From the Source: LTGEN Peter Leahy AC, Chief of Army | ADM Oct 07
By Julian Kerr
LTGEN Peter Leahy was appointed Chief of Army in June 2002; his appointment was extended in June 2005 for a further three years. An infantryman, he was previously Deputy Chief of Army, Director of Army Research and Analysis and a former instructor at the US Army’s Command and General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth. He was interviewed by ADM’s senior correspondent, Julian Kerr.
PROFILE – LTGEN Peter Leahy, AO
2002 Chief of Army (extended in 2005 for a further three years)
2000 Deputy Chief of Army
1997 Commander, 3 Brigade
1994 Director of Army Research and Analysis
1991 CO 8/9Bn, The Royal Australian Regiment
1987 US Army Command & General Staff College
ADM: The Hardened and Networked Army initiative includes greatly increased protection, mobility, firepower, and communications. It would be useful to run through each of those subjects and ascertain the situation now, the ultimate objective, and when it will be achieved.
Leahy: It’s important to note that it is the combination of the improvement of each of these attributes that delivers the Hardened and Networked Army.
Protection – Army’s experiences on contemporary operations have reinforced the value of the physical protection provided by vehicles such as ASLAV and Bushmaster.
The acquisition of the M1A1 Abrams, a Self Propelled Gun under Land 17 and the fleet of protected B vehicles acquired under project Land 121 will complement the ASLAV and upgraded M113AS4 to provide unprecedented levels of physical protection to Army.
These systems enhance Army’s ability to conduct protected combined arms operations. The procurement of UAV and digital command and control systems under Land 75 and Land 125 further enhance protection by enabling the increased ability to rapidly regroup, enhancing access to responsive fire support and improving situational awareness.
Mobility – Bushmaster has demonstrated its capability on current operations, providing protected mobility to both combat and combat service support elements.
Maintaining a combination of tracked and wheeled protected vehicles will enable forces to be battle grouped to operate in different types of terrain.
This will be further enhanced with the acquisition of Land 121 vehicles for combat service support elements, and the new MRH 90 helicopters.
When linked with the strategic mobility provided by Navy’s new amphibious ships and Air Force’s C-17, Army’s tactical, operational and strategic mobility has developed significantly from the time of intervention in East Timor.
Firepower – The tank remains the mainstay of Army’s direct firepower and this has obviously been enhanced by the acquisition of the M1A1 AIM, ASLAV and the new M113AS4 form critical components in delivering precision direct fire on the battlefield.
The enhanced capabilities given to the dismounted soldier should also not be forgotten. We also continue to develop our indirect capabilities.
The Land-based indirect fires will be enhanced through digital command and control systems and the provision of precision 155mm ammunition systems that provide enhanced terminal effects. We are also working to enhance our access to air and naval fire support.
Communications (Networking) – Army’s key project for communications networking is Land 75 and the dismounted C4I aspects of Land 125. The bearers for these systems will be provided through Land 2072.
These projects are now reaching the points of decision and we will shortly see enhanced capability throughout Army’s units.
The critical elements of the HNA initiative are increased combat capabilities through the emphasis on combined arms philosophy of mixing capabilities such as infantry, armour, engineers and logistics and according forces greater protected mobility, firepower and communication systems.
The HNA initiative has been expanded upon by the Enhanced Land Force project which is increasing the Land Force’s ability to provide more capacity to meet our strategic commitments.
ADM: Army is being configured to be capable of medium-intensity combined arms combat involving the coordinated use of tanks, engineers, artillery, mounted infantry and supporting air assets connected through a state-of-the-art networked C2 system. Does planning assume use of these capabilities in anything but coalition operations?
Leahy: Yes. The nature of the current strategic environment is such that Army must be capable of providing units that can operate as part of a coalition led by another nation, act as a coalition lead, or operate independently in pursuit of the national interest.
The development of Army’s capabilities under the HNA and ELF initiatives will ensure that we have a highly flexible, adaptable and capable force able to operate successfully in any of these circumstances.
<B>ADM: What changes to doctrine and training does the move to battle groups and combined arms teams require?
Leahy:<P> Current doctrine and training is focused on battle groups and combined arms teams.
However, we will continue to develop doctrine and training as we learn lessons from operational deployments and following the introduction of new capability.
The challenge to the concept of battlegrouping and combined arms teams is flexibility of thought. Commanders at all levels require greater understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of other elements that may be battlegrouped.
Army is currently rewriting its battlegrouping doctrine to reflect this. Army has long adopted a combined arms approach in training. It continues to develop as new capabilities are added or enhanced.
ADM: What are the main strategic and tactical lessons learnt to date from Iraq and Afghanistan. How are they being applied to HNA?
Leahy: The ‘military option’ on its own is unable to solve any security or defence challenge. All elements of national power: political, economic, social, diplomatic and geographic need to come together to ensure an effective long-term solution.
