Defence Business: EW to converge with cyber? | ADM June 2012

Differing views on the indigenous electronic warfare (EW) sector were evident at the biennial convention of the Australian Chapter of the Association of Old Crows – Defence thought the sector was growing and many industry participants did not, although there was common ground on the threats and opportunities presented by cyber.

The confluence of EW, information operations and cyber was reflected not only in the convention’s official title but also in general recognition by speakers of the linkage of the three domains within the global information environment.

In the only significant announcement of the convention, Air Vice Marshal Neil Hart, Head of Joint Capability Coordination (JCC) within the Vice Chief of Defence Force Group (VCDF), disclosed that agreement in principle had been reached through the VCDF for the establishment of a Joint EW Operations Support Centre (JEWOSC). As anticipated, this will be located at Edinburgh.

The intention to create such a centre was first disclosed in the 2009 Defence White Paper. This stated it would involve the colocation of a number of different ADF EW organisations, aimed at growing a critical mass of personnel and expertise and taking responsibility for training, research and development, countermeasures development, and the validation and verification of EW systems.

Acknowledging several false starts and the time taken to bring the project to this stage, AVM Hart said the concern had been not to affect systems and platform development within the individual service groups.

“There are still some fine details to be hammered out but with capabilities like the Joint Strike Fighter and the changes in strategic direction with increasing cyber attacks etc, this is a great step forward,” he commented, but without disclosing schedule or structure.

“We’re going to start to see some of those synergies that we talk about and the convergence of capabilities across that whole C4ISREW (Command and Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and EW) spectrum.”

AVM Hart described JCC as the bridge between the warfighter on one axis and capability developers on the other axis; alternatively, as the bridge between the grand strategy in White Papers and the tactics and doctrine that are developed somewhere in the middle.

“My aim is to get the warfighting concepts out ahead of the requirements rather than the requirements and the equipment turning up and us then trying to work out what in the hell we’re going to do with it,” he commented. “My team spends a lot of time between the services, between the various (defence) groups, and with our allies, doing joint and combined work to make sure we’ve got some sort of coherence in the joint capabilities that are being delivered.”

The same role was being undertaken by the cyber coordination office established within VCDF group in January, he added.

A continuing relationship with industry was vital, not just because of the concepts and technologies emerging from there, but also to ensure Defence could provide some sort of influence as those capabilities were being developed.

Given concerns within industry on the future of the domestic EW sector, the wrapup of current and future EW activity within Defence by Geoffrey Cropper, Director of the DMO’s Tactical EW Systems Program Office, was the subject of careful if not overly enthusiastic attention.

Standing in for Mark Devlin, Director of the EW Warfare Branch, Cropper said EW sustainment expenditure in the current year would be about $60 million. This was pretty much where it would stay in the future, given that “the business end” of efficiency targets set under the Strategic Reform Program was approaching and operational support spending would decline in line with operational tempo.

Some 26 major projects involved in upgrading and enhancing ADF EW capabilities were currently approved under a 2002-2012 program budgeted at $1.5 billion, of which about $400 million was still to be spent, Cropper said.

An additional 31 proposed new EW projects were identified in the 2009-2019 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) although the majority were classified and therefore not in the public version of the DCP. Five had received first pass approval and the overall budget for the 31 was $1.7 billion, of which $1.1 billion would be spent over the next five years.

“That’s quite a significant increase in expenditure planned. The takeaway there is the amount of money that is being put into the land and maritime environments due to some of the remediation work that clearly been fast-tracked; also the amount of money that is proposed to be spent in the joint area,” Cropper commented, without giving details.

Although it was very early in the project life cycles, the Australian industry content – not necessarily all EW-specific - over the next five years was expected to total about 38 per cent, worth about $400 million.

Briefings to industry had been provided on both classified and unclassified projects through the Australian Defence Information and Electronics Systems Association (ADIESA), and a recent decision meant DMO would lead industry engagement on procurement activities associated with pre-second pass projects.

