Land Force: Project Land 400 awaiting the next step (Part 2) | ADM Mar 2011
Market forces
What elements of the project present the greatest risk, and who is best placed to manage and mitigate that risk? While actually choosing a vehicle may not be easy, the vehicle itself is unlikely to be the seat of serious risk – particularly if a MOTS solution is adopted. There are plenty of good platforms to choose from, backed up by combat experience and a proven service record.
That said, as BAE Systems’ Kim Scott told ADM, “the Australian Army operates differently to the British Army, US Army and USMC. Hence the requirements for Land 400 are likely to be different to FRES and GCV, particularly in the areas of legacy equipment, operational infrastructure, support regime and force composition.”
Nevertheless, it’s impossible to rule out some sort of collaborative arrangement with either the UK (following the recent AUKMIN talks) or the US whereby Australia might become a partner in elements of the GCV or FRES programs. This could be an echo of Australia’s involvement in the US Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, and also in other projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter and P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft: Australia pays a ‘joining fee’ to become a program partner and supports the design, test and development programs at some appropriate level.
However, in making this early financial commitment Defence might leave itself open to charges it has shut other non-GCV/FRES players out of the program. So as well as paying a significant dollar sum to be part of such a program it may have to conduct a parallel market solicitation process (as it has for Land 121 Ph.4) and then make a final source selection which could see Defence abandoning several tens of millions of dollars worth of investment in the early stages of the US program.
But this is exactly what might happen: the GCV may not be what the Army needs; or it may meet only part of the Army’s needs, necessitating a split buy with a fleet of GCVs augmented by a separate vehicle such as a lighter cavalry platform supplied by a different prime contractor.
Deciding exactly what the Land 400 portfolio of capabilities should be and then choosing a contractor to deliver them probably represents the greatest project risk. It has be said that Defence’s own track record in developing and delivering military vehicle projects isn’t exactly stellar: Project Waler, the M113 upgrade, Project Mulgara, Project Bushranger and Project Land 121 have all been blighted at various times by poor (and always, it seems, interminably slow) requirements development and poor project management. Industry has compounded the damage in those projects which got into contract by under-performing, which undermines the case put forward by local companies for significant Australian industry involvement.
The only recent projects which seem to have gone well have been the Abrams tank and ASLAV projects, both of which were sole source MOTS purchases (although the latter was lightly ‘Australianised’ in-country). And even the latter phases of the ASLAV project seem to have been delayed by internal issues within the DMO rather than by any significant technical or contractual difficulties.
Industry sources believe Army has to decide promptly what it actually needs, develop an Operational Concept Document (OCD), operational requirement and specification for the Land 400 capability, and then stick to it. And if Defence lacks the modelling capabilities required to assess the trade-offs between things like tracks and wheels or protection and mobility in a theatre such as Afghanistan or a mountainous jungle closer to home, there are other proven models and battlelabs elsewhere which can help.
A latent ‘block obsolescence’ outlook within Defence might not help much either, according to one industry source: this would dictate that existing vehicle fleets need to be replaced on masse and the replacements kept in service for another 30 years. However, this makes for a complex requirements definition and acquisition process and results in a bow-wave of expenditure when the fleet reaches the end of its service life.
A spiral development and acquisition process which seeks to acquire new capability in smaller increments, guided by emerging operational and technical issues, would represent a more measured approach. This needn’t result in a proliferation of vehicles types and would certainly eliminate the need for a massive capital investment. It would probably result in a constantly updated suite of mission systems as needs and technology evolve – rather like the Army’s Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS), supplied incrementally by Saab Systems under Land 75. It would also leave a role for legacy vehicles for which an upgrade may be more cost-effective than total replacement, thus saving a bit more money.
A single prime systems integrator with (or with access to) the requisite vehicle and NCW smarts should be able to manage such a system - and, just as important, honour the intent of the SRP by capturing logistics and maintenance savings, so long as Defence considers the in-service support as an integral part of the initial acquisition program.
Assuming a MOTS vehicle is the platform of choice, this could be imported complete or assembled locally; in any case some sort of Mission Role Integration Kit (MRIK) will be required to configure it to meet the ADF’s requirements, as was the case with the ASLAV. The MRIK will likely include features such as spall liners, C4I systems, vetronics, harnesses, cabling and interfaces for a variety of mission systems including sensors, radios, ruggedised servers, UAV/UGV control stations and soldier combat systems.
Defence’s worst case scenario would be a replication of the current situation where three different vehicle families are on three separate development trajectories supported by three different prime contractors with little or no technical, training or logistics synergy between them.
The simplest solution would be a single, multi-purpose vehicle filling both cavalry and combat roles, built and supported by a single prime contractor who is responsible for developing and supporting the MRIKs and for supporting the vehicles in-service.
The likely solution will probably lie somewhere in the middle. If two vehicle families are required it would still make sense to have a common logistics and configuration management system headed by a single prime contractor.
However, a single-platform solution amounting to as much as 1,000 vehicles would provide scope for a significant amount of indigenous design and construction – a 1,000-vehicle program is large by world standards and in most countries would justify at least serious consideration of an indigenous solution.
Thales Australia is well aware of this, and also of Defence’s risk-aversion which might result in a default preference for a MOTS rather than a local developmental solution in Phases 3 and 4 of Land 121. If that is indeed the case Thales might seek to partner with an overseas vehicle provider and act as a local prime systems integrator rather than a designer/manufacturer.
The majority of contenders for Land 400 are offering a mix of existing platforms, some of them still not quite in frontline service. What Rheinmetall MAN, GD Land Systems Australia and BAE Systems also have in common, aside from a range of existing vehicle solutions, are the capabilities and capacity to develop and integrate an MRIK in-country, carry out final assembly and provide in-service support. They have either strong local systems integration capabilities or ‘reach back’ through a parent or partner to these capabilities.
‘High-end Systems Integration’ and ‘system of systems integration’ is a Priority Industry Capability (PIC), while the ‘Repair, maintenance and upgrading of armoured vehicles’ is a Strategic Industry Capability – that is, it has the potential to become a PIC. Land 400 represents an opportunity for Defence to make a strategic investment which will support and strengthen these industry capabilities.
As noted earlier the vehicles are in many ways the least important aspect of Land 400: the commercial and integration risks make the choice of prime contractor and the framing of the contract a far more important determinant of project success. Determining the criteria for a source selection process which delivers the right result will be a major challenge for Defence, and especially the DMO.