Outcomes in such areas as social, economic and political stability take time, especially when there is considerable internal armed resistance against such outcomes.
The principal lessons to be learned from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, therefore, are to ensure military actions are aligned to the overall political objectives, that the military is sufficiently equipped to meet the myriad of tasks expected of it, including in areas such as restoring essential services, population protection and indigenous capacity building, and that we are prepared for a protracted struggle to achieve our desired outcomes.
It must be remembered that military force should always be employed as part of a whole of government approach to achieve national political objectives.
ADM: How much spare capacity does Army have with some 3,000 troops deployed. Can we deploy a brigade if a crisis emerges?
Leahy: Army is now at its busiest since the Vietnam War. We have over 2500 people deployed on operations overseas or within Australia at any one time.
We are busy and we continue to work extremely hard to ensure that our people have the time to recover between operational deployments.
This includes ensuring that Army’s personnel have enough time at home and that they are able to conduct the individual and collective training necessary to ensure they maintain their professional competencies.
Noting this operational tempo we still maintain other forces that are held at high readiness to react to a contingency either here or overseas. You will be aware that Army is currently growing. This growth is essential for the Army and will ease the current position considerably.
ADM: The announcement in 2006 of the Enhanced Land Force referred to an additional two battalions, as did the Minister’s 8 May 2007 press release following the latest budget. Yet the Defence Update released on 5 July refers to an increase in the size of Army by one “and in time possibly two” infantry battalions. This is no longer unequivocal. What’s happened?
Leahy: The Enhanced Land Force seeks to grow the Army by two battalions. Government will endorse the raising of the second battalion when the core capabilities of the first battalion are in place.
The core capabilities of the first battalion (7 RAR) are defined as the headquarters and two companies and will be in place by late September 07. It is after this that Government is expected to authorise the raising of the second battalion to begin.
ADM: How many new recruits per year are needed to meet this schedule without weakening other units?
Leahy: Army will require approximately 5,000 recruits per year to meet all of our growth targets which include HNA, the Military Gap Year Scheme, and ELF. Army is extremely well positioned to meet this requirement and early indications are that we will be successful in doing so.
ADM: Given the focus on HNA, can the Land Force look forward to a more rapid acquisition of capability associated with programs such as Land 400?
Leahy: The Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) has enabled the Army to hit harder and be harder to hit. HNA focused on preparing Army structurally for the introduction of equipment being procured under the DCP.
Rapid Acquisitions have complemented these acquisitions, allowing Army to quickly adapt to changing enemy threats and maintain high levels of capability of protection for deployed soldiers. The positives and negatives of both acquisition methods should not be ignored.
Currently Army does not intend to bring forward any programs of the scale of Land 400 as these require time to allow greater analysis.
Where appropriate, however, Army will always seek opportunities to provide improved capability as soon as possible to the soldier operating in the highly lethal contemporary battlefield.
ADM: The first of the upgraded M113s will soon be delivered to Army. What lessons have been learnt from this long-drawnout program?
Leahy: The first Company Group of upgraded M113s is due to be delivered to the 1st Brigade in November. There are still a few final tests to be completed, but Army and the Defence Materiel Organisation are confident that these milestones will be met and the upgraded vehicles will be introduced into service in the near future.
The original Land 106 project was a ‘minimum upgrade’ of the Army’s M113A1 fleet that was aligned with the strategic guidance at the time.
The current project comprises a more substantial upgrade to address firepower, protection, mobility and habitability issues with the M113A1 fleet.
The upgraded vehicle will provide Army with a M113 capability that is more substantially survivable, employable and relevant in current strategic circumstances.
ADM: With the realisation of the Mechanised Infantry capability on hold pending the delivery of the upgraded M113s, would the organisation and role of an armoured cavalry regiment be more appropriate for current contingencies than mechanised infantry?
Leahy: Army’s mechanised infantry capability already exists within the 1st Brigade, based on the current M113A1 fleet. Introduction of the upgraded M113 fleet will certainly increase this capability.
For example, it provides a tracked vehicle that can operate in terrain not suited to wheeled vehicles. The cavalry and the mechanised capabilities are not interchangeable; they are complementary.
The ASLAV and the Bushmaster have been used on the more dangerous contemporary operations to date because these systems provide the best levels of protection.
The upgraded M113A4 will provide equivalent levels of protection so increased options will be available for deployment. Army believes that battlegrouping its force elements to meet particular mission requirements is a more effective approach as complementary capabilities can be grouped to provide the most effective fighting force to conduct a mission.
ADM: IEDs and advances such as tandem-warhead HEAT rounds are leading the US to urgently purchase more heavily-armoured transport for its troops. Given these circumstances, are you satisfied with the level of protection afforded by Bushmaster and the upgraded M-113?
