EW: Old Crows 2010 - self reliance the key | ADM May 2010
However, much of the debate focussed on national self-reliance in the Electronic Warfare (EW) sector, what it actually is and how it should be sustained.
Gregor Ferguson | Sydney
Delegates at this year's Association of Old Crows (AOC) convention had hoped for a Federal Government announcement before the Convention on which firm would build the EW system for the Navy's Hobart-class destroyers, and potentially also its LHDs and Anzac frigates.
The long-awaited announcement came the day after the Convention closed, with ITT selected in preference to Spanish firm Indra, teamed with BAE Systems Australia.
The timing was fortuitous: at the Convention BAE Systems Australia chief Jim McDowell made a powerful speech warning of the consequences to the ADF of Defence industry policies which (deliberately or disinterestedly) weaken the design, Test & Evaluation and manufacturing capabilities of Australia's EW industry.
McDowell's comments were made in ignorance of the AWD outcome and can't be interpreted as sour grapes - he was speaking for the industry as a whole, and the principles in question apply to varying degrees right across the industry, not just to the EW sector.
One of the key issues to emerge from the Convention was the significant difference in views within and between Defence and Industry over the level of indigenous capability required of the local EW industry and therefore the policy, market and demand management measures required to sustain a credible, sovereign EW industry base - a Priority Industry Capability (PIC) - in-country.
The scene was set by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, LTGEN David Hurley, in his keynote speech to the Convention.
The 2009 Defence White Paper states that Information Superiority (including EW) is a key ADF capability, he noted; unfortunately, he added, the report card for EW capability management in Australia isn't a good one.
Defence-wide coordination of EW has been lacking for many years, he said, a problem not confined to the ADF; this is partly due to the complexity of, and the inter-relationships between, Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Surveillance (ES) and the cyber domain; and partly due to the embedding of EW capabilities in major capital equipment projects.
The ADF's EW remediation plan and concurrent EW capability development strategy will be shaped by the Strategic Reform Program (SRP) which will result, he warned, in much of the ADF's future EW capability being acquired on a MOTS basis.
His message was reinforced by CAPT Jeff Goedecke, Director of Navy's Project Phoenix, which was set up in 2007 to remediate the RAN's declining EW capability and establish the measures necessary to ensure a long-term warfighting capability.
He pointed to the US Navy's recently established Information Dominance Corps, headed by a three-star admiral, which embraces intelligence, network management, communications, EW, cyberspace and space and unmanned systems, as a model for Australia's Naval Communications and Information Warfare (NCIW) Directorate.
The DG NCIW is now directly responsible to the Deputy Chief of Navy for EW capability policy and wider stakeholder collaboration in Navy EW is replacing the former dysfunctional stove piped approach, he said.
For example a new Maritime EW SPO within DMO's Electronic Systems Division will be responsible for all EW sustainment, rather than individual platform SPOs which need to juggle competing priorities within a constrained budget.
This will help accumulate and retain corporate and domain knowledge in this vital area.
Similarly, Project Phoenix has placed increased emphasis on operator and analyst training and the development of a specialist cadre of EW personnel.
"EW systems in major warships have traditionally been federated wideband systems optimized for ASMD," he told delegates.
"The dilemma for Navy is that these federated systems have long procurement lead times and then undergo a highly complex installation and integration process into the combat management system and other ship systems.
"The equipment then generally stays in the platform until a major electronic upgrade is undertaken, such as the Anzac class ASMD upgrade, which will commence shortly.
"We then have effectively outdated technology, in a rapidly changing environment which is particularly difficult to upgrade.
"Our challenge is to be able to adapt quickly to emerging threats and new technologies.
"We need EW systems with flexibility, scalability and capacity to upgrade."
This represents an opportunity for the Australian EW industry, Goedecke said, but relies on the adoption of Open Architecture (OA) - well beyond the level of common standards and interfaces - in order to field truly upgradeable systems.
"Our only options at present for "P3I" is to augment these federated systems with stand alone, non-integrated capability which relies strongly on operator expertise to use the information tactically."
