C4I: Unending search for battlefield ISR | ADM Nov 09

Tom Muir | Canberra

The high-flown language of Defence's 2007 ISR Roadmap, like other mission statements, says it all without revealing anything tangible.

But is an overarching, integrated Defence ISR capability actually achieveable?

And is the pursuit of this goal ignoring the need for effective ISR at the tactical level?

If we interpret the ISR Roadmap correctly, Defence has plans to augment, and exploit the capabilities and platforms that make-up that troika of situational awareness- Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance-from mortar locating radars to space surveillance satellites, from night vision devices to airborne early warning systems.

But there is an important corollary: when integrated-as is proposed-the management and analysis of the enormous amounts of information flowing from these systems represents a planning nightmare that will have few precedents.

That the public version of the Roadmap lacks detail is understandable due to the highly classified nature of much of this country's intelligence sources but in our view, its focus on ISR at the tactical level appears almost cursory.

And ISR at the tactical level, and the situational awareness that it brings to improve the security of our forces in counter insurgency operations, is what concerns us here.

Airborne ISR
In his recently published CDF Fellowship study* on airborne ISR needs of the future ADF, FLTLT Travis Hallen says that a commander's situational awareness can never be considered absolute or perfect, a widely understood tenet of military thought generally ascribed to the ‘fog of war'.

"Indeed, increasingly adaptive adversaries and the complexity of the modern operating environment make attempts at attaining perfect situational awareness an ultimately futile endeavour.

"It follows that in the operating environments of the future, successful commanders will continue to be those who are able to make effective decisions in spite of incomplete situational awareness."

Hallen says ISR support should therefore be focused on providing the information that is necessary to address the gaps in commanders' situational awareness to allow decision superiority to be achieved.

He acknowledges that the ADF is making a concerted effort to boost the ISR capability of smaller land units to improve their ability to detect and discriminate adversaries in the complex future land operating environment.

However, the limits inherent in a resource-focused solution for smaller forces such as the ADF mean that, although additional resources may ameliorate the issue to some degree, they do not resolve it.

"The inadequacy of a resource-based approach is reinforced by the growing disaggregation of the battlespace and the resultant increase in the use of large numbers of small-teams, as the expansion in the number of small-teams will make the provision of highly-capable organic airborne ISR support to all units cost prohibitive.

"Similarly, the growing use of a larger number of smaller combined arms teams will make it unfeasible for non-organic ISR assets to support all teams involved in the execution of land operations.

"The paucity of operational level airborne ISR assets in the ADF will necessitate that their employment be focused on providing support where it will have the greatest potential impact; either where the success of an operation is critical to the campaign outcome, or where there is a high probability that the employment of the asset will make an appreciable difference to the outcome of an operation."

Operational uncertainty
According to Hallen, operations in a complex land environment also call for a degree of persistence in the support provided by the ADF's airborne ISR capability.

This need is based on the operational uncertainty created by the unpredictability in the actions of the adaptable adversaries likely to be encountered in the future land domain.

"By sheltering in complex terrain, potential adversaries are able to initiate actions at the time and place of their choosing, decreasing the force's ability to predict, with any degree of certainty, the shape or flow of operations that will be conducted against an adaptable adversary in complex terrain.

"This operational uncertainty creates a need for commanders in the future land domain to have ready and rapid access to ISR support to enable their force to respond quickly and decisively to unanticipated upsurges in adversary activity.

"This unpredictability requires that airborne ISR planners create a degree of ISR persistence across the area of operations for the duration of the operation.

"Achieving such persistence in this context does not necessarily equate to continual direct support to the land force in question, rather it requires that airborne ISR support be available to respond on an as-required basis.

"The ADF's future airborne ISR capability must be able to provide support to the land force not just on-time and on-target but also ‘on-occurrence," Hallen says.

IAI Heron lease
FLTLT Hallen refers to ScanEagle and JP 129 TUAV as among the ADF's extant and proposed airborne ISR capabilities but does not mention the RAAF's recent arrangement to lease airborne ISR capabilities from Canadian firm MacDonald Dettwiler based on the highly capable Israel Aerospace Industries Heron medium-altitude long-endurance UAV system.

