The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is likely to increase its role supporting the development of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) capabilities following the launch of New Zealand’s new defence policy.
NZ Minister of Defence Andrew Little, released three documents on 4 August: a new National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defence Policy Strategic Statement (DPSS) and the NZDF Future Force Design Principles (FFDP).
The NSS outlines the wider security challenges New Zealand faces, whilst the latter two are the initial parts a wider defence review that will be completed by 2025. The DPSS focuses on the strategic challenges for defence and the FFDP provides a framework for NZDF reforms.
“Australia is New Zealand’s most critical defence and security partner and our only formal ally,” the DPSS states. But Australia is likely to become an even more critical partner in the coming years – the NSS called Australia “indispensable to New Zealand’s national security.”
The DPSS calls for the NZDF to become “a credible combat-capable, deployable military force able to operate across the spectrum of operations.” However, the FFDP is scathing in its assessment that the NZDF is “designed for a relatively benign strategic environment, and not the challenges of increased strategic competition and the adverse effects of climate change.” It added that the NZDF “is not in a fit state to respond to future challenges.”
The NSS security outlook focussed on intersection of three main challenges: strategic competition and a rules-based international system under pressure, particularly from China; transboundary challenges, such as disinformation, crime, espionage, emerging tech, maritime security; and challenges to democracy from populist movements, inequality and lack of trust in government.
“I welcome these documents because they show the defence and security policies being taken much more seriously than it was in the past. There is a recognition – albeit belated – that we're not immune from trends which affect other countries. And that a number of security problems don't recognize borders, including climate change,” Professor Robert Patman, Professor of International Relations at the University of Otago told ADM.
“We depend on an international rules-based system, not because we're strong, but because we're relatively weak. And that rules are there for the weak, not the strong.”
As a way of responding to the challenges, the NSS calls for more intelligence-led prevention intervention to shape and influence activities and the DPSS calls for a more pro-active approach.
But only through an increasing closeness with Australia will the NZDF be able to achieve the combat-capable service that is needed to play its role in meeting the threats the defence documents have identified. Under the new NSS and DPSS, Australia’s defence activities will be “part of an overall, deliberate coordinated bilateral approach” to promoting shared security interests in region and beyond, the DPSS stated.
In partnership with Australia, New Zealand will pursue opportunities to update and expand defence cooperation and combined effectiveness, the DPSS explained: “This will include better coordination on defence policy development, increasing personnel exchanges, strengthening joint operational capabilities, and enhancing planning for combined responses to regional events.”
This language is similar to that used in the NZ Army and Australian Army’s Bilateral Service Cooperation Plan (BSCP) – also known as Plan ANZAC – that will increase integration between the two forces. It will see the NZ Army adopt the Australian Army’s structures, doctrine and training in an attempt to regenerate its capabilities and readiness levels after Covid-19 and eventually become interchangeable.
It looks as if the DPSS is approving a service-wide expansion of the Plan ANZAC principles that could see the start of more in-depth cooperation between the two countries navies and air forces, similar to the armies. The result could impact procurement projects as NZDF platforms will need to be able to integrate with their Australian counterparts.
“I think we could see a ramping up of the relationship between the two navies,” Dr Peter Greener, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies in Victoria University of Wellington told ADM.
He said that the recently upgraded RNZN frigate, HMNZS Te Mana, doing a work-up in the East Australian Exercise Area prior to being signed off prior to being combat capable. “They are using long-range weapons facilities in Australia that the RNZN does not have access to in New Zealand,” Greener explained, “They’ll be test firing the new SeaCeptor missile – the first time a missile has been fired [by the RNZN] in at least 10 years – and we will be doing that with Royal Australian Navy (RAN) personnel on board.”
Greener added that the RNZN-RAN relationship will be really important in terms of future development of RNZN capability and platforms. “How does it work for NZ, but how will it fit and provide and that will fit and work alongside Australia?” he asked.
Both the RNZAF and RAAF already operate the same maritime patrol aircraft (P-8A) and tactical transport aircraft (C-130J-30). The NZ Army has recently started taking delivery of Australian-made Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles. Meanwhile, Exercise Talisman Sabre 2023 in July-August saw the NZ Army deploy a 150-strong combat team within an allied battlegroup.
The NZDF stated that its liaison officers in headquarters “learned about Australian process and procedures, as well as assisting the Australians with planning and their understanding of New Zealand capabilities.”
“The exercise confirmed the NZ Army’s readiness to conduct combat operations and to test interoperability with the Australians and others, as well as the integration of signals, intelligence, infantry, armour and others,” it added.
However, the development of a combat-capable force this will only happen over the long-term. The next part of New Zealand’s defence review expected in mid-2024 is the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) that will identify the NZDF’s equipment requirements and funding for the coming 10-15 years. So, whilst the threats are identified, the NZDF will not be optimised to respond to them to around a decade.
“The reality is there is a lead time in getting new equipment,” Andrew Little told ADM, “That's why it's important we get on with the DCP, so that we can make the longer-term investment decisions over the next couple of years. In the meantime, we upgrade what we've got, we have to make it fit for purposes that we need to fulfil at the moment.”
“We need to be spending more as a country on defence and national security, because if we're going to have a voice on international issues that matter to us, we must be able to walk the walk, we must be able to contribute,” Robert Patman added.
However, Little admitted that spending increases could be at least two or three budgets away. The NSS advocates a concerted effort to engage with the New Zealand public on national security issues as one of its main initiatives. A wider public understanding of the threats will be essential to secure acceptance for an increase in the defence budget.
“This is a test of domestic public opinion,” Patman said, “Until recently there seems to have been a bipartisan consensus that we shouldn't spend more than one per cent of GDP on security and defence - these documents are challenging that.”
Little told reporters that he expects defence spending to rise as a consequence of the DCP, but added “it won't be two per cent”, which is the level that Australia or European NATO countries are aiming for.
The main focus area for New Zealand is the Pacific region and the new defence documents reinforce the Pacific Reset strategy that was announced in 2018. Climate change is the “single greatest threat to security and well-being of the Pacific”, the DPSS states. But it also highlights other threats including the potential for the establishment of permanent military bases in the region and the possibility of coercion or malign influence on the island nations as a result of their vulnerability to climate change.
“[New Zealand’s] intent in the Pacific focus is that it will be carried through in a way that it hasn’t done previously,” Greener said, “I think New Zealand is guilty of having taken Pacific Island neighbours for granted in many ways. We haven't always maintained people when they've been in place. I do think that needs to happen.”
The DPSS calls for improved information sharing between NZ and the Pacific Islands and the creation of a Common Operational Picture to integrate data. This will go some way to help provide New Zealand with better understanding, the ability to build resilience and to take action.
Greener said that New Zealand’s involvement providing support for Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions in the Pacific when a disaster happens is welcome. But he added that New Zealand needs to be seen to be doing more to reduce its carbon footprint as something “politically would be appreciated by the islands.”