Bolstering deterrence through acquiring long range submarines, transferring technology to like-minded countries, and defence industry reforms were among the key recommendations of the Japan Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) “Fundamental Strengthening of Defence Capability” report, which was released last Friday (September 19).
Compiled by experts including economists and business leaders, the report cited evolving security threats posed by Beijing’s rise, and increasing strategic alignment between China, Russia and North Korea, as key factors behind Japan’s need for radical defence reforms. In total it presented six wide-scoping recommendations spanning force posture, defence diplomacy and defence industry ecology.
Readjusting force posture
One of the report’s most high-profile recommendations was a call for strengthening deterrence through potent counter-strike capabilities, including vertical launch system (VLS)-equipped long range submarines equipped.
Those specifications have fuelled speculation in Japanese media of renewed interest in procuring nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) – a proposal formerly advocated by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership contender Sanae Takaichi, but which has faced persistent opposition among pacifist factions.
Other recommendations included altering the nation’s force structure not only on account of evolving threats, but also in response to Japan’s ongoing demographic decline. The report in particular called for further investment in digital transformation, cutting edge AI, and the “full fledged introduction of unmanned assets” to overcome chronic manpower shortages.
The plan to increase the utilisation of unmanned and autonomous assets was also cited as a factor behind the need to accelerate cross-domain integration, particularly in relation to cyber-security and space platforms.
Enhancing security partnerships
Another recurring theme in the report was an emphasis on strengthening defence partnerships both with Japan’s major ally, the United States, and other like-minded Indo-Pacific countries.
While the report reaffirmed the US-Japan alliance as the central pillar of the nation’s deterrence strategy, it emphasised the need for Japan to take greater initiative to reshape the two nation’s security partnership. Citing policy changes by the current US Trump administration, the report also recommended closely engaging with other Indo-Pacific partners to move towards building a regional autonomous defence capability, in the vein of current efforts by European NATO nations.
An additional high-profile recommendation in the report was a call to relax Japan’s strict rules against selling weapons to other countries, including completely dismantling restrictions in the case of some partners. In particular it emphasised that joint [technological] development and equipment transfer not only delivers economic benefits while strengthening the capabilities of these partners, but could potentially expand Japan’s munitions/defence supply chain options in the event of a conflict.
Reshaping Japan’s defence industry ecology
Yet perhaps the most radical components of the report were proposed defence industry policies which, if implemented, could see Tokyo radically reshape the nation’s defence industrial ecology.
One suggestion included mobilising additional state resources to expand defence industry capacity, including expanding responsibility for defence production from the exclusive purview of the MoD to multiple ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
The report similarly recommended strengthening engagement between the government and industry, to identifying products that should be manufactured domestically and reduce excessive economic dependency on the supply chains of certain foreign nations.
A greater role was also envisioned for publicly owned firms and public stakeholder investments, with the report suggesting that consideration be given to setting up public defence corporations and state run factories whose role could include enhancing the supply of equipment needed in times of emergencies.
A surprising addition to the report was the suggestion that there was no technology that is unrelated to defence, implying a wider scope for defence-related state incentives / policy to apply to civilian/commercial sectors. A particular focus was that more should be done to facilitate a two-way flow between civil and military sectors that goes beyond defence incorporating dual use/civilian grade equipment and includes repurposing defence technology for use in the civilian/commercial sphere. It proposed that such a repurposing could result in mass production of commercial parts that can be repurposed as [defence] equipment when the need arises, with the resultant compatibility, complementarity and reusability between military and commercial products facilitating a rapid shift to large scale defence production.
The paper in addition proposed that closer cooperation between the MoD, research institutes and smaller commercial firms could potentially foster the further development of Japan’s startup tech sector ecology and create a ‘virtous cycle’ between defence industry strengthening and broader economic growth – a factor that could potentially be used to help sustain support for larger future defence budgets.