Citing the 2009 Defence White Paper's statement on self-reliance - the ADF must have the capacity to act independently where we have unique strategic interests at stake and in relation to which we would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power - Goedecke emphasised local industry's essential role in developing critical niche capabilities: "EW is an important indigenous capability and not one we can afford to rely upon solely from overseas."
This sentiment was echoed by BAE Systems Australia's chief, Jim McDowell, who spoke for the industry as a whole though BAE Systems, as the largest company in the industry, has most to lose from a down-turn in EW work.
His view that sustainment work alone will not sustain the necessary skills for self-reliance is shared by Dr Jackie Craig, Chief of DSTO's EW and Radar Division, who stated the following day during her presentation on Technology Transition: "To have a truly sovereign EW capability requires an industry component.
"Without this even an intellectual capability is compromised as there is significant intellectual endeavour and content in transitioning something from a concept demonstrator to a real system - we cannot afford to lose our handle on this aspect of Science, Technology and engineering."
In an earlier presentation Dr Craig had summarised the technology dimension to the EW threat: there had been rapid growth in a large range of EW-related technologies, not just in one specific area; this growth had been exponential, not linear; and weight, size cost and power demands had all come down quickly, she noted.
On device size, for example, the linear dimensions of device size had shrunk each decade by a factor of around 5.6, while growth in fibre laser average power output was now advancing at a rate approaching that of Moore's Law.
The result, she said, is there are more Electro Magnetic (EM) domain users.
The challenge for the EW community is to ensure that "opportunity growth outweighs threat growth," she said.
Part of the key to opportunity growth is technology transition, which Craig describes as the most critical EW issue.
A rapidly evolving EW threat doesn't always allow defence forces and industry years or even months to develop and field EW solutions.
Rapid technology advances demand a balance between COTS uptake and developmental programs, and a more rapid transition cycle: getting the balance wrong could compromise the ‘fitness for purpose' of some EW systems almost from the day they enter service.
Technology transition models need to be revised, with a shorter and cheaper path from the laboratory to the frontline user, Craig said.
Echoing CAPT Goedecke, she said one way to achieve this is to ensure that the EW equipment acquired by the ADF in future is built on an OA in order to allow rapid technology insertions and upgrades.
ITT is It for AWD
The Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance has selected ITT-EDO Reconnaissance and Surveillance Systems, Inc as the preferred supplier for the EW system for the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs).
The announcement, by defence materiel minister Greg Combet, was made the day after the Association of Old Crows convention closed in Adelaide.
The contract is expected to be worth some $30 million.
The ITT solution is based on the ITT ES-3701-02S Electronic Surveillance (ES) systems and the Southwest Research Institute MBS-567A comms ES system.
The ES-3701 ESM system is already in Australian service aboard the Collins-class submarines, Norway's Nansen-class Aegis frigates and is the basis of ITT's proposals for the Anzac and LHD EW contracts.
Combet's announcement made no mention of an Electronic Attack (EA) capability, but CAPT Jeff Goedecke, Director of the RAN's EW remediation program, Project Phoenix, told AOC delegates, "An onboard EA capability is a very capable effector ... and is a capability (apart from the Nulka Active missile decoy) that has been missing from the RAN inventory since the 1980s.
"EA has however been recognised as an essential capability for our new Air Warfare Destroyers so will be making a comeback to the RAN."
The ES-3701 aboard the submarines was supplied by EDO, which ITT acquired in 2007, and the extended system selected by the AWD Alliance incorporates additional Comms ESM and EA capabilities using the same architecture as on the Collins, but with extended frequency coverage.
The ITT solution provides the basis for a single common EW architecture for all of the RAN's fighting ships and submarines and, for the surface ships, identical passive antennas.
ITT is teamed with two Australian SMEs: Jenkins Engineering Defence Systems (JEDS), which will supply its own low band receiver, integrate it and conduct land-based testing of the complete system in Australia; and Ultra Electronics Avalon Systems who will supply an upgraded version of its own broadband multi-purpose digital receiver and integrate it with the ITT system.
The Avalon Systems receiver was developed under DSTO's Adonis program, while JEDS's low-band receiver has been developed under a Capability & Technology Demonstrator (CTD) contract awarded under Round 12 of the program.
