As ADM reported last week, the Department of Defence has pulled a backflip on its decision to cancel JP 9102.
In less than eight months, the Department has gone from cancelling the program to returning to industry with a new request for information (RFI).
JP 9102 intended to provide Australia with access to a sovereign satellite communications system across the wideband (X band and Ka band) and narrowband (UHF) frequences. Currently, the ADF accesses the two wideband frequencies through the US Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) system, and narrowband UHF through the Intelsat 22 satellite over the Indian Ocean.
The Optus C-1 satellite also provides some capability across all three bands, but that satellite is old and its capacity is degraded.
But JP 9102 was cancelled in November last year. The reason, according to Defence, was that a single orbit geostationary satellite communication system was too vulnerable.
“With the acceleration in space technologies and evolving threats in space since the project’s commencement, Defence has assessed that a single orbit GEO-based satellite communications system would not meet strategic priorities," Defence said at the time.
"Instead of a single orbit solution, Defence must instead prioritise a multi-orbit capability."
Many would argue this assessment from Defence is unfair on industry, which met the requirements of the original tender with a secure, reliable satcoms system just eight months ago.
According to publicly available documentation, Lockheed Martin spent over $300 million on JP 9102 before it was cancelled – let alone the investments made by the supply chain across Australia. Many of those small businesses committed substantial money and time.
For its part, Defence spent $102 million of taxpayer money on JP 9102, only to publicly conclude that the fundamental single-orbit design of the program was too vulnerable.
Why did Defence not reach that conclusion far earlier? Analysts have known for years that Russia and China use several tools to interfere with geostationary comms satellites, including proximity operations.
Of course, Defence has the prerogative to change its mind on capability acquisitions as the threat picture evolves. But the threat to single orbit satellites had been obvious for a long time. This news did not arrive overnight.
What’s more, ADM understands that the threat to geostationary satellites – an orbit that is closely monitored, with long sight lines and warning times for adversary operations – are not nearly as great (relative to low-earth orbit satellites) as many believe.
So what is the real reason behind the cancellation of JP 9102?
The new RFI holds some clues. In the new documentation for JP 9102 – now officially called SPA 9102 – Defence says it is seeking information “in relation to addressing the narrowband SATCOM component only to complement Defence’s current understanding of industry capabilities.”
So the scope has been reduced to just one narrowband frequency with no wideband at all. In other words, JP 9102 was likely cancelled due to budget cuts.
And with only First Pass approval for the new descoped program, there is no guarantee it will proceed.
If so, JP 9102 now joins a growing list of major Australian defence programs that have been cancelled or rescoped following the announcement of AUKUS and the Defence Strategic Review. Amongst the largest are Land 400 Phase 3, which dropped from 450 vehicles to 129; a second regiment of self-propelled howitzers; and the OPVs, which were cut from 12 to 6. ADM understands job losses at Henderson are now in the hundreds as uncertainty pushes shipworkers into the oil and gas sector.
Meanwhile, minehunting ships have been decommissioned without replacement; both the RAN’s oilers are out of service; the Collins submarine life-of-type extension has been descoped; and Navy’s urgent sustainment budget is $200 million short over two years, with both LHDs experiencing total power failures on deployment. The money is running out fast.
As Marcus Hellyer reported in ADM in May, the only new money in the Defence budget has been allocated to AUKUS and the general purpose frigate program – and only one per cent of that funding was allocated in the 2024-2025 financial year. A further nine percent is in the last four years of the forward estimates, and the rest is so far in the future that it’s virtually imaginary.
The SSNs will use up $3.9 billion in 2025-2026, growing to $10 billion by 2033-34; for perspective, that equals the combined Army and Air Force budget, and this year exceeds the RAAF’s entire capital budget.
The funding pressure is growing and something has to give. LHD sustainment was yesterday’s headline; JP 9102 is today’s. What will be tomorrow’s?