The Heron, which will support Australian deployed forces in Afghanistan under Project Nankeen, will be operated by the Air Force and will provide a significant boost to the ADF's operational ISR capability in Afghanistan.

In preparation for delivery and introduction into service of the system, Australian personnel trained in Canada have already been absorbed within the Canadian Heron UAV Detachment at Kandahar airfield, conducting combat operations in support of ISAF's Afghan mission.

In regard to JP129, Hallen's reference to the provision of ISR support ‘on-occurrence' would suggest that this should apply to the future leasing of airborne ISR at whatever tier level, and as and when required.

As ADM has previously argued, to lock the ADF into a particular and costly long term UAV capability-irrespective of its ‘growth opportunities' at a time of rapid development of unmanned aerial systems and advances in the minaturisation of their payloads, would be shortsighted indeed.

Ian Thomas, President of Boeing Australia and South Pacific, was unequivocal when asked by ADM recently whether Boeing could provide higher level Tier 2 UAV contracted service if required along the lines of the original JP129 capability.

Yes, he said, and we're approaching that opportunity through our Insitu Pacific subsidiary.

We're taking the basic ScanEagle platform and growing it in terms of range, payload and size-the same technology but bigger and better, with enhanced EO/IR sensors, and possibly hard points on the wings.

We're looking to place that platform with customers, Thomas said.

ADF deployments in Afghanistan have highlighted the dangers and the difficulties of dealing with a seemingly fearless, but hidden enemy.

Under overall Dutch command, Australian soldiers undertake their mentoring and reconstruction and other activities in an increasingly insecure environment, attested to by the number of ADF personnel killed or wounded on operations.

If the NCW Roadmap is to be believed, the first networked battle group should emerge within a year or two, their capabilities being met from projects in the DMO pipeline, with situational awareness accorded very high priority.

However networking the land force and the eventual achievement of the so-called hardened and networked army (HNA) will not of itself cover all the bases.

To the soldier on the ground situational awareness is a critical capability in the face of uncertainty as to the whereabouts of hostile insurgents, and the next incoming RPG or bullet, or the location of the next IED and how it might be triggered.

Defence doesn't tell us how effective the ADF's current ISR assets are, airborne or otherwise and prefers not to publicise the systems in use or in the pipeline or to what extent we rely on our coalition partners for capabilities such as blue force tracking.

For their forward observer and tactical air control role, Australian forces in Afghanistan are equipped with thermal cameras integrated with laser target markers and weapon locating radars.

Outputs are reported over a voice network using the PRC-117multi-band single channel CNR.

Remote video receivers acquired under rapid acquisition arrangements, provide necessary eyes-on-the-target capability.

These ROVER portable receive-only terminals display sensor data from multiple airborne platforms.

ADM understands that aside from FO/TAC needs, these have been distributed down to ADF company commanders with most video provided by Coalition targeting pods on fixed and rotary wing aircraft and unmanned airborne systems such as Predator.

These may eventually be supplemented through the use of ADF systems such as the RAAF Heron and the Tiger ARH.

The AP-3C equipped with Star Safire HD electro-optics and TCDL technology has extraordinary surveillance capabilities, but ADM suspects that their normal tasking does not include that of surrogate UAS for ADF ground forces though they have provided counter-IED support on occasion.

ISR experimentation
The ADF also monitors interoperable ISR capabilities, especially those suited to ameliorating the incidence of IED placement and improving counter insurgency operations.

A biennial highpoint in this regard is the US DoD's Empire Challenge (EC09), a live joint and coalition ISR interoperability demonstration undertaken by the US Joint Forces Command and sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Hosted at NAWS China Lake in July this year, there were other distributed locations in the US as well as coalition sites in the UK, Canada and Australia and the Netherlands (NATO).

During this year's demonstration, live and virtual capabilities were demonstrated within the context of operations typically performed by a real world combined task force.

EC09 generated ISR data on a range of simulated ambushes, sniper and ‘shoot and scoot' mortar attacks, making and planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping and other elements of irregular insurgent warfare very similar to the environment coalition forces face in Afghanistan.

ADM understands the RAAF are keen participants at Empire Challenge.

*Travis Hallen: ‘Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance for the Future Australian Defence Force' Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2009.