This is close to completion and ITT has already made it an integral part of other maritime EW proposals to potential customers elsewhere.
"Jenkins Engineering will also install and test the equipment in the AWDs," according to Combet.
"This work will build upon their experience with the ITT equipment fitted to the Collins class submarines, extending their capability to support latest generation electronic warfare systems.
"This is a modern electronic warfare system that uses proven technology and delivers the right capability and value for money," he added.
"This strongly supports the Australian Government's objectives for Priority Industry Capabilities in the area of electronic warfare, by enhancing the knowledge and capability of local industry in this important area."
The ITT solution was selected in preference to the Rigel C-J Band ES/EA system and the Regulus Comms ES systems offered by Spanish firm Indra, in partnership with BAE Systems Australia.
Australia enhances threat warners
Australia is making a significant contribution to the development of two separate threat warner families, both of which are in service with the ADF.
Under the US-Australia Project Arrangement 2-08, DSTO is working with the US Navy and Raytheon on technology and performance enhancements for the AN/ALR-67(V)3 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR).
These include passive geolocation capability and SEI capabilities which the current system presently lacks.
The program has joint resourcing to address joint requirements, with joint ownership of the resulting IP.
There is an opportunity for a number of DSTO staff to be embedded at Raytheon, as well as for a concurrent R&D program examining next-generation WR technology.
DSTO says this opens up a potential pathway for the transition of DSTO technology and ideas into a US-sourced platform operated by the RAA, and could be a model for future collaborative efforts under Projects Air 6000 and Air 7000.
Concurrently, EADS Defence and Security working with DSTO's EWRD on enhancements to the AN/AAR-60 MILDS missile warning system which the ADF has ordered for its Black Hawk, Tiger ARH, MRH 90 and Chinook Helicopters as well as its AP-3C Orions.
In all, some 100 ADF aircraft are fitted with the AAR-60.
DSTO has undertaken a performance analysis of the AR-60 and identified potential performance improvements, according to EADS's Eric Wagenbauer.
He told the Convention these enhancements relate principally to the Object Classification function to prioritise inbound targets, and could be implemented via software algorithm upgrades.
One and a half years of collaborative effort has resulted in a new Version 3.x of MILDS software which bestows better declaration performance against a wider range of missiles, a lower false alarm rate in specific environments (including Afghanistan) and some special-to-Australia functionality.
"It's been a pleasure to find such a highly experienced and knowledgeable customer," Wagenbauer said.
"This hasn't always been the case."
The collaborative effort will continue, he added.
The ADF seeks further enhancements including a Hostile Fire Indicator (HFI) function.
This will help detect small arms fire and RPG launches and will be incorporated into a future MILDS Block II sensor currently under development which employs more advanced internals developed for the fast-jet variant, MILDS-F.
Australian jammer on APG-81
It's not widely known that DSTO's EW & Radar Division (EWRD) at Edinburgh, SA, has been working with Northrop Grumman on Electronic Attack (EA) aspects of the AN/APG-81 radar for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Details of the program and recent trials have been held very closely but EWRD Chief Dr Jackie Craig disclosed at the AOC Convention that the company had tested the radar fitted with an Australian-designed jammer.
Craig's Technology Transition presentation included a carefully worded statement: "Australia recently completed a test campaign with Northrop Grumman in which they tested the JSF's APG-81 radar with an Australian designed DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory) jammer.
"Australia brings a wealth of EA and testing experience along with a broader world view of effective jamming techniques.
"This event was an excellent example of ‘reverse' technology transfer benefiting the US and all partner countries.
"The test campaign was very successful, with the radar performing extremely well.
"Australia is continuing to work closely with the JPO (Joint Project Office), Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to further enhance the Joint Strike Fighter."
Further details of this program are unavailable.
The APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) sensor is understood to have an in-built jamming capability, but it hasn't been disclosed whether this includes the Australian-developed DRFM jammer.
It's also not clear whether the DRFM jammer was tested in flight aboard Lockheed Martin's CATBird avionics test bed for the F-35, or aboard Northrop Grumman's own BAC-111 avionics test bed.
The first full mission system-equipped F-35, a STOVL B-model, has just entered the flight test program.