR systems comprise:

* Boeing's long range mine reconnaissance system (LMRS)

* Lockheed Martin's remote minehunting system (RMS)

* Northrop Grumann's airborne laser mine detection system (AMLDS) and their rapid airborne mine clearance system (RAMICS)

* EDO's organic airborne and surface mine influence sweep (OASIS)

* Raytheon's AQS-20 minehunting sonar and airborne mine neutralisation system (AMNS).

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems is concerned that the USN's plan for mine warfare mission modules has too little industry involvement and has proposed that the lowest risk and cost approach to fielding the above systems would be to maximise direct contractor involvement in systems integration and that the LCS mission system integration team should be expanded to include the MCM industrial partners listed.

The suggestion is that the mission system integration team should define and manage the interface requirements with individual contractors then be tasked to design and implement a mission module variant of their system. While this is of little interest to Australian companies squeezed out of the Flight 0 mission modules, Raytheon's proposal for procurement of the Flight 1 and subsequent modules may be of concern to them.

Raytheon's proposal is that the US Navy should procure post Flight 0 modules through a multi-year, multi-flight, mission package system integration contract with the emphasis on delivering capabilities rather than systems. To this end Raytheon goes on to suggest that the US Government should encourage Flight 0 mission module contractors to form a national team to bring rapid mission integration to the LCS.

While Raytheon says Office of Naval Research (ONR), DARPA and industry innovation should be encouraged via the system integration contract, Australian companies may feel they would have a better chance of their capabilities being accepted for post Flight 0 modules if responsibility for the integration of mission packages was managed by the Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) or handled by an independent contractor without links to the suppliers.

While there has been considerable interest shown in the LCS program by Australian industry not least due to encouragement by Defence, which at one stage viewed it in a similar light to the JSF program, it has to be emphasised that the program is not funded (beyond the current ship designs), that there are major challenges in bringing such a revolutionary concept to fruition, and that there is no provision for the LCS in the US Navy's current force structure.

And there is always the fear that if the LCS was introduced into service Murphy's Law would inevitably apply. This would be when ships in far-flung locations suddenly discover they have the wrong mission system for the threats they face...

By Tom Muir, Canberra