Leahy: The ADF is constantly assessing improvement in threat capabilities. The ADF has led the way with improvements to protected mobility for its soldiers through the acquisition of the Bushmaster, and improved protection for M113AS4 and ASLAV.
Protection was a key factor in the acquisition of the M1A1. These vehicles provide enhanced levels of physical protection. When enhanced with the structural protection gained by operating within a situationally enhanced combined arms team these vehicles provide excellent protection for our soldiers.
IEDs are a constant concern for our force as they rapidly adapt to defeat modern technology. The ADF has invested prudently in countering this threat.
Led by the Counter IED Task Force the ADF continually upgrades its capabilities in this area. As threat capabilities develop the ADF continues to assess affordable options for improvement.
ADM: Do HNA initiatives include consideration of extending Project OverLander to provide the protected mobility required for modern battlefield and counter-insurgency operations?
Leahy: Project OverLander has been based on HNA structures. As a result, consideration has been given to the protection requirements for soldiers in the modern battlespace.
ADM: You referred in February (in Defence magazine) to optimising the capabilities generated by the DCP by modifying unit structures and adjusting the current plans for some of Army’s new vehicles and equipment. Could you please expand on this?
Leahy: This process began with the HNA initiative which seeks to make best use of DCP equipment and structure Army in the best possible manner to meet its operational commitments both now and for the foreseeable future.
Following on from the ELF initiative, Army has now begun work on the Army Force Structure Implementation Plan, which will provide guidance on the growth of the Army to 2016.
This plan will fully integrate HNA and ELF, as well as the growth emanating from the 2000 White Paper, to ensure that force structures are built in such a way that, when combined with new equipment, highly trained personnel, improved doctrine and enhanced facilities, they can deliver significantly enhanced capabilities in the truest sense of the word.
The plan will also be reviewed annually to ensure that it remains relevant to the current operational situation and allows Army to continuously modernise in a coherent and measured fashion.
ADM: Have the systemic problems found in naval aviation resulted in any reviews and/or measures within Army Aviation?
Leahy: It should be noted that the recent aviation health report presented to CAF highlighted that Army Aviation is healthy in terms of overall airworthiness.
We are in no way complacent about this and will maintain our focus on air safety in conjunction with the relevant air worthiness authorities. Army has fully reviewed the recommendations into the Sea King accident and has implemented any or all recommendations where appropriate.
Of note, there were only two recommendations where Army had not been already fully or partially compliant and those are being examined. (These recommendations involve medical stretchers on aircraft).
ADM: Why have Chinooks not been deployed in Afghanistan continuously? What additional risks arise from not having our own airlift in-theatre?
Leahy: The aircraft were required to return for routine phase maintenance and engine modification upgrades. Our Chinooks replaced the Dutch Chinook capability so that they could recuperate their capability, as all Armies of our size require.
They have now returned that recuperated capability to Afghanistan which allows us to effectively, safely and efficiently recuperate.
Given that Army has such a small fleet of CH-47, we have a limited number of personnel to operate and maintain the aircraft. They too require recuperation from this high tempo and high stress environment and spend time with their families, among other things.
Five CH-47 aircraft were rotated through Afghanistan over a 12-month period and achieved a flying total of 1,215 hours. All aircraft operating in theatre are appropriately armoured.
The Australian Army Aviation contribution is part of a coalition aviation force that supports coalition forces. That coalition aviation force provides continuous support to our soldiers regardless of the deployment status of our aircraft.
Our CH-47s are being prepared now for a further deployment in Afghanistan commencing in early 2008.
ADM: If the Dutch were to withdraw from Afghanistan, how would the fire support now provided by their artillery and helicopters be replaced?
Leahy: It’s a coalition effort in Oruzgan where a number of different countries provide specific capabilities. Our focus is upon reconstruction and the Dutch make a significant contribution to our work by providing the essential capabilities which protect our soldiers on the ground when there is a need.
If the Dutch were to withdraw the critical force enablers they provide in support of the ADF, and a third partner country could not be found by NATO, the ADF would need to review its ability to safely continue with its mission in Oruzgan.
ADM: After extensive reviews of ADF weapons, equipment and procurement in 2006, the CDF has described ADF weapons and equipment in general to be amongst the best available. When will this equipment capability be realised within the Reserve forces?
Leahy: Under the HNA initiative, the ARes (Australian Reserves) was given roles and tasks designed to make it more ready and relevant. These roles and tasks focus the ARes on support to the ARA in terms of high readiness individual reinforcements, as well as high readiness sub-units that can deploy overseas to assist the regular force to maintain operational commitments elsewhere.
It also asks the ARes to continue to fulfil important roles in contributing to domestic security. The success of the ARes in meeting these roles has been clearly underscored since 2004, with the successful deployment of ARes sub-units to the Solomon Islands and the performance of ARes personnel in support of security operations, such as those associated with the Commonwealth Games in Melbourne.
Copyright - Australian Defence Magazine, October 2007