British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has announced the largest increase in British military funding in 30 years, but questions remain over Britain’s future in the Indo-Pacific region.
In a speech to the House of Commons last week, Johnson set out a £16.5 billion increase above the manifesto commitment over four years. That manifesto commitment was an increase to defence spending by 0.5 per cent above inflation for every year of the current parliament, which represents an overall cash increase of £24.1 billion over four years compared to last year’s budget (on current forecasts).
“I have taken this decision in the teeth of the pandemic because the defence of the realm must come first,” PM Johnson said. “The international situation is more perilous and more intensely competitive than at any time since the Cold War and Britain must be true to our history and stand alongside our allies. To achieve this we need to upgrade our capabilities across the board.”
Johnson also announced a new agency dedicated to Artificial Intelligence (AI), the creation of a National Cyber Force, and a new Space Command, capable of launching its first rocket in 2022. The British government says this is supported by a record investment of at least £1.5 billion extra and £5.8 billion total on military research and development, and a commitment to invest further in the Future Combat Air System.
The funding increase also means the UK will confirm its Type 26 and Type 31 frigate orders, commit to the Type 32, build two multi-role research vessels and construct fleet solid support ships to supply its Carrier Strike Group.
“Our extra defence spending will restore Britain’s position as the foremost naval power in Europe,” PM Johnson said.
The announcement comes ahead of a possible deployment of a British carrier strike group to Asia next year, which would be the largest British naval force assembled in a long time.
A recent report prepared by British politicians for a think tank is placing pressure on London to allocate more resources to countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. The report was overseen by former Canadian PM Stephen Harper and is endorsed by former Japanese leader Shinzo Abe. Prime Minister Scott Morrison is also understood to be supportive.
However, there are questions around the extent of Britain’s capacity to shape and contribute to the democratic coalition of countries acting as a counter-weight to China in the Indo-Pacific.
The main question, of course, is Brexit. It is difficult for Britain to argue the case for free trade when it is voluntarily leaving the world’s largest single market.
The economic cost of Brexit also looms, which some have said will be more severe than the effect of the pandemic. Will a post-Brexit Britain be more strategically influential in the Indo-Pacific then, say, France? Paris has sent nuclear carrier groups to the Pacific and is rapidly expanding its military and intelligence ties with Australia.
The second question is the future of Diego Garcia, a disputed Indian Ocean territory that underpins much of Britain’s power in the Indo-Pacific. The territory is leased to the US for a strategically-vital military base.
The territory was taken from Mauritius before independence, and Mauritius is now finding diplomatic success in its effort to regain sovereignty. This year, the UN General Assembly voted in an overwhelming majority on a deadline for Britain to return the islands. That deadline passed this week without a response from London. Australia was one of only six countries that voted against the motion.
Crucially, India supports Mauritius in the dispute (although it also quietly supports the US military base), which puts Britain in a diplomatic bind: India will be central to any British effort to be more relevant in the Indo-Pacific.
The final question is Russia, which is becoming more active across the North Sea. ADM understands that Russian submarines regularly operate in western British coastal waters, perhaps mapping key communications cables, and London was forced to borrow NATO aircraft to monitor them until the arrival of Britain’s first P-8A Poseidon earlier this year. What capacity does Britain have to shape the Indo-Pacific if it struggles to keep tabs on Russian submarines in its own backyard?
In short, Johnson’s commitment to expand British military spending will certainly be welcomed in our region. But whether that spending makes London a more attractive partner than Paris, let alone New Delhi or Tokyo, remains an open question.