Future business opportunities could be expected to arise from the convergence of technologies. One example was the Joint Strike Fighter and how its EW capabilities could be networked into the larger EW picture. Another was the common topside in the maritime area – common antennas and apertures for both communications and EW.

Australia had not done well in the past on common architecture within the EW area on major platforms – either EW hotel services or systems with common EW interfaces – and this, together with the real time, machine-to-machine networking of sensors, were areas which would be receiving future attention, Cropper said.

Future challenges included understanding EW in unmanned operations, the likelihood of an increased workload in DMO having to be set against manning constraints, and the retention of EW skills.

The need for a shake-up in EW education and training within Defence, from introduction into service training through to senior leadership awareness, was acknowledged by Group Captain Wayne Johnson, Special Projects Officer in JCC.

Initial training resulting from a review begun late in 2009 was likely to begin later this year, drawing heavily on industry. The bulk of the curriculum would be available by mid-2013.

The training will revolve around four themes: EW awareness training at a very basic level for all Defence members; EW general knowledge and subject matter expert training for personnel in operational and tactical level units that have EW as part of their roles; technical officer training, in the main for service’ headquarters, DSTO, DMO and CDG; and awareness training for senior leadership.

Each senior awareness session will draw from classified EW intelligence briefs and be focused on strengths and weaknesses in EW capabilities for both the ADF and credible adversaries, Gp Capt Johnson said.

For Kim Scott, Director, Land and Integrated Systems at BAES Australia, EW work for Australian industry had gone through peaks and troughs, visibility of forward needs was sporadic, and real industry consultation was minimal.

“Unlike other nations lie the US and the UK, industry has never truly been embraced or properly utilised in the EW community,” he commented. “Significantly increasing the number of industry staff in JEWOSU (Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Unit) is an activity largely unblemished by success.”

Scott said building a competent group of experienced EW engineers had taken BAES about 10 years from graduation. However, of more than 480 staff engaged in EW programs in mid-2009, as of mid-April this year around 100 remained and this would probably fall to less than 50 by December.

Lessons learnt from the EW experience could nevertheless be applied to Australia’s cyber security future, particularly since investment in combating the cyber threat in the defence environment would also have significant benefits for the commercial sector.

While the cyber security strategy released in 2009 clearly identified the lead roles played by the Attorney-General’s Department, the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the Computer Emergency Response Team, it did not take a view on what capabilities should reside in industry. Given the borderless nature of cyber, solutions needed to be applicable at a global level and were unlikely to be specific to Australian requirements, Scott noted.

“With the majority of cyber attacks coming from offshore, the response to the cyber threat must be 24/7,” he said. “This presents a unique opportunity to industry as we can provide ‘follow the sun’ capability with our overseas partners.”

According to Dr Gary Waters, Head of Strategy at Jacobs Australia, in defending cyberspace the military will need to conduct active and passive operations including defensive measures designed to destroy attacking adversary forces or reduce their effectiveness.

But it must also be able to conduct offensive cyber operations “to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, deceive, or exploit an adversary”.

“Offensive cyber operations would ensure friendly freedom of action in cyberspace while denying that same freedom to adversaries. This means the military must have the capability to attack or interdict an adversary’s electronic systems, electromagnetic systems, networks, and infrastructure,” Dr Waters said. “Targets would include the adversary’s terrestrial, airborne and space networks, electronic attack and network attack systems, and the adversary itself.”

Establishing decoys within their own networks would enable friendly cyber forces to learn the type of information being sought by particular adversaries and the techniques being used to undermine security protocols.

Once inside adversaries’ networks, the military could leverage ‘cyber-ISR ‘ operations to conduct actual intelligence gathering and preparation of the battlespace, Dr Waters added.

Meanwhile Australia needed to address three imperatives for operating effectively in cyberspace – develop a more comprehensive approach to military operations in cyberspace, centralise command of cyber operations, and enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments.